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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents novel schemes and techniques to overcome the difficulties associated 
with the integration of distributed generation (DG) and microgrids in the context of existing short 
circuit characteristics and protection infrastructure adequacy. One such inadequacy is associated 
with the loss of coordination (LOC) in existing protection infrastructure, with disruption to an 
expected sequence between utility reclosers and fuses. This thesis aims to offer solutions to these 
issues, allowing for DG sources and microgrids to be integrated into utility distribution networks 
without significant effect on existing protection infrastructure. 
The integration of DG units into radial distribution networks can result in LOC between 
upstream reclosers and downstream fuses. To overcome this issue a novel reclosing scheme is 
proposed whereby a control unit, variable load bank and dedicated recloser are integrated at the 
point of common coupling (PCC) between the DG unit and the network. This scheme works by 
receiving a control signal from the distribution network head-end recloser via a communication 
channel to signal the detection of a fault. Post fault detection, in conjunction with the DG current 
exceeding pre-specified pick up levels, the control unit disconnects the DG unit from the 
network to a transfer impedance. This transfer allows the DG unit to continue to supply the 
transfer impedance at the pre-fault load sharing condition, without the requirement for a shut 
down. This causes the DG unit to maintain its pre-fault speed and frequency, resulting in a fast 
reconnection time once the system fault is cleared by the existing protection infrastructure. The 
scheme is also compared to another potential method, namely fault current limiters (FCLs). 
To address the possibility of communication failure in the novel reclosing scheme, a fault 
detection technique is proposed based on measurements of the rate of change of current output 
by DG sources. The rate of change of current (ROCOC) is measured over a specified time 
window to generate a fault detection signal when the ROCOC exceeds specified pickup values.  
A hybrid adaptive overcurrent and differential protection scheme is proposed to protect 
microgrids that operate in both grid and islanded modes. Differential relays are utilized for 
feeder backbones and buses while adaptive overcurrent relays are concurrently used for load 
points. The hybrid approach is to reduce both infrastructure upgrade requirements and setting 
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computation complexity, whilst also addressing the potential lack of coordination when differing 
protection mechanisms are merged. The proposed scheme is validated through multiple time-
domain simulations while the microgrid is in both grid and islanded modes of operation. 
A smart protection scheme is then proposed to predict and mitigate the short circuit 
contribution of a microgrid to a utility fault at a magnitude below the LOC limit. The scheme 
utilizes polynomial regression analysis (PRA) and particle swarm optimization (PSO) in 
conjunction with a directional element of a relay to allow for partial continual microgrid 
connection during utility faults. The directional element specifies the direction of short circuit 
current flow, only allowing the scheme’s operation when the microgrid current is flowing to the 
utility. The PRA and PSO utilize wind speed, irradiance and operating conditions of synchronous 
machine based (SM-based) generators to determine the short circuit contributions to utility faults 
from plants and units within the microgrid. The predictions are used to minimize generation 
source disconnection to reduce the microgrid short circuit contribution to below the LOC limit 
dictated by the utility network allowing for the original utility coordination to be maintained. 
Finally, a case study is offered to demonstrate the capacity of every approach to mitigate 
microgrid short circuit contributions while restoring pre-fault operating conditions shortly after 
fault clearance by utility protection infrastructure. In this thesis, all case studies have been 
conducted using realistic distribution network and microgrid designs and settings, ensuring the 
efficacy of the proposed approaches. Time-domain simulations are carried out on these test 
benchmark models within the EMTP-RV software environment for validation purposes. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1      Distributed Generation and Microgrids 
The development of renewable technology and ideological shifts has prompted a distinct 
increase in consumer energy demands, resulting in operational and behavioral changes in the 
electrical grid. Electrical utilities globally face the challenge of sourcing new methods and 
technologies to accommodate this increased demand. One method of increasing supply capacity 
is through employing distributed energy resources (DERs), also known as distributed generation 
(DG), whereby power is supplied locally to the load to reduce strain on existing sources [1].  
Since load centers are capable of installing local generation, the inclusion of DG sources 
has attracted increased attention from utilities and the public. In part this can be attributed to the 
fact that these DG sources (such as biogas generators, wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) 
panels) have the capability to generate grid quality power. This practice, although advantageous, 
introduces unique challenges. One such challenge is ameliorating undesired functionality 
changes in protective devices resulting from the DG unit’s capability to shift operational 
behaviors of the grid locally in existing infrastructure  [2]-[8].  
An interesting proposed solution that has emerged recently is the concept of the 
microgrid [3]-[10]. A microgrid can be expressed as a low or medium voltage network that 
contains a small cluster of local loads in conjunction with DG sources and storage devices [6]. 
Microgrids are capable of two modes of operation; grid connected and islanded [6]. Both are 
controllable to enable modification of operational characteristics. This close source generation by 
DGs in the microgrid context has numerous advantages, including transmission reduction loss 
and prevention of network congestion. Additionally, local DGs and controllable loads reduce the 
probability of supply interruption for end-of-line infrastructure, due to the capability of reversion 
to islanded operation of the microgrid during severe grid fault conditions [5]. 
It is typical for DERs to be classed as either traditional (diesel or gas fueled generators) 
or non-traditional (renewable energy generators). Generators such as low speed turbines, diesel 
engines and micro-turbines are some examples of traditional sources. It is common for micro-
turbines to be used, as they are efficient and have the capacity to operate using multiple fuel 
sources. In general, traditional generation sources are synchronous machine based [2].  
2 
 
Non-traditional DERs are typically used in reference to renewable energy sources or 
electrochemical devices such as fuel cells. The non-traditional sources that have been attracted 
the most attention are renewables such as wind turbines and PV panels [11]. Due to the 
introduction of green initiatives [12] and public demand, wind and solar PV generation have 
been increasingly employed for wide scale integration by governments and utilities.  
1.1.1     Interconnection of Distributed Resources 
Interconnection occurs when DERs are connected to the main network. In order for 
interconnection to occur, the scheme will require components such as a collector feeder and an 
inter-connecting transformer. This is depicted in Figure 1.1 [8]. 
 
Figure 1.1: A typical DG interconnecting scheme. 
Table 1.1: Advantages and disadvantages of interconnecting transformers. 
Low Voltage 
Side 
High Voltage 
Side 
Disadvantages Advantages 
Delta Delta 
Supplies network from 
ungrounded source even if 
utility breaker trips. 
Provides no fault current for a 
ground fault on the HV side 
of the transformer. Main 
network breakers will not 
react to ground faults on the 
LV side of the transformer. 
Ground-Wye Delta 
Delta Wye 
Delta Ground-Wye 
Provides an unwanted 
ground current for network 
faults. 
Main network breakers will 
not react to ground faults on 
the LV side of the 
transformer. No overvoltages 
for faults on main feeder. 
Ground-Wye Ground-Wye 
Allows main feeder relaying 
to respond to ground faults 
on the LV side. 
No overvoltages for ground 
faults on main feeder if the 
DG source is grounded. 
Collector Feeder 
∞ 
DG/Microgrid Source 
 
Interconnecting 
Transformer 
Utility Network 
G 
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An important component of interconnection is the transformer; however each type comes 
with advantages and disadvantages. Currently there are five connections that are most commonly 
used: the advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Table 1.1. 
There is no universal agreement amongst utilities about the most effective connection 
type [13], but a  range of utilities have specified preferences for DG interconnection in relation to 
DG size.  
SaskPower specifically has two regulations based on DG source size, namely smaller or 
greater than 100 kW in generating capacity [14]. For DG sources that contribute less than 100kW 
the utility side is required to be wye-grounded, with the DG/Microgrid side to be wye-grounded 
or wye-ungrounded. For a DG size greater than 100 kW SaskPower requires that the source not 
contribute to the ground current, to avoid affecting the main feeder ground protection 
coordination. For greater than 100 kW in size the interconnection transformer can be one of two 
connection types: 
• Delta on the utility side with a wye-ground connection on the LV side. 
• Wye-grounded on the utility side with a wye-grounded or wye-ungrounded 
connection on the LV side. For the wye-grounded connection the DG generator 
must be delta connected. 
1.2      Power System Protection 
Power system protection is defined as “the science, skill and art of applying and setting 
relays and/or fuses to provide maximum sensitivity to faults and undesirable conditions, but to 
avoid their operation on all permissible or tolerable conditions” [15] - [16]. Modern protection 
schemes attempt to remove only faulted sections from the network, while requiring the protective 
device closest to the short circuit to operate before devices that are further away [15]-[18].  
1.2.1     Protection Coordination of Radial Distribution Networks 
In a radial distribution network it is common for a recloser to be connected at the head-
end of a designated feeder to allow for attempts at temporary fault clearing. If a recloser operates 
but short circuit current is still flowing, the fuse will melt and remove the source of the fault 
from the network. This sequence is termed a ‘fuse saving scheme’ [17]. For successful 
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implementation of fuse saving schemes in distribution networks, both the minimum and 
maximum short circuit currents experienced by each component must be known in order to allow 
for protective device coordination. The head end recloser is required to be placed below the 
fuse’s minimum melting time (MMT) curve since it has a fast operating characteristic curve. In 
contrast, the slow operating characteristic curve of the head end recloser is placed above the 
fuse’s total clearing time (TCT) curve. This coordination ensures that the head end recloser will 
operate for a temporary fault before the fuse melts, allowing for an attempt at fault self-clearing. 
Increases in DG penetration on the network can result in downstream devices such as fuses, 
experiencing higher short circuit levels than upstream devices (reclosers). As a result of the 
alterations in short circuit behavior, there is potential that the efficacy of existing protection 
coordination will be compromised, yielding unexpected performance. This scheme can be 
depicted graphically via Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Typical characteristic curves for protection coordination in radial distribution 
networks. 
1.2.2     Directional Protection Coordination 
Directional relays are designed to operate for faults that are present in one direction only [17], 
and are necessary when fault current is multidirectional in nature. This type of protection is 
classified as ‘directional’ since operation is dependent on the relative direction of current 
compared to voltage.  
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In directional protection, the system voltage is always taken as the point of reference [17]. 
The operation of directional relays is best explained through examples. In Figure 1.3, B21 is 
required to operate for fault currents that are in the direction of bus two to bus one. The current 
flowing from bus two to bus one will lag the voltage at bus two by approximately 90 degrees; 
since transmission/distribution line characteristics are typically mostly reactive [19]. For fault 
currents that are in the direction from bus one to bus two, the current will lead the voltage at bus 
two by approximately 90 degrees. As depicted in Figure 1.3, B21 is required to trip for faults 
flowing from bus two to bus one and block the tripping mechanism for faults flowing from bus 
one to bus two. This operational concept can be explained diagrammatically as well 
mathematically and is depicted in Figure 1.4 and Equations 1.1 and 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.3: Sample system with a directional relay. 
 
 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 > 𝜃𝑜𝑝 > 𝜃max: 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 (1.1) 
 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝜃𝑜𝑝 < 𝜃max: 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 (1.2) 
 where θop is the phase angle of the current through the relay with respect to the polarizing 
phasor voltage (in this case V2LL). 
 
Figure 1.4: Sample directional relay operational characteristic. 
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For directional relays there are two important parameters that require determination: relay 
connection angle and relay characteristic angle. 
1.2.2.1     Relay Connection Angle 
The relay connection angle can be defined as the angle between the current applied to the 
relay and the phase voltage applied at system unity power factor [19]. 
When applying the polarizing voltage to the relay, two common connection methods are 
utilized: 30 degree and 90 degree connections [19]. For the 30 degree connection, the angle of 
phase A (ABC reference frame) is energized by the current of phase A and the line voltage VAC. 
Similarly, the angle of phase B is energized by the current of phase B and the line voltage VBA, 
and the angle of phase C is energized by the current of phase C and the line voltage VCB. This 
connection method is designed to develop maximum torque of the relay when the current and 
voltage are in phase, which occurs when the system phase angle is at 30 degrees. 
For the 90 degree connection, the angle of phase A (ABC reference frame) is energized by 
the current of phase A and the line voltage VBC. Similarly, the angle of phase B is energized by 
the current of phase B and the line voltage VCA, and the angle of phase C is energized by the 
current of phase C and the line voltage VAB. This connection method is designed to develop 
maximum torque of the relay when the current leads the voltage by 45 degrees. For all fault types, 
the phase angle of the connection method is well below 90 degrees; hence this connection will 
perform better in most circumstances [19]. The weakness of the 90 degree connection angle is it 
is not able to operate correctly for very small values of current and voltage delivered to the relay. 
1.2.2.2     Relay Characteristic Angle 
The relay characteristic angle (RCA) can be defined as the angle by which the current applied 
to the relay must be displaced from the polarizing voltage (line to line voltage) when applied to 
the relay to produce maximum operational sensitivity (digital) or maximum torque (induction) 
[19]. In Equations 1.1 and 1.2, the RCA is θmin. θmax is 180 degrees more than θmin. The standard 
relay connection angles and RCAs can be summarized as: 
• 90 degree connection with 30 degree (leading) RCA for plain feeders with the 
zero sequence source (e.g. delta (HV)/ Wye-grounded (LV) transformer 
connection). 
• 90 degree connection with 45 degree (leading) RCA for feeders with the zero 
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sequence source in front of the relay (e.g. transformer feeders). 
1.3      Microgrids 
Microgrids have the capability to operate in AC (AC microgrid) or DC (DC microgrid) 
systems [11]. In the case of AC microgrids, the network is connected to the utility through power 
transformers with directly-connected AC loads. For DC loads in the AC microgrid, power 
electronic inverters are required for network connection. DC microgrids have increasingly been 
considered for implementation [20] since they have several advantages: they do not require 
synchronization with the AC utility and are compatible with most DG source coupling interfaces, 
hence reduction of conversion losses.  
Although microgrids offer a feasible solution to the issue of integration of DGs, they also 
introduce challenges from a system operational perspective. In low voltage distribution level 
networks, protection systems are generically divided into protective zones in the network 
(overhead lines and cables) and in apparatus classification (buses, transformers, generators, 
loads.) [5]. Traditionally, distribution networks are designed on the basis of large fault currents 
with radial (unidirectional) characteristic power flow [3]. The introduction of DERs into 
standalone or microgrid contexts yields potential for degradation of this common characteristic, 
especially in older classical networks.  
 
Figure 1.5: A typical microgrid layout. 
One key operational constraint associated with microgrids is the requirement for internal 
protection infrastructure to have the capability for quick responses to both grid connected and 
microgrid faults. In the case where a grid fault occurs, the microgrid must not affect the utility 
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protection scheme so as to allow for reliable and efficient clearing. In the case of a microgrid 
fault, the smallest portion of the microgrid must be sectionalized to allow for continued normal 
operation [5]. A typical microgrid configuration is demonstrated in Figure 1.5. 
Another issue associated with microgrids is the insufficient level of fault current contributed 
by DG sources. During a fault on the utility grid, if the microgrid maintains full connection then 
the short circuit contribution from the utility source may reduce to such a level that existing 
overcurrent devices malfunction in their operation [4]. In contrast, during the microgrid islanded 
mode the DG sources may provide insufficient levels of short circuit current to allow for 
overcurrent fault detection and clearing mechanisms to operate. This is particularly prevalent in 
inverter based DGs as they are equipped with current limiting devices to prevent overload 
currents on individual components [4]. 
The requirement for the microgrid to have the capacity for topological change also introduces 
the issue of selectivity and sensitivity of overcurrent relays. The protective devices employed in 
the microgrid and network must have the capability to discriminate between grid and internal 
microgrid faults [4].  
1.4      Polynomial Regression Analysis 
Polynomial regression is a well- documented method of approximating data sets when inputs 
can be variable [21]. In order to generate a polynomial equation associated with a dataset, the 
least squares method is commonly used. A generic form of the polynomial can be expressed as: 
 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑘𝑥
𝑘 + ⋯+ 𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎0 + 𝜀, 𝑘 = 𝑁 − 1 (1.3) 
Where the maximum order of the polynomial k is dictated by the number of data points N. 
Following a set of matrix equations will allow for the coefficients of the polynomial to be 
determined. This matrix equation can be expressed generically by: 
 
 
[
 
 
 
𝑁 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ⋯ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ⋯ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘+1𝑁
𝑖=1
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘+1𝑁
𝑖=1 ⋯ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑘𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
 
 
 
[
𝑎0
𝑎1
⋮
𝑎𝑘
] =
[
 
 
 
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
⋮
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
 
 
 
    (1.4) 
By solving Equation 1.4 for a set of N data points in the form (xi, yi), a polynomial of order k 
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or less can be found. In the case of a polynomial of degree 2, at least 3 data points would be 
required. The set of matrix equations to be solved would then be expressed as: 
 [
𝑁 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
3𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
3𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
4𝑁
𝑖=1
] [
𝑎0
𝑎1
𝑎2
] = [
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
]    (1.5) 
1.5      Particle Swarm Optimization 
Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population-based stochastic optimization technique 
developed by Kennedy and Eberhart in 1995 [22]. The method was inspired by bird flocking and 
fish schooling and involves the use of “particles” which present a candidate solution. The 
algorithm then generates the optimal solution based on a multitude of criteria. PSO and genetic 
algorithm (GA) techniques have recently been applied to power systems contexts and have 
yielded impressive results however, GAs have been shown to converge prematurely. This has led 
to PSO being adopted as a potential optimization technique for power systems in the future. 
PSO operates on the premise of three simple behaviors: separation (to avoid overcrowding), 
alignment and cohesion (move toward the average position of local path). Each particle will 
adjust speed dynamically in a fashion that is dependent on the experiences of other particles and 
itself. This adjustment is modified according to current position, current velocity, difference 
between the current position and the particle’s best position and the difference between the 
current position and the best of all the particles [22]. 
In PSO the population has particles that can represent possible solutions. Each particle is an 
n-dimensional real valued vector with n being the number of optimized parameters [23]. 
The PSO algorithm can be explained in the following set of steps [23]: 
1. Initialization 
a. Set the time counter at n. 
b. Create t particles and generate random initial velocities for each particle. 
c. Evaluate each particle’s position according to an objective function. Use each 
individual particle’s value for the objective function as the best particle 
solution (pbest) and use the best value from every particle as the global best 
solution (gbest). 
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d. Set the initial weighted value of inertia which is used to control the impact of 
previous velocity on current velocity of each particle. 
2. Update the time counter, n=n+1. 
3.  Update the inertia weight using the equation: 
 𝜔𝑛 = 𝛼𝜔𝑛−1 (1.6) 
where α is a decrement constant smaller than one (a typical value is 0.98 as used 
in this thesis [12]) and ωn is the inertia coefficient (typically ω0 is equal to 1 [23]). 
4. Update the velocity using the equation: 
 𝑣𝑛+1
𝑖 = 𝜔𝑛𝑣𝑛
𝑖 + 𝑐1𝑟1(𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑖 ) + 𝑐2𝑟2(𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑖 )   (1.7) 
where vn+1
i is the velocity of particle i for iteration n+1, xn
i is the position of 
particle i for iteration n, c1 and c2 are positive constants typically equal to two as in 
this thesis [23] while r1 and r2 are uniformly distributed random numbers in the range 
from zero to one. 
a. The first component of the equation represents the inertia. Inertia influences 
the particle to move in the same direction as its current velocity. 
b. The second component represents personal influence which improves the 
individual particle’s performance and also makes the particle move toward a 
previous solution if it performed better. 
c. The third component of the equation represents social influence which makes 
the particle move toward the best neighboring particle’s solution. 
5. Using the new velocities of each particle through use of Equation 1.7, update each 
particle’s position according to: 
 𝑥𝑛+1
𝑖 = 𝑥𝑛
𝑖 + 𝑣𝑛+1
𝑖  (1.8) 
6. Evaluate each particle’s position according to an objective function. Compare each 
individual particle to its previous best solution. If the current position is better than 
the previous best (pbest) then update it, otherwise use the previous best solution. 
Compare every individual particle to the previous global best (gbest). If one particle 
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has a better solution than the previous global best then update it, otherwise use the 
previous best solution. 
7. The algorithm terminates if any of the following conditions are met: 
a. The number of iterations since the last change in best solution is greater than a 
pre-determined number of iterations. 
b. The number of iterations has reached a pre-determined maximum 
PSO has several advantages over other optimization techniques namely [24]: 
1. PSO is a population-based search algorithm. This means that local minima’s are less 
likely to trap the algorithm. 
2. The use of the objective function guides the search for the best solution. 
3. PSO algorithms are more robust and flexible as they make use of probabilistic 
transitional tools. 
4. PSO algorithms typically will not converge prematurely, enhancing the search 
capability. 
5. The end solution does not rely on initial population selection. 
6. PSO algorithms converge to an optimal solution regardless of starting position in the 
search space. 
1.6      Fault Current Limiters 
Fault current limiters (FCLs) limit the amount of short circuit current that is allowed to flow 
into a power network, enabling continual operation of systems despite faulted conditions [25]. 
FCLs are series devices that have very low impedances (near zero) during steady state system 
operation (normal mode) but rapidly introduce high impedance into the protected line to restrain 
the short circuit current (superconducting mode) to a desirable level during fault conditions [26].  
FCLs can be classified into quench, non-quench and composite types, depending on their 
operating characteristics. Quench FCLs can be resistive, inductive or hybrid and act to limit the 
fault level through control of the conversion between the normal and superconducting states. 
Non-quench type FCLs can be iron core, bridge or active types, and control the fault level by 
controlling the conductor current. Composite type FCLs combines the principles of the quench 
and non-quench types [27].  
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An alternate type of FCL is known as the resonant FCL. The resonant FCL, as the name 
suggests, is a component that utilizes a series resonant circuit in a system to limit the short circuit 
level during fault conditions. For resonant FCLs, the short circuit current increases gradually, (as 
opposed to instantaneously) during a fault condition; the effect being that the fault can be 
interrupted at a lower magnitude, preventing damage to the system [28]-[29].  
1.7      Research Objective and Scope of the Thesis 
Although DERs and microgrids have undeniable advantages they also introduce their own 
challenges. Present literature demonstrates that the field of DG and microgrid protection is still 
emerging as a key topic for researchers, with rarely more than an idea being presented on a 
scheme, as opposed to methods with tangible evidence of feasibility. Following the introduction 
of the microgrid concept for DG source integration, there is a growing need for feasible 
protective solutions for implementation. The main objective of this research is to determine the 
feasibility of a novel reclosing method in conjunction with a prediction method coupled with a 
protection scheme to allow for integration of DG sources and microgrids. These objectives are 
able to be accomplished through the following five stages: 
1. Investigation of the use of a reclosing scheme to aid in mitigation of DG effects on 
existing utility protection infrastructure. This will allow for the integration of DG units 
into distribution networks without loss of coordination between reclosers and fuses.  
2. Comparing the reclosing scheme with another method, namely fault current limiters. 
Comparison with FCLs will demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach in stage 1 
for cases where an FCL may not work in mitigation of DG unit short circuit contributions 
while the proposed scheme does, justifying it’s use.  
3. Creation of a fault detection technique to enable the novel reclosing scheme to operate 
without the requirement of a communication link. This will remove the requirement for 
the communication link that will be outlined in stage 1, making the novel reclosing 
scheme more robust. 
4. Creation of a smart protection scheme for a microgrid integrated into a distribution 
network. This protection scheme is to be developed to handle the drastic changes in short 
circuit current between grid and islanded modes of operation for microgrids. 
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5. Implementation of a PSO controller that uses polynomial regression to predict short 
circuit currents present in a microgrid. This controller will then be able to identify sources 
that are yielding a negative effect on existing network protection infrastructure. This will 
allow for generator short circuit contributions to be identified and mitigated preventing 
loss of coordination between the distribution network protection infrastructures. 
 This thesis is organized into seven chapters, a list of references section and appendices. 
  Chapter 1 introduces the fundamentals of protection coordination, generation source 
interconnection, microgrids, polynomial regression analysis and particle swarm optimization. 
Objectives are also presented. 
In Chapter 2, the systems under study are introduced along with the details associated 
with the modelling of individual components.  
Chapter 3 outlines the approach for the reclosing scheme used to mitigate DG effects on 
existing network protection. In addition, this chapter demonstrates the comparison of the method 
with FCLs. Case studies are presented for validation purposes. 
Chapter 4 presents the approach for detecting faults within the distribution network 
without the need for communication links. An analysis of these results, with supporting case 
studies, is also presented. 
Chapter 5 presents a hybrid adaptive overcurrent and differential protection scheme to be 
used in microgrids that are integrated into the utility network. Case studies with results are 
presented. 
Chapter 6 presents a smart protection scheme which utilizes polynomial regression in 
conjunction with PSO to mitigate microgrid short circuit effects on the existing protection 
infrastructure in distribution networks. Combined case studies are discussed, with results 
demonstrated. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the research described in this thesis and presents conclusions. 
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2. MODELING OF POWER SYSTEMS FOR 
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND MICROGRID 
INTEGRATION STUDIES 
 
2.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents the system and microgrid that are utilized in the investigations 
conducted in this thesis. Details of the protection settings, models and individual components are 
also provided.  
2.2      System under Study 
2.2.1     Distribution Network 
The distribution network used during the investigations in this thesis is presented in 
Figure 2.1. The system is a modified representation of an actual network currently being used in 
the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. It comprises of a connection to the utility (modeled as a 
constant voltage source behind an impedance) through a double grounded wye substation 
transformer. The substation serves two 25 kV feeders which share a point of common coupling 
(PCC). A two ohm series reactor is placed after the substation to limit the highest short circuit 
current to less than 6100 A. There are six loads in the network which represent lateral feeders. 
Each load is protected via a fuse (F1 to F6). The system loads are characterized as: constant 
impedance loads (L1, L2 and L4), constant power loads (L3), and composite loads (L5 and L6).  
In addition to the fuses, each feeder is protected by an individual head-end recloser (RE1 and 
RE2) with a relay connected in the substation as a backup. Further detail on loads, components 
and conductors are presented in Appendix A.  
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Figure 2.1: Single line diagram of the typical system under study. 
 
2.2.2     Protection Coordination Paths 
As per Figure 2.1, all loads are fuse protected, with each individual feeder utilizing a 
head-end recloser. As a result, there are six coordination paths each with a relay-recloser-fuse 
scheme. The coordination paths are shown in Figures 2.2 to 2.4. 
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Figure 2.2: Single line diagram of the: (a) load 1 coordination path, (b) load 2 coordination path. 
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Figure 2.3: Single line diagram of the: (a) load 3 coordination path, (b) load 4 coordination path. 
  R 
 R  
P 
  R  0.5 km 
  RE1 
  RE2  2 km 
 1 km 
 2.5 km 
T 
 1 km 
  2 Ω reactor 
Relay 
 R  
 25 kV 
 138 kV 
 0.5 km 
 1 km 
P 
∞ 
 4 km 
 Utility 
  T L5 
F5 
F4 
L4 
L2 
F1 
L1 
F6 
L6 
 2 km 
L3 
F3 
 4 km 
Feeder 2 
Feeder 1 
F2 
  R 
 R  
P 
  R  0.5 km 
  RE1 
  RE2  2 km 
 1 km 
 2.5 km 
T 
 1 km 
  2 Ω reactor 
Relay 
 R  
 25 kV 
 138 kV 
 0.5 km 
 1 km 
P 
∞ 
 4 km 
 Utility 
  T L5 
F5 
F4 
L4 
L2 
F1 
L1 
F6 
L6 
 2 km 
L3 
F3 
 4 km 
F = Fuse 
RE1 & RE2 = Recloser 
L = Load 
T = Tulip conductor 
P = Pigeon conductor 
R = Raven conductor 
Feeder 2 
Feeder 1 
F2 
(a) 
(b) 
18 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Single line diagram of the: (a) load 5 coordination path, (b) load 6 coordination path. 
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2.2.3     Protection Settings 
2.2.3.1     Utility to Load 1 Coordination Settings 
As per Figure 2.1 (a), this coordination path extends through feeder 2 to load 1 and includes 
the substation relay, RE2 recloser and the fuse F1. The recommended rating of this fuse is 
selected through the use of Equation 2.1 [30]. 
 𝐼 =
𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑
√3×𝑉𝐿𝐿
× 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (2.1) 
For the fuse, a multiplying factor of 1.75 is used [31]. 
This gives a recommended rating of: 
𝐼 =
106
√3 × 25000
× 1.75 = 40.4 A 
Using S&C SM-4 and SM-5 slow distribution fuses [32], an S&C 40E should be 
adequate. 
For the recloser, multiplying factors for the phase and ground settings are 1.5 and 0.75 
respectively [30]. Feeder 2 has loads 1, 2, 4 and 5 equating to an overall load of 9 MVA. As such 
the RE2 recloser rating can be expressed as: 
𝐼 =
9 × 106
√3 × 25000
× 1.5 = 311.8 A 
The nearest standard recloser rating that is adequate is 400 A [15].  
The ground trip setting is given as: 
𝐼 =
9 × 106
√3 × 25000
× 0.75 = 155.9 A 
The nearest standard recloser rating that is adequate is 200 A [15].  
The substation relay is not always used in distribution networks. As such, it was excluded 
from the studies conducted in this thesis. 
The head end recloser is required to coordinate with the downstream fuse to achieve a 
fuse-saving scheme. For this condition to be realized, the recloser fast time current characteristic 
(TCC) needs to be able to operate faster than the fuse for the most severe short circuit currents 
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present within the network. The short circuit current for the network is given in Appendix B. The 
maximum phase current that is experienced by F1 is 4229 A while RE2 experiences 4244 A. In 
order for fuse-saving schemes to be realized, it is recommended that the upstream recloser fast 
clearing time be at least 75% lower than the downstream fuses MMT. In addition, the recloser 
slow clearing time should be at least double the fuses TCT [17]. For F1, if a 40E fuse were to be 
selected, the MMT would be 0.0401 seconds. This is faster than any of the standard fast clearing 
curves for an ABB PCD2000 Recloser [33]. As such, F1 can be increased to be a 175E fuse. As a 
result, the recloser RE2 fast TCC was selected to be ANSI INV INST-1 with a trip setting of 400 
A. For the maximum short circuit case (a three-phase fault), this yields a trip time of 0.0762 
seconds while F1 has an MMT of 0.1094 seconds. The RE2 slow TCC was selected to be the 
ANSI INV-2 curve. For the minimum short circuit case (a line-to-line fault), this yields a trip 
time of 0.576 seconds for a short circuit current of 3748 A while F1 has a TCT of 0.171 seconds 
for a short circuit current of 3670 A. 
The ground settings can be found in a similar way. The maximum short circuit current 
(linne-to-line-to-ground fault) experienced by F1 is 4141 A while RE2 experiences 4162 A. The 
RE2 fast ground TCC was selected to be ANSI INV INST-4 with a trip setting of 210 A. This 
means for a short circuit current of 4162 A the clearing time of RE2 is 0.0814 seconds. In 
contrast, the MMT of F1 for a short circuit current of 4141 A is 0.1368 seconds. The RE2 slow 
TCC was selected to be ANSI LTVI-1. For the minimum short circuit case (single line-to-ground 
fault), this yields a trip time of 0.868 seconds for a short circuit current of 3421 A while F1 has a 
TCT of 0.2052 seconds for a short circuit current of 3399 A.  
 
2.2.3.2     Utility to Load 2, 4, 5 Coordination Settings 
As per Figure 2.1 (b), Figure 2.3 (b) and Figure 2.4 (a) this coordination path extends 
through feeder 2 to load 2, 4 and 5 including the RE2 recloser and the fuses F2, F4 and F5. The 
fuse sizes are selected in a similar way to Section 2.2.3.1. From short circuit analysis results 
given in Appendix B, the fuse size selected for F2, F4 and F5 was the S&C 150E. Results with 
tripping times, MMTs and TCTs are given in Appendix B. 
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2.2.3.3     Utility to Load 3 and 6 Coordination Settings 
As per Figure 2.3 (a) and Figure 2.4 (b) this coordination path extends through feeder 1 to 
loads 3 and 6 including the RE1 recloser and the fuses F3 and F6. The fuse sizes were selected in 
a similar way to Section 2.2.3.1. From short circuit analysis results given in Appendix B, the fuse 
size selected for F3 and F6 was the S&C 125E. Results with tripping times, MMTs and TCTs are 
given in Appendix B. 
For the recloser, Feeder 1 has loads 3 and 6 equating to an overall load of 7 MVA. As 
such the RE2 recloser rating can be expressed as: 
𝐼 =
7 × 106
√3 × 25000
× 1.5 = 242.5 A 
The nearest standard recloser rating that is adequate is 280 A [15].  
The ground trip setting is given as: 
𝐼 =
7 × 106
√3 × 25000
× 0.75 = 121.24 A 
The nearest standard recloser rating that is adequate is 200 A [15].  
The maximum phase current that is experienced by F3 or F6 is 3077 A while RE1 
experiences 3090 A (three-phase fault). The recloser RE1 fast TCC was selected to be ANSI 
INV INST-1 with a trip setting of 280 A. In contrast the RE1 slow TCC was selected to be ANSI 
INV-2. Similarly for the ground settings, the maximum ground short circuit current experienced 
by F3 or F6 is 2939 A (line-to-line-to-ground fault). As a result the ground fast TCC curve was 
selected to be ANSI INV INST-4 while the slow TCC curve was selected to be ANSI LTEI-1.  
2.2.4     The Microgrid 
The microgrid used in the investigations of this thesis in an adaptation of a model 
depicted in reference [34]. The network is connected to the utility via an interconnecting line at 
the point of common coupling (PCC). The voltage of the network is 13.8 kV. The microgrid 
consists of six main buses each with a DG source and a load. The microgrid consists of two 
separate feeders. Loads 1, 2, 4 and 5 are all operating at 0.2 MW while loads 3 and 6 are 
operating at 0.1 MW. At each load there is a protective breaker. In addition, each bus has three 
breakers while each line has a breaker on each end. It should be noted that the breaker protecting 
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the load point is also used for the load bus (i.e. it can be tripped due to a fault on the load or on 
the load bus). Details of the protection system are discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Further 
detail on loads, components and conductors are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2.5: Single line diagram of the microgrid under study. 
2.3      Power System Modeling 
2.3.1     Modeling of Distribution Lines 
Transmission and distribution lines can be defined by one of three categories based on 
their length [15]: 
1. Short lines: lines smaller than 80 km. 
2. Medium lines: lines equal to or longer than 80 km but smaller than 240 km. 
3. Long lines: lines longer than 240 km. 
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In the EMTP-RV software environment, there are multiple types of distribution line 
models each with their own characteristics. These can be described as such: 
1. Beregon/Steady State Model: this is the traditional nominal PI model of 
conductors. In this model the admittance and impedance are input for a specific 
frequency. As a result this model is limited to applications where the frequency is 
expected to fluctuate at a negligible level. Studies such as relay coordination and 
short circuit analysis are suitable for this type of line application [35]. 
2. Frequency Dependent Model: in this model the parameters of the line are 
frequency dependent. The parameters are calculated at multiple frequencies in 
addition to being dependent on transmission tower configurations. This model is 
accurate in the majority of studies but is typically limited to transmission line 
applications where tower configurations are known [35]. 
3. PI Model: The PI model in EMTP-RV requires the steady state impedances based 
on a fixed frequency be input to allow for the load flow to be solved. In time-
domain simulations the model is able to re-evaluate the impedance of the line 
based on changes in frequency in real-time. This model is suitable for applications 
where tower configurations are unknown but steady state data is available. 
Considering that the longest lines in the distribution networks under study are 6.5 
kilometers and short circuit time-domain simulations are required, the PI model was selected for 
use in this thesis. This model can be represented visually by Figure 2.6 [15]. 
Figure 2.6: The PI model for distribution lines. 
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where 
• VS is the sending voltage (V) 
• VR is the receiving voltage (V) 
• IS is the sending current (A) 
• IR is the receiving current (A) 
• Y is the total shunt admittance (S) 
• Z is the total series impedance (Ω) 
When modelling distribution lines in the PI model it is important to obtain the sequence 
impedance data. Positive sequence components comprise of three phasors that have identical 
magnitude but are displaced by 120 degree spacing. The phasors rotate in the same direction as 
the phasors in the network. It is very common for the negative sequence components to be the 
same as the positive, with the phasors rotating in the reverse order. The zero sequence 
components are three in phase equal magnitude phasors that rotate in the same direction as the 
positive sequence phasors. The key difference between positive/negative sequence and zero 
sequence components is that the magnetic fields that create the positive/negative sequence are 
different to that of the zero sequence. In the context of single circuit overhead lines, the zero 
sequence impedance can be up to 3.5 times the positive. In the context of single circuit 
underground cables, the zero sequence can be between 3 and 5 times larger than the positive for 
triplex core cables [36] - [37]. In this thesis, the cable data is taken from an actual system with 
field measured impedances. Cable impedances are given in Appendix A. 
2.3.2     Modeling of transformers 
The three-phase transformer model used in EMTP-RV comprises of three single-phase 
transformers. The transformer leakage and magnetizing reactances are accounted for.  
2.3.3     Modeling of system loads 
System loads can be modeled by Equations 2.2 and 2.3 [38] 
 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝑃0 (
𝑉
𝑉0
)
𝑎
 (2.2) 
 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝑄0 (
𝑉
𝑉0
)
𝑏
 (2.3) 
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where        𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = real load power at V 
 𝑄𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = reactive load power at V 
 𝑎 = real load constant equal to the slope
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑉
  
 𝑏 = reactive load constant equal to the slope
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑉
 
 𝑉0 = initial voltage 
 𝑉 = current voltage 
From Equations 2.2 and 2.3, load types can be classed into multiple categories: 
1. Constant Power Loads: have a fixed active and reactive power demand regardless 
of the voltage level. Constants a and b in Equations 2.2 and 2.3 are both zero. 
Examples of this type of load are induction motors and tap changing transformers. 
2. Constant Current Loads: have a power demand that is proportional to the voltage. 
Constants a and b in Equations 2.2 and 2.3 are both one. An example of this type 
of load is the thyristor application drive. 
3. Constant Impedance Loads: have a power demand that is proportional to the 
square of the voltage. Constants a and b in Equations 2.2 and 2.3 are both two. 
Examples of this type are residential and commercial loads. 
4. Composite System Loads: have combinations of the other three load types. The 
constant ‘a’ usually ranges between 0.5 and 1.8 while ‘b’ usually ranges between 
1.5 and 6. 
2.3.4     Modeling of the synchronous generator 
In a conventional synchronous machine, the stator circuit consisting of a three phase 
winding is responsible for generating a magneto motive force. The field winding, located on the 
rotor, is excited by a DC voltage. The synchronous machine model can be represented in the 
equations below and the d-q reference frame given in Figure 2.7. The convention adopted for the 
signs of the voltages and currents in the equations below is that v is the impressed voltage at the 
terminals, and the direction of positive current i corresponds to generation [39].   
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Figure 2.7: Modeling of the synchronous machine in the d-q reference frame. 
With time t expressed in seconds, the angular velocity 𝜔  expressed in rad/s (𝜔0 =
377𝑟𝑎𝑑/sec) and the other quantities expressed in per unit, the stator equations become: 
 𝑒𝑑 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ𝑑
𝑑𝑡
−
𝜔
𝜔0
Ψ𝑞 − 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑑 (2.4) 
 𝑒𝑞 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ𝑞
𝑑𝑡
+
𝜔
𝜔0
Ψ𝑑 − 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑞 (2.5) 
The rotor equations: 
 𝑒𝑓𝑑 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ𝑓𝑑
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑅𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑑 (2.6) 
 0 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ1𝑑
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑅1𝑑𝑖1𝑑 (2.7) 
 0 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ1𝑞
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑅1𝑞𝑖1𝑞 (2.8) 
 0 =
1
𝜔0
𝑑Ψ2𝑞
𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑅2𝑞𝑖2𝑞 (2.9) 
The stator flux linkage equations: 
 Ψ𝑑 = −𝐿𝑑𝑖𝑑 + 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑑 + 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖1𝑑 (2.10) 
iq 
efd ed 
id 
d-axis 
q-axis 
ifd 
i1d
d 
𝜔𝑟, elec. Rad/sec 
eq 
i1q 
i2q 
27 
 
 Ψ𝑞 = −𝐿𝑞𝑖𝑞 + 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖1𝑞 + 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖2𝑞 (2.11) 
The rotor flux linkage equations: 
 Ψ𝑓𝑑 = 𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑑 + 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖1𝑑 − 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑑 (2.12) 
 Ψ1𝑑 = 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑑 + 𝐿11𝑑𝑖1𝑑 − 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑑 (2.13) 
 Ψ1𝑞 = 𝐿11𝑞𝑖1𝑞 + 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖2𝑞 − 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖𝑞 (2.14) 
 Ψ2𝑞 = 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖1𝑞 + 𝐿22𝑞𝑖2𝑞 − 𝐿𝑎𝑞𝑖𝑞 (2.15) 
The electromagnetic torque equation: 
 𝑇𝑒 = Ψ𝑑𝑖𝑞 − Ψ𝑞𝑖𝑑 (2.16) 
The overall differential equations which describe the transient performance of the 
synchronous machine are given by the following matrix equation: 
 [
𝑑𝑋𝑠𝑦𝑛
𝑑𝑡
] = [𝐴𝑡𝑠𝑦𝑛][𝑋𝑠𝑦𝑛] + [𝐵𝑡𝑠𝑦𝑛] [
𝑉𝑡𝑑
𝑉𝑡𝑞
𝑒𝑓𝑑
] (2.17) 
where 
[𝑋𝑠𝑦𝑛] = [𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑞 𝑖𝑓𝑑 𝑖1𝑞 𝑖1𝑑 𝑖2𝑞]
𝑇 
[𝐴𝑡𝑠𝑦𝑛] = [𝐿]
−1[𝑄𝑡] 
[𝐵𝑡𝑠𝑦𝑛] = [𝐿]
−1[𝑅𝑡] 
 [𝐿] =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
11
22
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
d ad ad
q aq aq
ad ffd ad
aq q aq
aq ad d
aq aq q
L L L
L L L
L L L
L L L
L L L
L L L
−
−
−
−
−
− ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (2.18) 
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[𝑄𝑡] =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0
0
0
0 1
0 1
0 2
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
a q aq aq
d a ad ad
fd
q
d
q
R L L L
L R L L
R
R
R
R
   
   




−
− −
−
−
−
− ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[𝑅𝑡] =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0



]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, the superscript T means matrix transpose. 
2.3.5     Modeling of the excitation system 
The excitation system model is given in Figure 2.8 [40]. Data for the system is given in 
Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2.8: Excitation system block diagram. 
The state-space equation of the excitation system is given by Equation 2.19 
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where 
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2.3.6     Modeling of the DFIG wind turbine 
 
Figure 2.9: Schematic diagram of a DFIG wind turbine. 
In the case of a doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) type wind turbine, the stator of the 
induction machine is connected directly to the grid. The wound rotor is then connected to the 
grid via a back-to-back (BTB) partial scale power converter. This BTB link consists of two, three 
Slip rings 
Gearbox 
Grid 
Stator power 
Rotor-Side Converter 
(RSC) 
Grid-Side 
Converter (GSC) 
Rotor power 
Step down 
Transformer 
Windmill 
Crow-bar 
ri  gi  
dcV  
30 
 
phase pulse width modulated (PWM) voltage source converters (VSCs) (a rotor side converter 
and a grid side converter) coupled to a DC bus. A crowbar is used as a backup to protect the 
power electronics converter against overvoltage or thermal breakdown. Details of the 
mathematical modeling and control of the DFIG wind turbine are given in reference [41].  
The aggregated model of a 1.5 MW, 60 Hz DFIG type wind turbine given in reference 
[42] is utilized in this thesis. Within the model there is capability to control the pitch thereby 
limiting the maximum speed of the turbine. In addition a DC resistive chopper is used to limit the 
DC voltage, preventing the crowbar from operating during an AC fault. A two mass model is 
utilized to represent the low frequency oscillation in the turbine [43] - [44]. 
2.3.7     Modeling of the Photovoltaic array 
A photovoltaic (PV) array consists of multiple PV modules linked in series and parallel 
for the purpose of obtaining the desired current and voltage output. The array feeds a DC/DC 
boost converter through a DC disconnect switch. The output of a PV array depends on the level 
of solar irradiance and surface temperature present in the atmosphere. This level varies over the 
course of the day. As a result, maximum power point trackers (MPPTs) are used to ensure the 
most efficient mode of operation of the PV array. The MPPT is responsible for adjusting the 
DC/DC converter switch in order to match the load impedance to the current and voltage output 
of the array at the maximum power point. This occurs when a DC voltage is fed into a 3-legged 6 
switch voltage source inverter (VSI) to output the same voltage as a line-to line sinusoid. An LC 
filter is then used to smooth out harmonics before feeding an isolating transformer. The 
transformer connects to the grid via an AC disconnect switch. Details of the mathematical 
modelling and control are given in reference [45]. 
2.4      Summary  
Chapter 2 has provided an introduction into typical distribution systems and microgrid 
networks utilized in the study of this thesis. In addition, details are offered with regards to the 
various models and components used in the EMTP-RV software environment. Models presented 
include distribution lines, loads, synchronous generators, transformers, DFIG wind turbines and 
PV arrays.  
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3.   A NOVEL RECLOSING SCHEME FOR 
MITIGATION OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
EFFECTS ON OVERCURRENT PROTECTION 
 
3.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents a novel scheme to mitigate distribution generation (DG) effects on 
existing fuse-recloser infrastructure in radial distribution networks. The proposed method 
employs the use of a control unit, a variable load bank and a dedicated recloser at the point of 
common coupling (PCC) between the DG unit and the distribution network. Investigations are 
conducted through several time-domain simulations to ascertain the suitability of the novel 
reclosing technique for the purpose of mitigating the effects of DG sources without the 
requirement to alter existing overcurrent protection infrastructure. 
3.2      Mitigation of Distributed Generation Effects on Overcurrent Protection 
Conceptually, inclusion of DER/DG sources has attracted growing attention, especially in 
the context of smart grid operation, since DG sources can be installed locally to individual loads. 
This practice introduces unique challenges. Traditional grid operations and short circuit 
characteristics can potentially be affected, yielding degradation in existing equipment adequacy 
[2]-[4]. The extent of influence is determined through DG size, location, type and 
interconnection methods [31], [46] - [47]. IEEE standard 1547 [46] was introduced to address 
possible disconnection of all DG units following a distribution system fault, resulting in zero 
short circuit current contribution from the DG unit to the fault in the distribution network, which 
allowed for restoration of the initial fuse-recloser coordination. Widespread use of the IEEE 
standard 1547 [48] suggests that it has become global in its application.  
In addition to IEEE standard 1547, multiple methods have been proposed to mitigate the 
effects of DG units on existing overcurrent protection. Mitigation is the first step in 
understanding the effects of DG units on individual distribution networks, but it is also 
imperative that the level of penetration that yields degradation in existing protection 
infrastructure adequacy should be ascertained. In references [31], [47] methods for determination 
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of DG penetration levels that result in fuse-recloser coordination degradation are presented. In 
reference [31], it is further proposed that the DG penetration be limited to a specific level based 
on the unique feeder. Although effective, this method lacks long term feasibility. Another 
solution offered is the redesign of the existing infrastructure. This is a reliable method but may 
be economically infeasible depending on the size of the distribution network.  
In addition to re-engineering and penetration limitation, many researchers offer solutions 
that allow for increased levels of DG integration. Reference [7] presents a method where 
individual relays are pre-programmed with every anticipated state that the network will 
encounter. Based on the state of the network, the protection settings will adapt. The key 
drawback is that the method may be ineffective when a state is encountered that was not 
expected. Generally, all previously proposed methods capable of mitigating the effects of DG 
units on existing protection infrastructure [5] have advantages and drawbacks. Some of these 
include voltage based methods [49], which monitor the DG source voltage and use these to 
discriminate fault types.  
Another viable protection infrastructure option following DG integration is to install a 
current-limiting device that is self-triggering, rapidly activated within milliseconds, and failsafe. 
Fault Current Limiters (FCLs) are series devices with low impedance (considered zero) during 
steady state operation but change to a high impedance value, limiting short circuit current 
following a fault [26].   
3.3      The Proposed Reclosing Scheme 
In review of Section 3.2, it can be inferred that the majority of utilities and publications 
aim to mitigate the influence of DG units on existing protection infrastructure through two main 
concepts: the first is complete disconnection of the DG unit. This causes the unit to shut down 
following disconnection and reconnect following fault clearance by the existing network 
protection infrastructure. The second concept is to restrict the DG short circuit contribution to 
minimal levels such that the original coordination is not disturbed.  
The proposed scheme works through disconnection of the DG source following fault 
detection and excessive current increase, but maintains operation of the unit at its pre-fault load 
sharing level with no need for immediate shut down. This allows for the DG source to maintain 
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its pre-fault speed and frequency, resulting in a fast reconnection of the unit following fault 
clearance. The key effect of this method is a significant reduction in the costs of shut down and 
restarting procedures [50] - [51].  
The proposed scheme (designated as RD) is applied at the PCC between the DG unit and 
the overall network. This can be expressed diagrammatically via Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: DG source interconnection with the RD recloser. 
The structure of this scheme can be expressed in three parts: 
1. The communication and control unit (CCU). 
2. The controlled transfer impedance. 
3. The sequence of operation.  
3.3.1     The Central Control Unit 
The CCU contains two key components: the receiver/transmitter (R/T) unit and the 
control component of the DG recloser (DG-RC). The R/T unit is designed to allow for RD to 
receive a fault detection signal from the head-end recloser.  The DG-RC unit is designed to 
detect the rise in the DG terminal current and will produce a tripping signal if this current 
exceeds a preset pickup value. If both signals from the R/T and DG-RC unit are present then the 
CCU will transmit a control signal to the circuit breaker CCB1 (normally closed) in Figure 3.1 to 
disconnect the DG unit from the network.  
The pickup settings of the DG-RC unit are directly related to the DG unit rating (IDGrat). 
Through multiple short circuit studies conducted, it was observed that the DG current output will 
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not exceed three and two times the rated DG current following reconnection from a phase and 
ground fault respectively. As a result the DG-RC pickup settings can be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑃 = 3 × 𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑡         (3.1) 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑔 = 2 × 𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑡         (3.2) 
where        𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑃 = DG − RC phase pickup current (A) 
 𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑔 = 𝐷𝐺 − 𝑅𝐶 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐴)  
 IDGrat = rated DG unit current (A)  
When the CCU transmits to CCB1, it will send another two signals: one to controlled 
transfer impedance (ZRE) and one to CCB2. The signal to ZRE prompts selection of the value of 
the transfer impedance. The signal to CCB2 acts to close the normally- open circuit breaker, 
resulting in the transfer impedance being connected at the PCC between the DG unit and the 
distribution network.  
Through observation of Figure 3.1, it is apparent that there is a requirement for a 
communication link between the head-end recloser and RD. Although this particular component 
is outside the scope of this thesis, Ethernet Fiber Links technology should be adequate for this 
application with a delay time in the order of only a few milliseconds [52]. Although this 
technology should be adequate for this application, there are many others that would be 
potentially viable. In order to account for the communication, a delay time of 5 milliseconds is 
used in time-domain simulations. 
Another important aspect of the scheme is the circuit breakers. CCB1 and CCB2 are 
thyristor-based circuit breakers (TBCBs) which have a fast clearing time (microsecond scale) 
[53]. As a result a 10 microsecond delay is utilized in the investigations of this thesis to account 
for the clearing time of the breaker. 
3.3.2     The Controlled Transfer Impedance ZRE 
The purpose of the controlled transfer impedance is to allow for the DG unit to maintain 
its operation at the same pre-fault levels in terms of current, frequency and terminal voltage after 
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it is disconnected from the distribution network following a fault. This will allow for the DG unit 
to be easily reconnected to the system following fault clearing.  
The value of the transfer impedance to be connected at the PCC can be determined 
through the use of Equation 3.3. 
𝑍𝑅𝐸 =
𝑉𝑝ℎ
2
𝐷𝐺𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
= 
𝑉𝑝ℎ
2
(𝑆𝑠𝑦𝑠+ 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙)
=
𝑉𝑝ℎ
𝐼𝑝ℎ
× (
𝑃𝑝ℎ
(√𝑃𝑝ℎ
2 + 𝑄𝑝ℎ
2 )
+ 𝑗
𝑄𝑝ℎ
(√𝑃𝑝ℎ
2 + 𝑄𝑝ℎ
2 )
)  (3.3) 
where        𝑉𝑝ℎ = phase voltage of the system (kV) 
 𝑆𝑠𝑦𝑠 = MVA supplied by the DG unit to the system  
 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = local load MVA  
 𝐼𝑝ℎ = phase current of the system (A) 
 𝑃𝑝ℎ = pre − fault phase active power (MW) 
 𝑄 = pre − fault phase reactive power (MVAR) 
Equation 3.3 reveals a relationship between the DG current contribution during the fault 
and ZRE. This relationship can be exploited when determining the value of the transfer impedance. 
The CCU is responsible for the selection of the transfer impedance value based on the pre-fault 
measurements of real and reactive power delivered by the DG unit with the corresponding 
voltage and current. From these measurements, and using Equation 3.3, the value of ZRE in the 
form RRE+jXRE can be calculated using power equations [17]. The calculated values are stored in 
temporary memory after a half second delay.  
Values are read half a second before the fault because a steady state short circuit can be 
considered by the CCU to be present after 30 cycles (half second in a 60 Hz system) following 
fault inception [54]. This means that the RRE and XRE transmitted to the load bank are from a 
steady state operating condition as RD is expected to operate within a few cycles of fault 
inception. There is an advantage in selecting ZRE based on pre-fault conditions, as factors such as 
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fault location, system topology and fault impedance will have no influence on the calculation 
procedure. 
3.3.3     Sequence of Operation 
The sequence of operation for the RD recloser can be explained in the following steps: 
1. The CCU will measure the steady-state outputs of the DG unit to determine the 
necessary value of ZRE. 
2. When a fault occurs, the head-end recloser will detect it when the short circuit 
current from the substation exceeds the pickup setting. Following detection, the 
head-end recloser will transmit via a communication channel to the CCU. Before 
this transmission has even occurred, the CCU will have been constantly 
measuring the outputs from the DG source. 
3. When the CCU receives the head-end recloser trip signal and the DG current 
output is in excess of the DG-RC pickup setting (for a phase or ground fault) then 
the CCU will produce a trip signal instructing CCB1 to disconnect the DG unit 
from the network. 
4. At the same time as step 3, the CCU will send a control signal to CCB2 and ZRE. 
This signal will force CCB2 to close onto the value of ZRE as determined by 
Equation 3.3. This allows for the DG unit to maintain its pre-fault speed and 
frequency which will facilitate a faster reconnection time following fault 
clearance. 
5. Once the fault is clear, the head-end recloser will send a clear signal to the CCU. 
The CCU will then wait a minimum reclose time (0.5 seconds). The CCU will 
wait to receive a synch-signal from a synchronizer to indicate that the DG unit is 
synchronized with the distribution network.  
6. When the minimum wait time is exceeded and a synch-signal is received then RD 
will attempt to reconnect the DG source to the network by opening CCB2 and 
closing CCB1.  
7. If the DG unit fails to reclose at least twice or the fault is unable to be cleared 
from the network within a preset time frame, RD will send a shutdown signal to 
the DG source. 
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3.4      Application of the Proposed Scheme 
This section aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme RD through 
four comparative studies. These studies can be expressed as: 
1. The application of a conventional method whereby the loss of coordination (LOC) 
limit is determined for a network under study. Limiting the DG penetration to 
levels below the LOC limit will result in existing fuse-recloser coordination being 
maintained.  
2. Time-domain simulations are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed scheme for different fault types.  
3. The proposed scheme is compared to one other method of mitigating DG short 
circuit contributions, namely superconducting fault current limiters (SFCLs).  
4. The proposed scheme is investigated under various changes in fault impedance, 
fault duration and interconnecting transformer types. 
The system that is utilized in the studies in the chapter is presented in Figure 2.1 in 
Chapter 2. The DG unit that is utilized in the studies of this chapter is a synchronous generator. 
Data for the generator is presented in Appendix A.  
3.4.1     Application of a Conventional Method to Determine Loss of Coordination Limits 
There are two distinct methods which are conventionally used when dealing with 
integration of DG units into a distribution network:  
1. Restricting the level of DG penetration on the network to those that are below the 
LOC limit. 
2. Limiting the points in a network where the DG unit is able to be connected. 
Reference [47] presents a method for determination of LOC limits for candidate DG 
connection points in distribution networks that have DG penetration present. The method works 
by conducting simulations that determine the level of short circuit current that is output by a DG 
unit for various fault locations in the network. Once fuse-recloser coordination is lost, the LOC 
limit for the candidate connection point with DG type is found. 
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In Figure 2.1, the candidate DG connection points are selected to be buses at L2, L3 and 
L5. Utilizing the algorithm in reference [47], the following LOC limits are obtained: 
 
Figure 3.2: LOC limits for the candidate DG connection points - Yg/Yg interconnection 
transformer. 
 
Figure 3.3: Short circuit levels experienced by F1 for a three-phase fault on load L1 with 
varying DG ratings connected at L2. 
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Figure 3.4: Short circuit levels experienced by F1 for a double line-to-ground fault on load L1 
with varying DG ratings connected at L2. 
Through observation of Figure 3.2, it is apparent that LOC will first occur when a DG 
source is connected at load busses 2 or 3 during a three-phase or line-to-line-to-ground fault near 
loads L1 or L6. In the case of a three-phase fault, the LOC limit will first occur for a DG unit 
connected to load bus 2 when the fault is at load L1. In the case of the line-to-line to ground fault, 
the LOC limit will first occur for a DG unit connected to load bus 3 for a fault at load L6. The 
LOC limit for the network is presented in Figure 2.1 is 4.2 MVA for phase faults and 2.6 MVA 
for ground faults.  
In order to demonstrate the effects of the DG unit on the existing short circuit 
characteristics of the distribution network, a small case study was conducted for a DG unit of 
varying capacity connected to load bus 2 for a fault on load L1.  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate the short circuit current experienced by fuse F1 when a 
fault occurs at load L1. Observation reveals that when there is DG penetration on the network, 
there is a simultaneous increase in short circuit current experienced by the fuse. As a result the 
fuse will operate faster than the capacity built into the design, potentially resulting in a loss of 
coordination between the fuse and upstream devices such as head-end reclosers. This captures 
one of the key challenges associated with integration of DG units into distribution networks. 
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3.4.2     Application of the Proposed Scheme to Mitigate DG Influences on Overcurrent 
Protection 
Two case studies are presented to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed scheme for 
mitigation of DG influences on fuse-recloser coordination. The case studies showcase the 
capability of the proposed scheme in managing DG penetrations beyond the LOC limit of 
individual feeders. The second investigates the efficacy of the proposed approach under varying 
fault types. The case studies are expressed in Table 3.1 with diagrammatic representation in 
Figure 3.5. 
Table 3.1: Case studies. 
 Case Study-1 Case Study-2 
Fault type Three-Phase Line-to-Line-to-Ground 
Fault location Load  L1 
Fault inception 1 second of simulation time 
Fault duration Sustained fault 
DG connection point at L2 
DG pre-fault load sharing condition & PF 0.8 of 8 MVA DG, 0.9 power factor 
DG transformer configuration Yg/Yg 
Before conducting the studies in Table 3.1, it is prudent to determine the pickup settings 
of RD in addition to determining the range of transfer impedances. As per Equations 3.1 and 3.2, 
the phase and ground settings for an 8 MVA synchronous machine based (SM-based) DG source 
are as such: 
𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑡 =
8 × 106
√3 × 25000
= 184.75 𝐴 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑃 = 3 × 184.75 = 554.26 𝐴 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑔 = 2 × 184.75 = 369.5 𝐴 
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From these equations, the phase and ground pickup currents are selected to be 555 A and 
370 A respectively.  
 
Figure 3.5: Fault applied on load L1 with the DG unit at load 2. 
In these case studies, the local load connected to the DG unit terminals is assumed to be 
zero. For simplicity reasons, the range of load-sharing conditions compensated for in ZRE for 
these case studies is restricted to three. It should be noted that there could be an infinite number 
of possible values for ZRE in a given range of operating conditions. The number of conditions 
that ZRE is capable of transferring is also related to the load bank itself. If the installation was to 
only have discrete values of impedance, then the values of ZRE would have to be selected in a 
range. If the load bank was capable of dynamically changing its impedance based on inputs then 
discretizing the ranges would be unnecessary and only Equation 3.3 would be required. For the 
case studies presented in Chapter 3, a range for discrete impedance values is specified. 
Utilizing Equation 3.3, ZRE is determined for pre-fault load sharing conditions where the 
DG unit is loaded to 80%, 70% and 60% capacity respectively. For the case of the 80% loading 
factor, the 8 MVA DG unit is connected to a 25 kV network. As such the ZRE values are 
determined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐸 =
(
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)2
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𝑋𝑅𝐸 = √(
(
25
√3
)2
0.8 × 8/3
)
2
− (
(
25
√3
)2
0.8 × 8/3
× 0.9)
2
= 43 Ω 
A similar approach is taken with the 70% and 60% case. The values for ZRE with their 
corresponding ranges can be summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Possible DG load sharing conditions and pickup settings. 
Load sharing condition, p.u. of DG MVA 
LS3 LS2 LS1 
0.6 0.7 0.8 
Corresponding RRE , Ω 
RRE3 RRE2 RRE1 
118 101 88 
Corresponding XRE , Ω 
XRE3 XRE2 XRE1 
57 49 43 
Pre-fault measured R range, Ω 
P3 P2 P1 
110≤R 95≤R<110 R<95 
Pre-fault measured X range, Ω 
G3 G2 G1 
53≤X 46≤X<53 X<46 
Phase pickup current, A 555 
Ground pickup current, A 370 
For the purpose of clear figure presentation, a duration time from 0.9 seconds to 1.6 
seconds is only shown for the cases where the proposed scheme is not applied, while a longer 
duration from 0.8 seconds to 7.8 seconds is shown for the cases that include the proposed scheme. 
All values are stated in RMS unless otherwise indicated.  It should also be noted that additional 
case study data is offered in Appendix B.  
3.4.2.1     Case Study-1 
Figures 3.6 to 3.9 present the time domain simulations results for Case Study-1.  
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Figure 3.6: Case Study-1 without the DG source: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 state 
signals. 
Figure 3.6 presents Case Study-1 for the condition where there is no DG penetration on 
the network. Observation reveals coordination between the downstream fuse (F1) and the head-
end recloser (RE2) for the system given in Figure 2.1. When there is no DG penetration, RE2 
operates twice in its fast mode before the fuse F1 clears the fault. Further observation makes it 
apparent that the short circuit currents experienced by RE2 and F1 are 4244 A and 4229 A 
respectively. This corresponds to a clearing time of 1.0762 seconds and 1.424 seconds 
respectively. This case demonstrates coordination between the fuse and upstream recloser.  
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Figure 3.7: Case Study-1 with the DG source connected at L2 when RD is not applied: RE2 
current, F1 current, DG terminal current, DG RMS phase voltage, RE2 and F1 state 
signals. 
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Figure 3.8: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied: RE2 current, F1 current, 
RE2, RD communication & DG frequency, Zoom on RE2, RD signals, DG terminal 
current. 
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Figure 3.9: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied: DG voltage, State 
signals, load bank calculated and actual values, Feeder 2 active power and System 
PCC phase voltage. 
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Figure 3.7 presents Case Study-1 for conditions where an 8 MVA SM-based DG source 
is connected to the L2 lateral while RD is not in service.  Observation reveals that the short circuit 
current experienced by RE2 is 4241 A while the short circuit current experienced by fuse F1 
increases to 5800 A. The resultant increase in the short circuit current in F1 is expected, 
attributed to the fault being fed by two independent sources (the utility and the DG source). The 
clearing times corresponding to the short circuit currents experienced by RE2 and F1 are 1.0762 
seconds and 1.0659 seconds respectively. Furthermore, it can be seen in Figure 3.7 that the fuse 
F1 operates before RE2. This demonstrates the existence of the coordination problem as the 
original fuse-saving scheme is violated. It is worth noting that in this case RE2 was intentionally 
left to operate despite the fuse F1 operating. This was to allow for an easy comparison between 
the clearing times of the fuse and head-end recloser. Lastly, it can be observed that due to the 
fault, the DG terminal voltage dropped to 0.993 kV.  
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 present Case Study-1 for the 8 MVA DG source connected to the L2 
lateral while RD is in service. Observation reveals that when the proposed scheme is 
implemented, the short circuit current experienced by RE2 remains relatively unchanged at 4242 
A while the level experienced by the fuse F1 decreases to 4226 A. It can also be observed that 
RE2 detects the fault and notifies RD via the communication channel at 1.004 seconds, resulting 
in the DG source disconnecting from the network and feeding ZRE at 1.013 seconds (less than one 
cycle following fault occurrence). 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 also demonstrate the DG terminal current, voltage and the per unit 
frequency for the following progression: the DG source disconnects from the network then 
switches to ZRE before reconnecting to the network following successful reclosing at 5.82 
seconds. This demonstrates that the proposed scheme disconnects the DG source but keeps it 
operational until fault clearance before reconnecting to the network within a 4.82 second 
timeframe.  This highlights that reconnection of the DG is faster under the proposed scheme than 
in current utility practices. 
In the context of system performance it can be observed that the voltage drops to 11.274 
kV in contrast to 0.994 kV when RD is not in service. Furthermore, the overshoot frequency 
when reconnecting the DG source to the network is 1.018 per unit (61.08 Hz) before it decays to 
a nominal level. In addition it can be seen that RE2 returns to its regular operating time of 1.0761 
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seconds which allows for an attempted clearing of a temporary fault if the fuse F1 clears it at 
1.453 seconds. Further observation of Figure 3.9 makes it apparent that the system regains its 
normal operating state post fault (following reconnection of the DG source). It should be noted 
that the Feeder 2 power is measured at RE2 and that the system voltage is measured at the PCC 
on the system side of the breaker. This demonstrates the capacity of the proposed scheme to 
restore coordination to the system without limiting the DG penetration. 
3.4.2.1     Case Study-2 
Figures 3.10 to 3.13 present the time domain simulations results for Case Study-2.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Case Study-2 without the DG source: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 state 
signals. 
Figure 3.10 presents Case Study-2 for the condition where there is no DG penetration on 
the network. Through observation it can be seen that there is coordination between the 
downstream fuse (F1) and the head-end recloser (RE2) for the system given in Figure 2.1. When 
there is no DG penetration, RE2 operates twice in its fast mode before the fuse F1 clears the fault. 
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Further observation makes it apparent that the short circuit currents experienced by RE2 and F1 
are 4162 A and 4141 A respectively. This corresponds to a clearing time of 1.0814 seconds and 
1.437 seconds respectively. This case demonstrates coordination between the fuse and upstream 
head-end recloser.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.11: Case Study-2 with the DG source connected at L2 when RD is not applied: RE2 
current, F1 current, DG terminal current, DG RMS phase voltage. RE2 and F1 
state signals. 
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Figure 3.12: Case Study-2 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied: RE2 current, F1 
current, RE2, RD communication & DG frequency, Zoom on RE2, RD signals, 
DG terminal current. 
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Figure 3.13: Case Study-2 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied: DG voltage, State 
signals, load bank calculated and actual values, Feeder 2 active power and System 
PCC phase voltage. 
 
 
0
1
0.8 1.8 2.8 3.8 4.8 5.8 6.8
S
ta
te
Recloser State
Fuse State
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.45 0.6 0.75 0.9 1.05
Im
p
ed
an
ce
 (
Ω
)
R Calculated R Bank
X Calculated X Bank
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
0.8 1.8 2.8 3.8 4.8 5.8 6.8
P
o
w
er
 (
M
W
) Feeder 2 Power
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0.8 1.8 2.8 3.8 4.8 5.8 6.8
V
o
lt
ag
e 
(k
V
L
N
)
Time (s)
System PCC  phase voltage
52 
 
Figure 3.11 presents Case Study-2 for the conditions where an 8 MVA SM-based DG 
source is connected to the L2 lateral while RD is not in service.  Through observation it can be 
seen that the short circuit current experienced by RE2 is 4160 A while the short circuit current 
experienced by fuse F1 increases to 5728 A. Again, the increase in the short circuit current in F1 
is expected, attributed to the fault being fed by two independent sources (the utility and the DG 
source). The clearing times corresponding to the short circuit currents experienced by RE2 and 
F1 are 1.0812 seconds and 1.0632 seconds respectively. Furthermore, it can be seen that the fuse 
F1 operates before RE2. This again demonstrates the existence of the coordination problem as 
the original fuse-saving scheme is violated. Lastly, it can be seen that due to the fault, the DG 
terminal voltage dropped to 1.016 kV.  
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 present Case Study-2 for the 8 MVA DG source connected to the 
L2 lateral while RD is in service. Observation reveals that when the proposed scheme is 
implemented the short circuit current experienced by RE2 remains relatively unchanged at 4157 
A while the level experienced by the fuse F1 decreases to 4137 A. It can also be observed that 
RE2 detects the fault and notifies RD via the communication channel at 1.004 seconds resulting 
in the DG source disconnecting from the network and feeding ZRE at 1.013 seconds (less than one 
cycle following fault occurrence). 
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 also demonstrate the DG terminal current, voltage and the per unit 
frequency for the following progression: the DG source disconnects from the network and 
switches to ZRE before reconnecting to the network following successful reclosing at 6.579 
seconds. This demonstrates that the proposed scheme disconnects the DG source but keeps it 
operational until fault clearance before reconnecting to the network within a 5.579 second 
timeframe. This highlights that reconnection of the DG is faster under the proposed scheme than 
in current utility practices. 
In the context of system performance it can be observed that the voltage dropped to 
11.938 kV in contrast to 1.016 kV when RD is not in service. Furthermore, the overshoot 
frequency when reconnecting the DG source to the network is 1.022 per unit (61.35 Hz) before it 
decays to a nominal level. In addition it can be seen that RE2 returns to its regular operating time 
of 1.0812 seconds which allows for an attempt at clearing a temporary fault before the fuse F1 
clears it at 1.499 seconds. Further observation of Figure 3.13 makes it apparent that the system 
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regains its normal operating state post fault (following reconnection of the DG source). It should 
be noted that the Feeder 2 power is measured at RE2 and that the system voltage is measured at 
the PCC on the system side of the breaker. This demonstrates the capacity of the proposed 
scheme to restore coordination to the system without limiting the DG penetration. 
3.4.3     Comparison with other Techniques to Mitigate DG Influences on Overcurrent 
Protection 
In this section, another scheme presented in the literature, namely superconducting fault 
current limiters, is applied to Case Study-1 to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed scheme. 
In this case, a 30 ohm resistive SFCL with the model presented in [26] is connected at the DG 
terminal in lieu of RD. Time domain simulations are presented in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. In 
practice, an SFCL is required to limit the short circuit current to three and five times that of the 
line nominal current. This is to prevent protection system failure when there is an inability to 
differentiate between faults and overload currents (for example large load switching) for values 
lower than three times.  If the short circuit current exceeds five times the line nominal then 
excessive heating can occur in the SFCL [26]. Observation of Figures 3.14 and 3.15 make it 
apparent that the peak steady state current experienced by the DG source is 206 A. Following 
fault inception, the SFCL limits the current to 659 A in the second cycle (3.68 times the steady 
state value), demonstrating the expected operation of the SFCL. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that when the SFCL is in service the short circuit currents 
experienced by RE2 and F1 are 4242 A and 4555 A respectively. Although RE2 operates before 
F1, F1 continues to receive a current of 460 A even without the utility connection. This results in 
F1 melting at 1.2213 seconds before RE2 is able to conduct its second operation. In this case the 
SFCL does not maintain the original coordination of the system for a DG size of 8 MVA. In 
conclusion, a comparison of results between Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 makes it apparent that the 
proposed scheme in Section 3.4.2 is more robust at restoring fuse-recloser coordination for DG 
penetrated feeders than the SCFL solution.  
Another potential solution that has been presented previously is the utilization of 
discharge circuits within the DG [55]. When a discharge resistance is added to the field circuit at 
the fault instant it reduces the current contribution by the DG during the fault. More specific, it 
accelerates the decrease in the transient component (the transition to steady state is much faster). 
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However, the field discharge circuit has almost no impact on the sub-transient part of the AC 
component of the generator’s current due to the fact that damper windings play the leading role 
during the sub-transient period. In addition, the capability of the field discharge in reducing the 
generator’s RMS AC current is affected by the value of field discharge resistance. Thus, the 
capability of the field discharge is also affected by the operating condition of system protection 
(i.e. operating intervals of instantaneous, extremely inverse-time and short time-delay 
overcurrent devices). Finally, it can be concluded that applying the field discharge circuit may be 
sufficient to reduce the DG contribution to fault current. In other words, in some cases 
(according to the operating interval of certain overcurrent protective function) the field discharge 
might not be effective enough to prevent miscoordination.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 with a 30 Ω resistive SFCL applied at the 
PCC: RE2 current, F1 current, DG frequency. 
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Figure 3.15: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 with a 30 Ω resistive SFCL applied at the 
PCC: DG terminal current, DG RMS phase voltage, State signals. 
3.4.4     Generalization of the proposed scheme 
3.4.4.1     Impact of changing the fault resistance 
To aid in verification of the robustness of the proposed scheme, the impact of changing 
the fault resistance is investigated for Case Study-1. Figure 3.16 presents the zoom on the RE2 
and RD signals when the fault experiences an impedance of 3 ohms. As can be observed, when 
fault impedance is present, RE2 produces a fault signal 50 microseconds slower than the bolted 
fault case. In contrast, RD produces a signal 2.6 milliseconds slower than the bolted fault case. 
Although the overall operation of the proposed scheme is slower, it is still able to maintain the 
original coordination of the distribution network. Further results are presented in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3.16: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied and the fault 
impedance is 3 Ω: Zoom on RE2, RD communication.   
3.4.4.2     Impact of changing the fault duration 
In this section, the fault duration is reduced to 0.12 seconds as opposed to a permanent 
fault. Comparison of the case presented in Section 3.4.2.1 with Figures 3.17 and 3.18 reveal that 
fault levels of RE2 and F1, with the tripping time of RE2, are similar to the case where a 
permanent fault is present. Additionally, it can be observed in Figures 3.17 and 3.18 that the DG 
unit reconnects with the network at the same time as that outlined in Section 3.4.2.1. Overall, this 
demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed scheme in restoring fuse-recloser coordination through 
an allowance of temporary fault clearing without premature fuse operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied for a fault duration of 
0.12 seconds: RE2 current, F1 current. 
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Figure 3.18: Case Study-1 with the DG source at L2 when RD is applied for a fault duration of 
0.12 seconds: RD communication & DG frequency, zoom on DG frequency, RE2, 
RD signals, DG terminal current, DG RMS phase voltage, State signals, load bank 
calculated and actual values. 
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3.4.4.3     Impact of changing the interconnecting transformer 
Figures 3.19 and 3.20 demonstrate the variation in short circuit current experienced by 
the fuse F1 for Case Study-1 and Case Study-2 when the interconnecting transformer type is 
changed. As can be observed in Figures 3.19 and 3.20, when the interconnecting transformer 
type changes, there is a change in the short circuit current experienced by the fuse. Furthermore, 
it can be seen that with the presence of RD, when a fault occurs, the short circuit levels return to 
non-DG penetrated network levels. This highlights the efficacy of the proposed approach for 
multiple transformer types. Additional results are offered in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 3.19: Short circuit levels experienced by F1 for a three-phase-G fault on load L1, 8 MVA 
DG connected at L2. Two different interconnecting transformer types: Yg/Yg and 
Yg/D. 
 
Figure 3.20: Short circuit levels experienced by F1 for a line-to-line-to-ground fault on the load 
L1, 8 MVA DG connected at L2. Two different interconnecting transformer types: 
Yg/Yg and Yg/D. 
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3.5      Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a novel reclosing scheme for mitigation of DG source effects on 
existing distribution network protection infrastructure without the need for alteration of settings. 
Results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed scheme for multiple scenarios, including three-
phase and line-to-line-to-ground faults, resulting in the removal of the need to limit DG 
penetration as proposed in traditional methods. As a result, this chapter offers significant value in 
the domain of network expansion planning, as there is no longer a requirement to re-engineer 
networks to accommodate increasing levels of DG penetration.  
Case studies conducted also demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides 
disconnection from the DG unit effectively, whilst maintaining operation at pre-fault load 
sharing levels without the requirement of shutting down. This allows the DG to maintain its pre-
fault operating speed and frequency, facilitating a faster reconnection to the distribution network 
following successful fault clearance. The outcome is a direct reduction in shut down and restart 
procedures required by the DG unit. From the context of system performance, results indicate 
that normal operating states are achieved once network faults are cleared and reconnection of the 
DG unit occurs.  
A comparison with the application of SFCLs is also offered in the context of the case 
studies presented. This comparison highlights that the proposed scheme is more flexible and 
effective in the context of restoration of fuse-recloser coordination in distribution networks with 
DG penetration. Although outside the scope of this thesis, it is prudent to mention that should 
multiple DG sources be required to be connected; the reconnection of DG units would need to be 
coordinated in order to mitigate transients.  
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4.   ALLEVIATION OF LOSS OF COMMUNICATION 
LINKS IN DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS THROUGH 
A FAULT DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
 
4.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents a current measurement-based fault detection technique to be used as 
a substitute for the currently used communication link between the utility head end recloser and 
distributed generation (DG) units in distribution networks. The technique utilizes a tripping 
signal when a change in current that exceeds a pre-specified minimum is detected over an 
adequate time window. This signal is designed as a substitute for the communication link from 
the head end recloser in Chapter 3. This new signal, in combination with the technique specified 
in Chapter 3, is investigated through several time-domain simulations to ascertain the suitability 
of substituting the communication link for the fault detection technique. 
4.2      Fault Detection in Electrical Networks 
As indicated in Chapter 3, integration of DG sources, for the purpose of meeting local 
power demands can result in observable changes in short circuit current characteristics. Methods 
proposed for the purpose of mitigating these changes utilize communication links to protect DG 
units and the overall network, since they allow for increased flexibility in operation [56]. 
References [57]-[59] utilize communication links to allow for adaptive overcurrent protection to 
be implemented in the network such that settings can be adjusted for various impacts caused by 
DG units. Additionally, in reference [56] a technique is provided that allows the utility to control 
and adjust operation modes and short circuit behavior of DG units through a communication 
interface. Reference [60] utilizes a communication link that connects fault detectors in order to 
identify line faults through synchrophasor data processing.  
The key difficulty associated with communication-based techniques in the context of 
protection with DG penetration, is vulnerability in the event of communication failure. In the 
context of fault detection, one of many techniques that have been proposed is a travelling wave 
based protection scheme, presented in references [61] and [62]. This method is unreliable when 
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employed to discriminate between load variations and faults. In reference [63], an impedance 
based method is presented that is capable of utilizing data points to determine apparent 
impedances such that faults and their locations can be estimated through iterative algorithms. 
The main concern with this type of algorithm is the slow speed at which it operates when the 
network topology is complicated.  
4.3      The Proposed Current Measurement-Based Fault Detection Technique 
Section 4.2 is a review of a variety of methods for fault detection, each with their own 
advantages and inefficiencies. Against this background, the proposed fault detection technique   
measures the difference in the RMS current output by a DG source interconnected to the 
distribution network over a predefined time period (Δt). This can be formally defined as the rate 
of change of current (ROCOC) (ΔI) over the time period Δt. This method can be visually 
represented via Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: ROCOC measurement of a time period of Δt. 
In accordance with reference [64], one twentieth of a cycle is an adequate time window 
for detection in changes in voltage and current. From this, the moveable time period Δt is defined 
by: 
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 𝑓 = 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (𝐻𝑧)  
Furthermore, the ROCOC can be defined by: 
∆𝐼 = 𝐼(𝑡) − 𝐼(𝑡 − ∆𝑡)         (4.2) 
where        ∆𝐼 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∆𝑡 (𝐴/𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑) 
 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝐷𝐺 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 t 
 𝐼(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) = 𝐷𝐺 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 − ∆𝑡  
Through the use of Equations 4.1 and 4.2, if ΔI exceeds a preset value over a time period 
of Δt then the DG source is deemed to be detecting a fault. From a practical standpoint, when ΔI 
exceeds the ROCOC pickup value, this value is held for one second in order to allow a brief 
window in which the short circuit currents can stabilize to a set value following their transient 
period.  
4.4      Application of the Proposed Fault Detection Technique 
This section aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique when 
integrated into the scheme proposed in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 3, the RD scheme 
detects a fault through the communication link between the head end recloser and DG unit 
central control unit (CCU). For the studies conducted in this chapter, the receiver/transmitter 
(R/T) within the CCU is blocked and replaced with the signal from the fault detection technique. 
In order to aid in clarity, this adjusted scheme is designated as RD-mod. It should also be noted 
that the transfer impedance in this chapter is taken as exact. 
Four case studies are presented to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed technique. 
Case studies showcase the ability of the technique to detect faults, and substitute for the utility-
DG communication link for varying fault locations, fault types, fault impedance and for a large 
sudden load change. The case studies are expressed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. 
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Table 4.1: Case studies. 
 Case Study-1 Case Study-2 Case Study-3 Case Study-4 
Fault type/Disturbance 
Solid Line-
to-Line-to-
Ground 
Solid Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground, Rf  = 
3 Ω 
Sudden 
10MVA 
Fault/Disturbance location Load  L1 Load L5 Load L5 Load L2 
Fault/Disturbance inception 
time and duration 
1 second of simulation time, 
Sustained fault 
PCC at L2 
DG pre-fault load sharing 
condition & PF 
0.8 of 8 MVA SM-based DG, 0.9 pf 
 
Case studies presented in Table 4.1 can be expressed diagrammatically in Figure 4.2. It 
should be noted that the system utilized in these studies is presented in full in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 4.2: Diagrammatic version of the case studies. 
 
  RE2 
 Fault-2  
DG 
L2 
F5 
L1 
To upper 
stream 
RD 
L4 
L5 
F1 
Fault-1 
 
Fault-3 
Sudden 10 MVA load 
Normally 
open 
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The case studies presented in this chapter have many similar conditions to that in Chapter 
3. As a result the phase and ground pickup currents are selected to be 555 A and 370 A 
respectively as per Equations 3.1 and 3.2. Through preliminary simulations, it was found that the 
pre-fault outputs from the DG unit are as such: 
• Iph = 146 A 
• Vph = 14.515 kV 
• Pph = 1.91984 MW 
• Qph = 0.873122 MVAR 
Through the use of Equation 3.3, the transfer impedance is determined to be 90.5+j41.16 
ohms. Again it should be noted that values specified curing case studies are in RMS unless 
otherwise stated. It should also be noted that additional case study data is offered in Appendix C. 
The system frequency utilized in this Chapter is 60 Hz. According to Equation 4.1 the 
time period can be determined by: 
∆𝑡 =
1
20 × 60
= 0.8333 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 
Multiple case studies were conducted other than the ones specified. These studies were 
conducted with results given in Appendix C. As a result of those case studies, it can be 
determined that the ROCOC for an 8 MVA DG source did not go below 20 A/second for any 
fault. As a result the ROCOC pickup value utilized is 20 A/second.  
4.4.1     Case Study-1: Bolted double line-to-ground fault 
Figure 4.3 presents the time domain simulation results for Case Study-1 where an 8 MVA 
DG source is connected to the L2 lateral while RD-Mod is in service and a line-to-line-to-ground 
fault occurs on load L1 one second into the simulation time as per Figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 makes it 
apparent that the DG and subsequent fuse (F1) current begins to ramp up following the inception 
of Fault-1. At this point, RD-mod measures the change in the current over the time period Δt 
(0.8333 milliseconds) where it reaches a peak ROCOC (ΔI) of 131 A/second which is greater 
than the pickup value of 20 A/second.  As a result, RD-mod signals a fault has occurred and the 
DG source switches from the network to the transfer impedance at 1.01045 seconds. 
Comparatively, in Case Study-2 in Chapter 3 (the case where the communication link is present 
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and the fault detection technique is not) a switch to the DG source from the network to the 
transfer impedance is at 1.013 seconds. Significantly, the RD-mod is faster at detecting the fault 
than the communication link reported in Chapter 3. Due to the rapid detection of the fault by the 
RD-mod, the DG source switched to the transfer impedance, resulting in restoration of existing 
fuse recloser coordination. The network returned to normal operation following fault clearance. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Case Study-1: F1 current, DG terminal current before PCC, ΔI, DG voltage, State 
signals. 
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4.4.2     Case Study-2: Bolted single line-to-ground fault 
Figure 4.4 presents the time domain simulation results for Case Study-2 where an 8 MVA 
DG source is connected to the L2 lateral while RD-Mod is in service. A single line-to-ground 
fault occurs on load L5 one second into the simulation time as per Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Case Study-2: F1 current, DG terminal current before PCC, ΔI, DG RMS phase 
voltage, State signals. 
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RD-mod signals the occurrence of a fault; subsequently switching the DG source from the 
network to the transfer impedance at 1.0139 seconds. Due to the rapid detection of the fault by 
the RD-mod, the DG source switched to the transfer impedance, resulting in restoration of 
existing fuse recloser coordination. The network returned to normal operation following fault 
clearance. 
4.4.3     Case Study-3: 3 ohm single line-to-ground fault 
Figure 4.5 presents the time domain simulation results for Case Study-3 where an 8 MVA 
DG source is connected to the L2 lateral with RD-Mod. A single line-to-ground fault with an 
impedance of three ohms occurs on load L5 one second into the simulation time as per Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Case Study-3: F1 current, DG terminal current before PCC, ΔI, DG RMS phase 
voltage, State signals. 
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Observation of Figure 4.5 makes its apparent that following the inception of Fault-3, the 
DG and subsequent fuse (F5) current begins to ramp up. At this point, RD-mod measures the 
change in the current over the time period Δt (0.8333 milliseconds). It reaches a peak ROCOC 
(ΔI) of 33 A/second which is greater than the pickup value of 20 A/second.  As a result, RD-mod 
signals a fault, subsequently switching the DG source from the network to the transfer 
impedance at 1.0164 seconds. In comparison, in Case Study-2, where the fault is bolted without 
an impedance value, the transfer occurs at 1.0139 seconds. It is apparent that RD-mod is slower 
in Case Study-3 than it is in Case Study-2. This is expected as the three ohm fault impedance 
will reduce the short circuit current output from the DG source and the utility. Although the fault 
impedance increases the transfer time, RD-mod was still able to detect the fault and the DG 
source was able to be switched to the transfer impedance, resulting in restoration of existing fuse 
recloser coordination with the network returning to normal operation following fault clearance. 
4.4.4     Case Study-4: Sudden load change 
Figure 4.6 presents the time domain simulation results for Case Study-4 where an 8 MVA 
DG source is connected to the L2 lateral while RD-Mod is in service and a 10 MVA load is 
suddenly applied on load L2 one second into the simulation time as per Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Case Study-4: DG terminal current before PCC, ΔI, DG RMS phase voltage. 
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Observation of Figure 4.6 makes it apparent that following the connection of the 10 
MVA load, the DG current begins to ramp up. At this point, RD-mod measures the change in the 
current over the time period Δt (0.8333 milliseconds) where it reaches a peak ROCOC (ΔI) of 
9.77 A/second which is less than the pickup value of 20 A/second.  As a result, RD-mod 
indicates that no fault has occurred so the DG source will ride through the transient event. This 
means that the proposed technique does not measure a change in current in excess of the 
ROCOC pickup setting which resulted in a continuous connection between the DG source and 
the network. As such RD-mod was successfully able to discriminate between a switching load 
and network fault.  
4.5      Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a current measurement-based fault detection technique to be used as 
a substitute for the communication link between the utility head end recloser and DG sources in 
distribution networks. Results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed technique through 
multiple case studies that investigate scenarios such as varying fault types, fault locations, fault 
impedance and sudden large switching loads. These case studies are implemented within the 
structure of the DG recloser proposed in Chapter 3 with the communication link between the 
head end recloser and DG unit disabled.  
Case studies conducted demonstrate that the proposed system successfully detects fault 
occurrences, allowing for the RD-mod recloser to disconnect the DG unit from the network and 
onto the transfer impedance while maintaining the original fuse recloser coordination. Following 
fault clearance the DG unit is able to be reconnected and operate as per pre-fault conditions. 
Furthermore RD-mod was able to successfully discriminate between a large switching load and a 
fault. Consequently the fault detection technique is able to add robustness to the approach 
specified in Chapter 3 as it no longer relies on a communication link to discriminate between 
switching transients and faults. 
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5.   A PROTECTION SCHEME FOR MICROGRIDS 
UTILIZING DIFFERENTIAL AND ADAPTIVE 
OVERCURRENT RELAYS 
 
5.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents a hybrid adaptive overcurrent and differential protection scheme 
that has the capability of compensating for significant changes in short circuit current 
characteristics of microgrids when transitioning between islanded and grid connected modes. It 
is proposed that adaptive overcurrent relays be used for the protection of individual load points 
whilst differential relays are utilized to protect load buses and feeder backbones. This 
segmentation reduces the need for equipment upgrades and minimizes setting computation 
complexity. The scheme is tested using multiple time-domain simulations, to determine its 
efficacy in protecting the microgrid in both grid and islanded modes.  
5.2      Protection Schemes for Microgrids 
As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, the inclusion of DER/DG sources has been attracting 
growing attention; with particular focus on the microgrid, since it can operate under multiple 
configurations. A microgrid can be defined as a low or medium voltage network that contains a 
cluster of local loads and DG sources that are capable of operating in both islanded and grid 
connected modes [8]. The modes of operation are dependent on the presence of a utility 
connection. Microgrids offer distinct advantages, particularly in remote areas where power 
delivery is not reliable, since they reduce line losses, prevent network congestion and reduce the 
probability of supply interruption due to their islanding capability [51]. This can be attributed to 
the ability of microgrids to adjust topology whilst utilizing DG sources close to the load points.  
As with DG integration, microgrids also introduce unique operational and protection 
challenges. Many of these challenges are similar to those encountered in DG integration, 
however microgrids offer additional difficulties due to topological changes when switching 
between grid and islanded modes. One of these challenges is associated with drastic short circuit 
behavioral changes when transitioning between modes. When the microgrid is in islanded mode, 
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the utility supply is disconnected (typically due to a disturbance or planned disconnection). The 
DG sources continue to supply the load locally [8]. Following islanding, there is a significant 
reduction in the magnitude of the short circuit currents in the network. This is attributed to the 
lack of utility connection, which would traditionally serve as the main source of short circuit 
currents during a fault. Another challenge is attributed to potential bi-directional power flow 
within the microgrid, which contradicts the traditional unidirectional power flow characteristic of 
distribution networks. In this context, existing traditional overcurrent protection devices may be 
rendered inadequate due to their reliance on high short circuit currents within the network. This 
is of particular concern in microgrids with a predominance of inverter based DG sources such as 
solar PV, which limit short circuit current to prevent overloads on individual components [65]. 
Research into microgrid protection schemes with the capacity to navigate changes in 
magnitudes of short circuit currents in grid and islanded modes is emerging. A number of 
potential solutions have been offered.  
Reference [4] contains an observation that integration of adaptive overcurrent relays can 
be difficult, due to the advanced technology required for practical implementation, and to the 
ability of the relay to self-monitor and compute multiple settings for distinctly different 
microgrid topologies. These relays require complex hardware and software units to 
accommodate a variety of topological configurations. An additional complication lies in the 
demand for fast relaying communication capacities. This means that significant upgrades are 
required to existing infrastructure to make it “smart ready” and to facilitate interfacing between 
adaptive overcurrent relays and the network. 
In reference [5], an off-line analysis methodology is presented that allows for the 
determination of suitable tripping characteristics in individual relays for every possible state the 
network and microgrid might encounter. This methodology is efficient only when there is 
substantial knowledge of the network and microgrid, ensuring that every possible state can be 
programmed into the relay. Should a state occur that was not pre-programmed, the relay could 
operate incorrectly or fail completely.  
In reference [49], a voltage based differential protection scheme is introduced to address 
high impedance faults in radial and meshed networks. Communicative overlays are integrated 
into the relays to make this scheme operate correctly. These relays require synchronized 
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measurements that can be rendered inadequate when imbalances in the system phases are present.  
Another viable protection infrastructure option for microgrids is the use of a differential 
current protection scheme in conjunction with a communication channel, as outlined in reference 
[66]. This differential protection scheme is shown to be effective in both grid and islanded modes 
under a variety of fault types and impedances. A key requirement for this scheme is the need for 
relays on each end of the line to be replaced, in addition to extensive adaption to communication 
requirements. As a result, differential current protection schemes may not be feasible due to 
infrastructure upgrade costs.  
5.3      The Proposed Microgrid Protection Scheme 
In summary, Section 5.2 outlined the technical difficulties posed in the field of microgrid 
protection due to the inherent short circuit changes experienced when transitioning between grid 
and islanded modes. In addition, there is often a need for significant infrastructure upgrades. In 
mitigation of these factors, a hybrid microgrid protection scheme that utilizes both differential 
and adaptive overcurrent relays is presented in this chapter. The proposed scheme utilizes 
differential relays for the protection of microgrid interconnecting buses and feeders in 
conjunction with adaptive overcurrent relays for load points. This approach allows for multiple 
microgrid protection methods to be utilized in conjunction with one another, providing additional 
options for utilities and private owners. The scheme also would allow for segmented installation 
of equipment where budget constraints are an issue. 
5.3.1     Adaptive Overcurrent Protection 
In traditional distribution networks, devices such as relays, reclosers and fuses are 
utilized to protect feeders and their lateral taps. In these traditional networks, reclosers are set to 
operate within fractional timeframes in order to allow for self-clearing, preventing unnecessary 
de-energization when a fault is temporary. Following a set number of operations by the recloser, 
the switching time reverts to a slow characteristic to allow for fuses to operate and clear the fault. 
This is the general principle operating in traditional fuse-saving schemes [17]. The scheme relies 
on high levels of short circuit current to allow for fuse-saving coordination. This is an inherent 
problem in microgrids, since they operate in both grid and islanded modes, yielding drastic 
changes in their short circuit current characteristics. As a consequence, the traditional 
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overcurrent schemes utilized in traditional networks may become unsuitable. One method that is 
able to address this phenomenon is adaptive overcurrent protection. 
In adaptive overcurrent protection, relays capable of sensing grid conditions are utilized 
to facilitate modification of TCC characteristics and settings [65]. This is typically accomplished 
when an external communication device interfaces with the relay and inputs the grid condition as 
islanded or grid-connected. Although effective, the inherent inefficiency associated with this 
practice is the requirement for every topology of the microgrid to be known and programmed 
into the relay. For highly complex networks, this may not be feasible, which creates malfunction 
vulnerabilities within the relay when un-programmed states are encountered.  
5.3.2     Differential Current Protection 
Differential protection is based on the concept of measurements of current entering and 
leaving a protective zone. This can be conceptually visualized as such: 
 
Figure 5.1: A line protected by a differential scheme. 
As indicated in Figure 5.1, each line end is equipped with a local current transformer (CT) 
with a corresponding circuit breaker. The CT’s secondary output is connected to the 
corresponding relay (for example relay 1) which communicates details about the current 
magnitude and phase angle to the opposing line relay (for example relay 2). The relays will 
measure the difference between these communicated current values from the CTs and will 
instruct the circuit breakers to open if they exceed a predetermined threshold [67]. Considering 
that differential protection schemes rely on comparisons between current levels only, rather than 
magnitudes, they are effective at overcoming challenges associated with topological changes in 
microgrids. The key drawback associated with differential current schemes is the requirement to 
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CT CT 
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have relays placed at either end of the protective zone, creating significant financial burden when 
network upgrades are required [65].  
5.3.3     The Hybrid Scheme 
The effectiveness of both adaptive overcurrent and differential current protection 
schemes have been demonstrated in the context of microgrids, however their practical 
implementation is typically limited by factors such as technical and cost-related challenges. As a 
consequence, a hybrid approach is proposed, utilizing both adaptive overcurrent and differential 
current protection schemes in a bid to overcome individual inefficiencies. In this approach, the 
requirement for detection and isolation of all abnormal conditions within the microgrid is 
addressed, to allow for the un-faulted sections to remain connected to power supplies.  
In the proposed scheme, differential relays are utilized to protect both the feeders and the 
interconnecting load buses. This can be represented visually via Figures 5.1 and 5.2 [67]. 
 
Figure 5.2: A load bus protected by a differential scheme. 
The adaptive overcurrent relays are placed at the point of common coupling (PCC) 
between the load and the feeder where their settings are adjusted according to whether the 
microgrid is in grid or islanded mode. The adaptive overcurrent relays are notified of the 
microgrid topology through signals transmitted through a communication link between the relays 
and interconnecting relay (the relay coupling the utility connection to the microgrid). 
The main advantage of this approach lies in its scalability. If either adaptive overcurrent 
or differential schemes were to be solely utilized then significant relay upgrades would be 
required within the microgrid. This is due to the fact that these schemes can be prone to failure if 
not implemented entirely. In this approach, the differential protection can be implemented on a 
Relay 
Bus 
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large or small scale depending on the application in question. With reference to the adaptive 
overcurrent protection, it can be adjusted to coordinate with existing downstream load point 
(downstream of the load taps adaptive overcurrent relay) reclosers and fuses or can be utilized as 
an instantaneous relay. As a consequence excessive infrastructure upgrades may be mitigated. 
Furthermore, the adaptive overcurrent and differential protection do not require coordination as 
both methods utilize different tripping algorithms. 
5.3.3.1     Sequence of Operation 
For the sequence of operation, CTs measure the current at each end of the feeder lines 
and load buses. These CTs connect to a relay (as indicated in Figure 5.1) which transmit and 
receive measured current values to and from neighboring relays. If the difference between the 
relay currents exceeds a predetermined threshold, the relays indicate that a short circuit has 
occurred on the line or bus and instructs the circuit breakers to open the faulted segment. When 
the difference between the relay currents is below the predetermined threshold then the short 
circuit is deemed to be outside of the protective zone of the relay, and it will not operate. 
For the load lateral taps, the adaptive overcurrent relays analyze the input signals 
communicated from the interconnecting circuit breaker to determine if the microgrid is in grid or 
islanded mode. CTs are responsible for allowing the adaptive overcurrent relays to measure the 
magnitude of the current. In the event of a downstream fault within the load (this could be near 
the relay or deeper into the subnetwork fed by the lateral tap) the current magnitude rises rapidly 
such that it exceeds a predetermined pickup setting. At this point the adaptive relay will instruct 
the corresponding circuit breaker to open to clear the fault. When there is no fault or the fault 
occurs upstream of the adaptive relay, the measured current will be below the preset pickup 
setting and as such will not instruct the circuit breaker to open. 
5.3.3.2     Protection Settings 
A similar methodology, reference [67], is utilized for the differential current relays 
settings, with a typical tripping characteristic illustrated in Figure 5.3. As can be observed in 
Figure 5.3, the two key parameters that dictate the operational characteristics of the differential 
relay are the restraint and the differential pickup current. These values will determine where 
operating and restraining regions exist for the differential relay. The pickup current can be 
defined by Equation 5.1 [67]. 
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𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐾𝑃 = |𝐼1| − |𝐼2|         (5.1) 
Where IDIFFPKP is the differential pickup current in amperes and I1 and I2 are the 
secondary CT phasor currents from each relay in amperes. 
 
Figure 5.3: A typical differential current relay characteristic. 
The restraint current can be defined by Equation 5.2 [67]. 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 = |𝐼1 + 𝐼2| ×
1
2
         (5.2) 
During a normal steady state operation, the differential current reading for the relays is 
theoretically zero however, due to factors such as line charging, CT saturation and inaccuracies 
in the CT mismatch; this is rarely the case in practice [66]. To accommodate the mismatches 
between practical and theoretical results, the typical minimum pickup setting utilized in 
differential current relays is 0.25 A on the secondary [67].  
Another important factor indicated in Figure 5.3 is the K1 and K2 values. These values 
are defined as the slope of the percentage differential characteristic [67] and they are generally 
expressed in percentage values. These values cause an increase in the pickup setting 
proportionate to the fault level increase as defined by Equation 5.3. 
𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐾𝑃 = 𝐾 × 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇         (5.3) 
Typical values of K1 and K2 are 20% and 98% respectively [68]. 
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The final setting for the differential protection is the breakpoint. This is the setting 
responsible for indicating which K value is to be used in Equation 5.3. A typical setting for the 
breakpoint is 5 A on the secondary [67]. 
The adaptive overcurrent relays at the lateral load taps are set such that their pickup 
settings are greater than double the normal load current but less than one third of the minimum 
fault current [69]. In a microgrid, the settings are required for both phase and ground type faults 
in both grid and islanded topologies. The pickup settings are determined by taking the greater of 
Equations 5.4 and 5.5. 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑥 =
1
3
× 𝐼𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑥         (5.4) 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑥 = 2 × 𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑         (5.5) 
where IPKPx is the pickup current in amperes for mode x of the microgrid (grid or islanded 
mode), ILoad is the lateral taps expected load current in amperes and Ifmintx is the minimum short 
circuit current experienced by the relay for a fault type t in mode x in amperes.   
5.4      Application of the Proposed Microgrid Protection Scheme 
Two case studies are presented in this section to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed 
scheme for protection of microgrids operating in either grid or islanded mode. These case studies 
showcase the capacity of the proposed scheme in managing the variations in short circuit current 
based on microgrid topology. These case studies are conducted utilizing the network indicated in 
Figure 2.5 with the details expressed in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Microgrid Case studies. 
 Case Study-1 Case Study-2 
Fault type Three-Phase Three-Phase 
Fault location Line 1 Load 1 
Fault inception 1 second of simulation time 
Fault duration Sustained fault 
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Case studies presented in Table 5.1 can be expressed diagrammatically in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Fault applied at line1/load1 for Case Study-1/2. 
The first case study is used to demonstrate the efficacy of the differential current relays in 
separating a feeder line when a fault occurs within its zone of protection. The second case study 
is utilized to demonstrate the efficacy of the adaptive overcurrent protection in removing a fault 
that occurs on the load point. The second case study highlights the ability of the differential 
current relay in discriminating against faults that lie outside of its protection zone.  
For the case studies outlined in Table 5.1, all DG sources are solar PV, connected at each 
load point as indicated in Figure 5.4. The PV DG’s are sized such that they are operating at 0.2 
MW at a power factor of 0.9 during steady state. Note: all values in the case studies are 
expressed in RMS unless otherwise specified and each case study is conducted in both grid and 
islanded mode. 
Before conducting the studies in Table 5.1, it is prudent to determine the protection 
settings of each relay. Short circuit data associated to the microgrid with PV and synchronous 
machine based (SM-based) DG sources is given in Appendix D.   
It should be noted that all relays had a 5 millisecond delay incorporating into them to 
account for detection and breaker operation. 
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5.4.1     Differential Relay Settings 
When determining the differential relay settings, it is prudent to factor in a CT ratio that 
is suitable for the application. As indicated in Figure 2.5, the total load expected to be supplied 
through line 1 is 1 MVA which gives a current as: 
𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 =
1 × 106
√3 × 13800
= 41.84 𝐴 
This calculation indicates that a CT ratio of 50:5 would be adequate. Low turns ratio CTs 
can be prone to saturation under high short circuit current conditions [70]. In accordance with 
IEEE standard C37.110, CTs are required to operate accurately up to 20 times their rated current 
during short circuit conditions. As per Appendix D, the maximum short circuit currents 
experienced by the relays is 2691 A. This would mean that the minimum CT ratio required 
would be: 
𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
2691
20
= 134.55 𝐴 
The closest standard CT rating that exceeds the minimum value is 150:5. As such the CT 
ratio selected is 150:5. 
As indicated in discussions in Section 5.3.3.2, the ratings that can be utilized for the 
differential relays are (note per unit values are on a 5 A base): 
𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁 = 0.25 𝐴 = 0.05 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑃𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 5 𝐴 = 1 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
𝐾1 = 20% 
𝐾2 = 98% 
5.4.2     Adaptive Overcurrent Relay Settings 
As indicated in Section 5.3.3.2, in order to determine the adaptive overcurrent relay 
settings it is imperative to know the expected load and short circuit current during both grid and 
island mode conditions. For load 1 in Figure 5.4 the load current can be determined by: 
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𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 =
0.2 × 106
√3 × 13800
= 8.37 𝐴 
As per Appendix D, the minimum short circuit currents experienced by the load points is 
1431 A and 2206 A for phase and ground faults respectively during grid connected mode. In 
contrast, the minimum short circuit currents experienced by the load points is 54 A and 89 A for 
phase and ground faults respectively during islanded mode. Utilizing Equation 5.4, the phase and 
ground settings for the adaptive overcurrent relay can be determined by: 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 =
1
3
× 1431 = 477 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 =
1
3
× 2206 = 735 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 =
1
3
× 54 = 18 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 =
1
3
× 89 = 29 𝐴 
As per Equation 5.5, the pickup setting associated to the load current can be found by: 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑥 = 2 × 𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 2 × 8.37 = 16.74 𝐴 
As a result of the discussions in Section 5.3.3.2, the pickup settings of the adaptive 
overcurrent relay are: 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 477 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 735 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 18 𝐴 
𝐼𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 29 𝐴 
For consistency purposes, the CT ratios are the same as those determined for the 
differential current relay. 
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It should be noted that the adaptive overcurrent relays in this chapter are set to operate 
instantaneously when pickup settings are exceeded. 
5.4.3     Case Study-1 
Figure 5.5 presents Case Study-1 for the condition where the microgrid is operating in the 
topology of grid connected mode. Through observation it can be seen that following the fault 
inception 1 second into the simulation, the short circuit current flowing through relay RBU1 rises 
rapidly until it peaks at a value of 2075 A. The differential current begins to rise rapidly 
following fault inception until it peaks at 12.5 per unit with a corresponding restraint current of 
12.98 per unit. As a consequence of these conditions, the differential relay protecting line 1 
detects a short circuit condition and causes the circuit breakers RBU1 and R1BU to trip 0.00745 
seconds after fault inception. This demonstrates the capability of the relay to detect the fault 
within its protection zone, disconnecting the faulted segment from the microgrid.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Case Study-1 during grid connected mode:  RBU1 current, RBU1 & B1BU 
differential current, RBU1 & R1BU state signals. 
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Figure 5.6 presents Case Study-1 for the condition where the microgrid is operating in the 
topology of islanded mode. Through observation it can be seen that following the fault inception 
1 second into the simulation, the short circuit current flowing through relay RBU1 rises until it 
peaks at a value of 40 A. The differential current begins to rise rapidly following fault inception 
until it peaks at 0.18 per unit with a corresponding restraint current of 0.05 per unit. As a 
consequence of these conditions it can be observed that the differential relay protecting line 1 
can detect a short circuit condition and cause the circuit breakers RBU1 and R1BU to trip 
0.00735 seconds after fault inception. This demonstrates the capability of the relay to detect 
faults within the protection zone, disconnecting the faulted segment from the microgrid. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Case Study-1 during islanded mode:  RBU1 current, RBU1 & B1BU differential 
current, RBU1 & R1BU state signals. 
Comparing results obtained in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 makes it apparent that the short circuit 
current experienced by the differential relay protecting line 1 drops significantly during the 
microgrid islanded condition as opposed to the grid connected mode. The short circuit current in 
islanded mode is 19.27% of the current experienced in grid connected mode. Despite this 
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significant decrease in current, the differential relay could still clear the faulted segment of the 
microgrid successfully, demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed approach. 
5.4.4     Case Study-2 
Figure 5.7 presents Case Study-2 for the microgrid operating in the topology of grid 
connected mode. Observation reveals that following the fault inception 1 second into the 
simulation, the short circuit current flowing through relay LP1 rises rapidly until it peaks at a 
value of 1660 A. The differential current begins rising marginally following fault inception until 
it peaks at 0.000576 per unit with a corresponding restraint current of 11.3 per unit. 
Consequentially, the differential relay protecting line 1 discriminates against the fault 
experienced on load 1 as it falls outside of its protection zone and thus circuit breakers RBU1 
and R1BU are signaled to remain closed. In addition, it is observed that the phase grid connected 
pickup current of the LP1 adaptive overcurrent relay is exceeded, yielding a breaker tripping 
time of 0.051 seconds. This demonstrates that adaptive overcurrent and differential relays 
operate correctly, given the fault location, indicating compatibility of use in conjunction with one 
another. Furthermore, the adaptive overcurrent relay is demonstrated to be capable of detecting 
the fault within the protection zone, disconnecting the faulted lateral load tap from the microgrid.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Case Study-2 during grid connected mode: LP1 current, RBU1 & B1BU differential 
current, RBU1 & R1BU state signals. 
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Figure 5.8 presents Case Study-2 for the condition where the microgrid is operating in the 
topology of islanded mode. Following the fault inception 1 second into the simulation, the short 
circuit current flowing through relay LP1 rises until it peaks at a value of 55 A. Again, it can be 
seen that the differential current peaks at 0.000576 per unit with a corresponding restraint current 
of 1.77 per unit. Consequentially, the differential relay protecting line 1 discriminates against the 
fault experienced on load 1 as it falls outside of the protection zone and thus instructs circuit 
breakers RBU1 and R1BU to remain closed. In addition, the phase islanded pickup current of the 
LP1 adaptive overcurrent relay is exceeded, yielding a breaker tripping time of 0.0457 seconds. 
Again, this demonstrates that both the adaptive overcurrent and differential relays operate 
correctly, considering the fault location, which indicates that they are compatible for use in 
conjunction with one another. Furthermore, the adaptive overcurrent relay is demonstrated to be 
capable of detecting and clearing within the protection zone, disconnecting the faulted lateral 
load tap from the microgrid.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Case Study-2 during islanded mode: LP1 current, RBU1 & B1BU differential 
current, RBU1 & R1BU state signals. 
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Comparison of results obtained in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 makes it apparent that the adaptive 
overcurrent relay is effective at removing lateral load tap faults despite topological changes with 
the microgrid. It is apparent that the short circuit current experienced by the adaptive overcurrent 
relay protecting line 1 drops significantly during the microgrid islanded condition as opposed to 
the grid connected mode. The short circuit current in islanded mode is 33.13% of the current 
experienced in grid connected mode. Despite this significant decrease in current, the adaptive 
overcurrent relay was still able to clear the faulted segment of the microgrid. Lastly, it can be 
observed that in both cases the differential relay was able to discriminate against the fault, 
preventing the circuit breaker operation along the feeder backbone, successfully demonstrating 
the efficacy of the proposed approach. 
In a traditional distribution protection scheme a fuse would typically be used to protect 
the load. In Case Study-2 a Kearney 20T fuse would be adequate for a steady state load current 
of 9 A. This fuse has a minimum melting current of 40 A. In the islanded mode case indicated in 
Figure 5.8 this fuse would only experience a short circuit current of 55 A. This current would 
correspond to a minimum melting time of approximately 15 seconds [71]. Typically, utilities 
require that a fault be removed from any system within 3 seconds [14]. Calculations indicate that 
a typical fuse used in the distribution network would fail to meet specified fault clearing 
requirements during an islanded mode. This highlights the suitability of the proposed approach in 
lieu of traditional protection methods. 
Multiple case studies were conducted other than the ones specified in this chapter. In the 
additional case studies using multiple fault types and locations in conjunction with multiple DG 
types (PV and SM-based) were utilized. All results demonstrated similar characteristics to the 
ones highlighted in this Chapter. In every case the differential relays were able to discriminate 
between faults that were inside the protection zone and those that were outside of it, tripping 
only when required. Additionally, all adaptive overcurrent relays were able to remove faults that 
occurred in both microgrid topologies.  
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5.5      Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a hybrid adaptive overcurrent and differential current protection 
scheme to compensate for drastic changes in short circuit currents experienced in microgrids 
following transitions between grid and islanded modes. Results make it apparent that the 
proposed approach is effective at clearing faults within the microgrid regardless of operational 
mode. Furthermore, results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach in discriminating 
against faults that fall outside of the protection zone for any given relay with no false tripping 
instances occurring. The proposed scheme is likely to require fewer infrastructure upgrades in 
existing utility networks, since it can be installed in segments rather in its entirety. This is 
particularly useful when budget constraints are a concern. 
Results obtained demonstrate inefficiencies associated with traditional fuse protection for 
loads when microgrid conversion is required. This is attributed to the inability of fuses to adjust 
TCC settings when the microgrid transitions between grid and islanded modes resulting in 
significant differences between short circuit currents in grid and islanded modes. The 
inefficiency associated with traditional fuse protection is not present for the adaptive overcurrent 
relays proposed as replacements for the fuses.  
In summary, results indicate that adaptive overcurrent and differential current relays do 
not require coordination, since upstream differential relays do not operate for faults that are 
outside of the zone of protection. 
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6. A REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND PARTICLE 
SWARM TECHNIQUE TO ALLOW FOR 
CONTINUOUS CONNECTION OF MICROGRIDS 
DURING DISTRIBUTION NETWORK FAULTS 
 
6.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents a smart protection scheme using polynomial regression analysis 
(PRA), in conjunction with particle swarm optimization (PSO), with a directional element to 
prevent excessive short circuit current contribution from microgrids during a grid fault. Through 
the application of this scheme at the point of common coupling (PCC), partial continual 
operation of the microgrid is permissible during grid faults without the need for complete 
disconnection.  Investigations are conducted through several time-domain simulations, designed 
to ascertain the suitability of the proposed scheme for the purpose of mitigating the effects of the 
microgrid on existing grid short circuit protection infrastructure.  
6.2      Microgrid Effects on Distribution Networks 
Due to a consumer-driven increase in demand for energy and increasingly complex grids, 
supplemental generation is being explored by utilities as a means of reducing strain on existing 
sources. As mentioned in previous chapters, one such solution, which delivers power on a local 
level, circumventing the need for increases in generation capacity, is distributed generation 
(DG)/distributed energy resources (DERs) [1]. Sources such as photovoltaic (PV), wind and 
biogas within individual or clustered load centers, converted to microgrids, are being explored to 
service local energy needs. Chapter 5 explores the advantages of microgrids in the context of 
system loss and interruption reduction, however microgrids introduce unique challenges, 
especially in the context of operational and protection constraints. When applied to a traditional 
distribution network designed on the basis of large short circuit currents with a unidirectional 
power flow characteristic, the inclusion of microgrids like DERs can result in the degradation of 
these common characteristics observed in classical networks [3]. 
The literature suggests that, when determining the effects on existing distribution feeder 
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protection infrastructure, investigations are often carried out by treating microgrids as a lumped 
DG source [31]. As a result, mitigation of excessive short circuit current contribution from DG 
sources onto the distribution network is achieved through techniques which reduce fault current 
from the DG source itself [55]. In the context of DG short circuit current contributions, Kalman 
filter techniques are also offered as a means of predicting fault level contributions in distribution 
networks [72] - [73]. 
With increasing penetration of DERs on networks, another solution is PSO, whereby 
operational issues are solved through optimization of specified constraints [23], [74] - [75].  
Multiple applications utilize PSO in the context of power systems [74], [76]. 
 
6.3      The Proposed Scheme 
Section 6.2 investigates microgrid integration and prediction/optimization algorithms in 
the context of power systems, viable for use by utilities. The use of PSO in a power systems 
context is becoming popular due to its simplicity in calculation. Although interesting, there is 
very little research that reports on the prediction and mitigation of short circuit contributions 
from microgrids during utility faults for the purposes of maintaining existing protection 
infrastructure adequacy. In this context, Chapter 6 offers a potential solution. 
In order to maintain the existing protection infrastructure adequacy the fault level 
contributions from generation plants within microgrids are required to be determined. This will 
identify what the contribution from the generation plants are and will highlight the level of short 
circuit current mitigation required. For simple networks where every possible combination of the 
generation plants (i.e. which plants are operating or not), wind speed, irradiance and system 
loading condition is plausible, a simple current source model could be utilized. However, 
practically, the number of generation combinations could be excessive (for example if there were 
24 plants there would be 24 factorial different combinations) and knowing every wind speed and 
irradiance combination is practically infeasible. As such a combination of a statistical and 
optimization algorithm should be used to predict short circuit contributions.  
The proposed scheme in this chapter utilizes a relay at the PCC between the microgrid 
and the distribution network. Within the relay, a direction sensing unit is used to determine the 
direction of flow of current (during a short circuit) which permits the scheme to operate only if 
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the current flow is from the microgrid to the distribution network. Failing this, the scheme is 
blocked and the internal microgrid protection is left to operate and clear the internal fault. When 
the scheme is permitted to operate, the polynomial regression analysis (PRA) uses the wind 
speed, irradiance and availability data to determine individual generation plant contributions 
from the microgrid to the distribution network. The PSO algorithm determines the minimum 
number of generation units within the plants that need to be disconnected such that the overall 
short circuit contribution of the microgrid to the utility during a grid fault does not yield loss of 
protection coordination. This allows for the connection between the microgrid and utility to be 
maintained, mitigating operational disturbances.  
6.3.1     Overall Sequence of Operation 
The proposed scheme’s interconnecting block is applied at the PCC between the 
microgrid and the utility network as demonstrated in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Location of the interconnecting block. 
 
Figure 6.2: Components of the interconnecting block in the proposed scheme. 
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As can be seen in Figure 6.2, a directional sensing unit is integrated into the relay of the 
proposed scheme, facilitating communication between the DG sources in the microgrid and 
corresponding generation unit breakers. The proposed scheme is responsible for detecting the 
short circuit contribution from the microgrid to the utility during a fault. The method can be 
explained using the following steps: 
1. Before the proposed scheme can work properly, the loss of coordination (LOC) limit 
for the given distribution utility network is required. In practice this limit would be 
provided by the utility however in this thesis it is determined using the method 
specified in reference [47]. The LOC limit is the maximum level of short circuit 
current that is permitted to flow from the microgrid to the utility for a fault before loss 
of coordination occurs between the reclosers and fuses. In this thesis a safety 
multiplication factor of 0.9 is used i.e. if the current flowing from the microgrid to the 
utility is greater than 0.9 times the LOC limit current, then the pickup value of the 
proposed scheme is exceeded. This is also known as the corrected LOC limit. The 
location of the fault that yields the LOC in the network is taken as the point for all 
short circuit measurements for the PRA conducted in Section 6.3.2. 
2. The current is fed into the relay unit via a CT. Then the current magnitude and 
direction is determined and communicated to the central control unit (CCU). If the 
current flow is from the utility to the microgrid then the CCU blocks communication 
between the relay and the generation unit interconnecting relays within the microgrid 
generation plants. This is to allow for the protection infrastructure specified in 
Chapter 5 to clear the internal microgrid fault without interference from the proposed 
scheme. In order to accomplish this, the proposed scheme is required to have a 
directional sensing unit integrated into the architecture as demonstrated in Figure 6.2. 
3. If the current is flowing from the microgrid to the utility and the short circuit 
contribution exceeds the pre-specified corrected LOC limit, then the CCU determines 
the short circuit current outputs from the microgrid generation plants through the use 
of regression analysis. The regression analysis takes training data from a multitude of 
cases for a specific microgrid to determine the short circuit contribution to utility 
faults from generation plants under varying conditions. This forms the basis for short 
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circuit current contribution predictions to aid in identification of individual units 
within generation plants that require their contributions to be curtailed. 
4. The relay within each generation plant communicates the current status to the CCU 
within the interconnecting block. This communication includes wind speeds (for wind 
turbines), solar irradiance level (for PV sources), the output power (for SM based 
plants, e.g. operating at 80% of capabilities) and also the status of each generator (i.e. 
if it is online or not). 
5. Utilizing the data from the generation relays in addition to the information from the 
current magnitude and direction sensing units within the proposed scheme, the PRA 
equations are used within the PSO algorithm to determine the minimum number of 
units to be disconnected within the plants to maintain utility protection coordination.  
Through observation of Figure 6.2, it is apparent that there is a requirement for a 
communication link between the proposed schemes’ CCU and the generation plant’s relays. 
Although this particular component is outside the scope of this thesis, Ethernet Fiber Links 
technology should be adequate for this application with a delay time in the order of only a few 
milliseconds [52]. Although this technology should be adequate for this application, there are 
many others that would be potentially viable. In order to account for the communication, a delay 
time of five milliseconds is used in time-domain simulations. 
6.3.2     Regression Analysis for the Prediction of Fault Current Contributions 
The key inputs that are required to be determined for the regression analysis is the 
percentage penetration from each generation plant in conjunction with the wind speed, solar 
irradiance and output of synchronous machine based (SM-based) (biogas) generators. The 
topology of the microgrid feeders plus pre-fault loading and post-fault measurements are 
required to determine percentage penetration for each feeder. This can be described as such: 
In order to determine the percentage penetration of each generation plant, the feeder pre-
fault current levels are required to be utilized in conjunction with: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃1 =
𝐼𝑃1
𝐼𝑃1+𝐼𝑃2+𝐼𝑃3
× 100         (6.1) 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃2 =
𝐼𝑃2
𝐼𝑃1+𝐼𝑃2+𝐼𝑃3
× 100         (6.2) 
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 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃3 =
𝐼𝑃3
𝐼𝑃1+𝐼𝑃2+𝐼𝑃3
× 100         (6.3) 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃4 =
𝐼𝑃4
𝐼𝑃4+𝐼𝑃5+𝐼𝑃6
× 100         (6.4) 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃5 =
𝐼𝑃5
𝐼𝑃4+𝐼𝑃5+𝐼𝑃6
× 100         (6.5) 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃6 =
𝐼𝑃6
𝐼𝑃4+𝐼𝑃5+𝐼𝑃6
× 100         (6.6) 
where PENPx is the percentage penetration of generation plant x in percent. The plant 
currents can be expressed diagrammatically as per Figure 6.3. As can be seen in Equations 6.1 to 
6.6, only generation plants that are connected to the same feeder are considered in the percentage 
penetration calculations.  
 
Figure 6.3: Example diagram of current measurements. 
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 To determine the percentage rating of a generation plant, the type of generators present in 
the plant is required to be known in addition to the pre-fault loading conditions. For a SM-based 
generation plant the following can be used to express the percentage rating: 
𝑟𝑃𝑆𝑀 =
𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
× 100         (6.7) 
 where rPSM is the percentage rating of a SM-based generation plant, Soutput is the pre-fault 
output of the SM-based generation plant in MVA and Srated is the rated MVA output of the SM-
based generation plant. 
Similarly for the wind based generation plants, the following is used to express the 
percentage rating: 
𝑟𝑃𝑊 =
𝐶𝑊𝑆
𝑅𝑊𝑆
× 100         (6.8) 
 where rPW is the percentage rating of a wind based generation plant, CWS and RWS are 
the current and rated wind speeds respectively in meters per second. It should be noted that 
Equation 6.8 assumes that the wind turbine diameters and air density are constant. As such the 
power output of the turbine is only related to the velocity of the wind. In the event that the wind 
speed is greater than the rated wind speed, rPW will be forced to be one. The reason for this is 
wind turbines will not generate above their rated power output (which first occurs at the rated 
wind speed) even when exceeding the rated wind speed. When the rated wind speed is exceeded 
the wind power curve of any turbine becomes flat until it reaches its cutout speed [11].  
For a PV based generation plant the following is used to express the percentage rating: 
𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑉 =
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼
× 100         (6.9) 
 where rPPV is the percentage rating of a PV based generation plant, CI is the current 
irradiance and RI is the rated irradiance in Watts per square meter. It should be noted that CI is 
measured as the irradiance level that actually strikes the solar array; as such the power converted 
is related to the number of modules, the area of the panels and the irradiance level. In Equation 
6.9 it is assumed that the area of the panels and the number of panels are constant hence the 
output of the PV plant is only related to the irradiance striking the panels.  
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 With the inputs defined, the PRA is able to account for variations in solar irradiance, 
wind speed and availability of generation plant resources to predict the short circuit contribution 
that will occur for a grid fault from the microgrid.  
 To allow for accurate predictions by the PRA, training data is required. This data is 
accumulated through numerous short circuit analysis studies that are required to be conducted on 
a given system. The percentage rating of the generation plants in addition to the penetration 
percentile are required to be recorded with the corresponding short circuit contribution for a 
variety of fault types. The more data points accumulated, the more accurate the PRA will be.  
 The first set of data points required correspond to the maximum short circuit contribution 
from a generation plant. A generation plant will deliver its maximum short circuit contribution 
when no other generation plants are in operation. This set of data must be accumulated for many 
percentage ratings of the generation plant (in these cases the percentage penetration is 100%). 
The second set of data points required correspond to the minimum short circuit current 
contribution from a generation plant. This occurs when all the other generation plants are 
operating at their rated capacity (in these cases the percentage penetration will gradually 
decrease as the percentage rating decreases).  
 
Figure 6.4: Example of short circuit current versus percentage generation plant rating for 
maximum and minimum cases. 
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The maximum and minimum cases are plotted with the short circuit current on the 
vertical axis with the percentage rating on the horizontal axis. As illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
In this thesis, all the predictions are scaled according to the maximum penetration case. 
As such a line of best fit is required for the maximum penetration case. Utilizing regression 
techniques discussed in Section 1.4, a quadratic equation of best fit can be expressed generically: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝛿𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝛼𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝛽𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.10) 
 where IftPi is the predicted short circuit level for generation plant i with a percentage 
rating r (rPi) and fault type t. It should be noted that δ, α and β are coefficients of the prediction 
polynomial that correspond to the specific generation plant, rating and fault type. It should be 
noted that for fitted polynomial equations of orders higher than two (upper exponents), the 
coefficients associated to the upper exponents of were of negligible magnitude hence 
polynomials of degree 2 (quadratic) were selected for equations of best fit. This is the same 
justification for all subsequent equations in this chapter (Equations 6.12 to 6.16). 
Once the maximum and minimum short circuit contribution cases are plotted, additional 
data is required to be obtained and plotted at individual rating states of the generation plant as 
defined by Equations 6.7 to 6.9. This additional data is used to scale the maximum short circuit 
case expressed in Equation 6.10 for predictions. The short circuit data must be scaled according 
to Equation 6.11: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑡 = 𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡/𝐼𝑓100𝑡         (6.11) 
where RApt is the ratio of the actual short circuit current level output by the generation 
plant at rating r for a fault type of t and penetration p. the denominator of Equation 6.11 
represents the fault level during the maximum output case (When only a single generation plant 
is operating). This allows for all other short circuit levels to be expressed in per unit quantities 
using the maximum case as the base. 
Consider an example case of a SM-based generation plant; the output can be run for a 
percentage rating of 100%, 90%, 80%, 70% and 60% to capture a wide cross-section of results 
for scaling. These cases are then fit with a quadratic polynomial. Consider the following sample 
data for the 100% and 90% rated case for a single line-to-ground fault: 
96 
 
Table 6.1: Sample fault data for a SM generation plant at an output rating of 100% and 90%. 
r = 100% r = 90% 
Fault level (A) PEN (%) (p) IfprLG/If100rLG Fault level (A) PEN (%) (p) IfprLG/If100rLG 
629 100 1 617 100 1 
277 47.727 0.440 276 45.882 0.447 
272 31.579 0.432 271 30 0.439 
268 23.823 0.426 268 22.504 0.434 
 
Figure 6.5: Example of single line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
for a SM-based Plant operating at rated output.  
 
Figure 6.6: Example of single line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
for a SM-based Plant operating at 90% rated output. 
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As can be seen in Table 6.1, the short circuit levels are scaled according to the maximum 
penetration case. For example, the rated output of the SM-based plant at 90% with a penetration 
of 30% gives a fault level of 271 A. The corresponding maximum case fault level is 617 A. With 
scaling as per Equation 6.11, this yields: 
𝑅𝐴30𝐿𝐺 =
271
617
= 0.439 
Plotting these cases with the fault ratio on the vertical axis and the penetration percentage 
on the horizontal axis allows for a prediction of the short circuit ratio at a specific rating and 
percentage penetration. An example for a 100% and 90% case can be seen in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 
respectively. 
Similar to Equation 6.10, a quadratic polynomial is fit to the data for individual operating 
outputs. These equations can be expressed generically in the form: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝜏𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.12) 
 As observed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the corresponding quadratic polynomials for the 
example cases with ratings 100% and 90% are as such; 
𝑅𝐴𝑝100𝐿𝐺𝑃𝑖 = 0.0001(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 − 0.009(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 0.5718 
𝑅𝐴𝑝90𝐿𝐺𝑃𝑖 = 0.0001(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 − 0.0081(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 0.5587 
Equation 6.12 is used for discrete percentage ratings of the generation plant (i.e. 100%, 
90% etc.). In order to predict the correct short circuit ratio, the generation plant would need to be 
operating at discrete percentage ratings previously accounted for in the data. It is not feasible to 
account for every scenario, hence the individual coefficients in Equation 6.12 need to be adjusted 
according to the percentage rating. To do this, each coefficient must be plotted on a graph with 
values serving as the vertical axis while the percentage rating serves as the horizontal axis. Note 
the following sample data from the case of a SM-based generation plant with a single line-to-
ground fault type, with the output ratings of the machine varying from 100% to 60% in 10% 
increments. 
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Table 6.2: Ratio scaling coefficients for a SM-based generation plant for a single line-to-ground 
fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100 0.00013 -0.00897 0.57180 
90 0.00012 -0.00806 0.55868 
80 0.00011 -0.00647 0.52376 
70 0.00010 -0.00553 0.50345 
60 0.00009 -0.00429 0.48137 
The coefficients in Table 6.2 are plotted as such: 
 
Figure 6.7: Example of single line-to-ground τ coefficients versus percentage rating for a SM-
based generation plant. 
 
Figure 6.8: Example of single line-to-ground γ coefficients versus percentage rating for a SM-
based generation plant. 
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Figure 6.9: Example of single line-to-ground ε coefficients versus percentage rating for a SM-
based generation plant. 
Similar to Equation 6.12, a quadratic polynomial is fit to the data to determine the 
coefficients. These equations can be expressed generically in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.13) 
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.14) 
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.15) 
These are known as the corrected coefficients (denoted c) 
As a result, Equation 6.12 can now be expressed using the corrected coefficients: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.16) 
where Equation 6.16 gives the predicted short circuit ratio relative to the maximum 
penetration case. As such, in order to predict the short circuit current that will be output by a 
generation plant, Equation 6.16 is multiplied by Equation 6.10 to give: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖         (6.17) 
Equation 6.17 gives the predicted fault current for generation plant i at a penetration 
percentage p with an operating output of r percent of the plant rating for a fault type t in 
Amperes. 
ε = -2E-06 r2 + 0.0027 r + 0.3242
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This procedure is conducted for every generation plant and fault type to be able to predict 
the short circuit contribution from the microgrid to the utility during short circuit conditions.  
6.3.3     Particle Swarm Optimization for Selection of Generation Plant Contribution 
Mitigation 
As specified in Section 6.3.1, PSO is utilized to determine which units within the 
generation plants are required to be disconnected to prevent LOC on the utility network. The 
PSO utilizes the prediction method specified by the regression analysis in Section 6.3.2 in 
conjunction with traditional PSO methods to make this determination.  
The traditional PSO algorithm is specified in Section 1.5 of this thesis. Although the 
traditional PSO is effective, it has been demonstrated to potentially converge prematurely [77]. 
In reference [77], a solution has been offered to mitigate premature convergence, accomplished 
through the addition of a new term in the velocity update equation specified in Equation 1.7 for 
the global best particle. Using an index of τ, the following position update equation is utilized for 
the global best particle only (all other particles continue to use Equation 1.7). 
 𝑥𝑛+1
𝜏 = 𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑛𝑣𝑛
𝜏 + 𝑝𝑛(1 − 2𝑟2)  (6.18) 
Where the factor pn is adapted after each iteration. This is updated according to the rules 
specified in Equations 6.19 to 6.21 [77]: 
 𝑝𝑛+1 = 2𝑝𝑛, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 > 15 (6.19) 
 𝑝𝑛+1 = 0.5𝑝𝑛, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 > 5  (6.20) 
 𝑝𝑛+1 = 𝑝𝑛, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  (6.21) 
where p0 is equal to one. A failure occurs if the current global best particle is in the same 
position as the previous global best particle. A success occurs when the current global best 
particle is in a different position to the previous global best particle. It is important to note that 
when a failure occurs the number of successes is reset to zero and when a success occurs the 
number of failures is reset to zero. 
PSO works on the premise of optimizing a specific objective function with specified 
constraints. In the case of the problem presented, the objective is to make the short circuit 
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contribution from the microgrid to a utility fault less than the LOC limit (we represent this as u1 
in the PSO algorithm). The first constraint in this problem is related to the number of generation 
units that are mitigated (this is designated the SourceCount). The second constraint is related to 
the difference between the numbers of sources mitigated in each plant (this is designated u2). 
This is to remove bias from the optimization spreads the effects of the mitigation (e.g. it is 
desirable rather trip one generator from two different plants than two generators from the same 
plant). As indicated in Section 6.3.2, the predictions equations are non-linear and the constraints 
associated to the PSO are integer values. As such this is a mixed integer, non-linear optimization 
problem. The function proposed for use in the PSO scheme is as such: 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑢1 + 𝑢2 − 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)  (6.22) 
where 
 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 =  ∑ (𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 × 𝑁𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1   (6.23) 
where PRPi is the percentage reduction determined by the PSO algorithm (e.g. 80% 
would mean that the number of generation sources within generation plant i would need be 
reduced to 80% of what it was when the fault occurred. If there were 5 sources at generation 
plant i then an output of 80% would mean that one source would be disconnected). NPi is the 
number of generation sources within generation plant i and n is the number of generation plants. 
The function in Equation 6.22 is based on reducing penalty factors u1 and u2. The penalty 
factor u1 is related to the LOC limit of the network. If the predicted short circuit contribution 
from the regression analysis is above the corrected LOC limit then u1 equates to 1000 or else it is 
zero. This ensures that the optimal solution will always be below the LOC limit. 
The penalty factor u2 is introduced to try and mitigate bias within the PSO algorithm in 
the context of choosing which generation plant’s sources will be disconnected. This is 
accomplished by taking the absolute of the difference for each PRPi× NPi value. Consider an 
example where there are 6 generation plants with 5 generation sources within each plant. The 
penalty factor u2 is calculated through: 
 𝑢2 = ∑ 𝑧𝑗
15
𝑗=1   (6.24) 
 𝑧𝑗 = 𝐴𝐵𝑆([5 − 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑘 × 𝑁𝑃𝑘] − [5 − 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑙 × 𝑁𝑃𝑙]) ×
1
5
 (6.25) 
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where k and l are plant numbers that cannot be equal to each other. Equation 6.25 is 
repeated for every combination of the plants (e.g. if there are 6 plants with 5 sources then there 
are 15 combinations). 
 In order for the PSO algorithm to work correctly the inputs that are required are the 
current percentage output of SM-based generation plants, the wind speed and the irradiance level. 
These are then used to calculate the percentage penetrations as per Equations 6.1 to 6.6 and the 
percentage rating as per Equations 6.7 to 6.9. These values are determined through real time 
monitoring of the generation plants.  
PSO operates on the basis of trialing a set number of candidate solutions before there is 
an adjustment to these initial candidate solutions using the algorithm procedure set out in Section 
1.5. This means that a number of initial trials are required to be programmed into the PSO 
algorithm. In order to accomplish this, a random continuous uniform distribution function is 
programmed into the PSO algorithm that gives 1000 random candidate initial solutions. It should 
be noted that one solution that is also programmed into the PSO algorithm is the net zero case 
where every generation plant and source is removed from the network. 
The PSO algorithm is set to take the greatest current value as the predicted short circuit 
current. This means that for a phase fault when the PSO algorithm runs a case, if the three-phase 
fault is predicted to be greater than the line-to-line fault, then the predicted phase short circuit 
current is taken as the three-phase fault. This same decision process is utilized for the ground 
faults.   
The population of random candidate solutions is run through the PSO algorithm, 
integrated with the PRA tool, to determine the optimal solution. Once the optimal solution is 
determined, it is stored in the CCU and transmitted via a communication channel to the relays of 
each generation plant in the scenario where the current exceeds the corrected LOC limit and is 
flowing from the microgrid to the utility.  
6.4      Application of the Proposed Scheme 
This section aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme through 
multiple comparative studies. As specified in Figure 3.2, LOC first occurs for a microgrid 
connected at distribution bus 2 when a fault occurs at load L1: that is, the microgrid is integrated 
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into the network at distribution bus 2 in this chapter. The system utilized in the studies in this 
chapter is similar to that of Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, in conjunction with Figure 2.5. These 
adjusted networks are presented in Figures 6.10 and 6.11.  
 
Figure 6.10: The system under study with a microgrid connected at distribution bus 2. 
The system presented in Figure 6.10 consists of a substation serving two 25 kV feeders. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, there are three types of loads present in the network, namely: constant 
impedance (L1 and L4), constant power (L3) and composite loads (L5 and L6). The microgrid is 
integrated into the network where load point 2 was previously located. Fuse protection is 
employed to protect all load points except the microgrid, and each feeder is protected by its own 
designated recloser (RE1 and RE2). The microgrid is connected through the interconnecting 
block and a 25/13.8 kV transformer. As per Section 2.2.3, the fuse sizes and load sizes of each 
load are specified in Table 6.3. 
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Figure 6.11: Single line diagram of the microgrid under study. 
Table 6.3: Load demand and fuse sizes for the system under study. 
Load 
number/demand 
(MVA) 
1/1MVA 2/6 MVA 3/2 MVA 4/1 MVA 5/6 MVA 6/5 MVA 
S&C SM4, 5 
Fuse size 
175E N/A 125E 150E 150E 125E 
It should be noted that the settings of the head end reclosers are the same as that specified 
in previous chapters. The microgrid integrated into the network is detailed in Figure 6.11. 
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The microgrid consists of six main buses. All loads are operating at a demand of 1 MW 
with a 0.9 power factor. The generation sources within each plant are summarized in Table 6.4. 
Furthermore, through observation of Figure 6.11 it can be seen that there is a communication 
link between the interconnecting block and the decision relays within the generation plants. As 
illustrated in Figures 6.12 to 6.14, within the generation plants there is a decision relay that reads 
the information communicated from the interconnecting block stating which generating units are 
required to be tripped (decided by the regression and PSO algorithm). The decision relay then 
transmits a trip signal to the circuit breakers for the relevant generating units. The generation 
sources within the plants couple at a common bus before being converted through a transformer 
to the voltage of the microgrid.  
Table 6.4: Microgrid plant information. 
Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Type SM DFIG PV DFIG PV SM 
Number of units 5 2 5 2 5 5 
Unit size (MVA) 0.2 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.5 0.4 
Plant Size (MVA) 1 3 0.5 3 2.5 2 
 
Figure 6.12: Internal connections of a SM-based generation plant connected to bus B1 in the 
microgrid. 
Plant 1 has five 0.2 MVA synchronous generators (SM) operating at a power factor of 0.9. 
Plant 2 has two 1.5 MVA doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) type wind turbines with a rated 
wind speed of 11.24 meters per second. Plant 3 has five 0.1 MVA photovoltaic (PV) plants with 
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a rated irradiance of 1000 W/m2. Plant 4 has two 1.5 MVA DFIG type wind turbines with the 
same rating as bus 2. Plant 5 has five 0.5 MVA PV plants with the same rating as bus 2. Plant 6 
has five 0.4 MVA synchronous generators with the same operating conditions as bus 1. 
The placement of breakers and relays within the microgrid is the same as that specified in 
Chapter 5. Protection settings will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
 
Figure 6.13: Internal connections of a PV based generation plant connected to bus B3 in the 
microgrid. 
 
Figure 6.14: Internal connections of a wind based generation plant connected to bus B2 in the 
microgrid. 
6.4.1     Determination of Loss of Coordination Limits 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, reference [47] presents a method for determination of LOC 
limits for candidate microgrid connection points in distribution networks. The method presented 
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in reference [47] gives the LOC limit in terms of MVA of the DG unit. In the case of the method 
specified in Section 6.3, it is necessary for the LOC limit to be determined in terms of fault 
current as opposed to MVA rating. As such in this chapter, the method discussed in Section 3.4.1 
is utilized with a minor change, whereby the LOC limit is expressed in terms of fault current.  
For a microgrid integrated into DB2 of the network specified in Figure 6.10, the LOC 
limit was found to be 438 A and 395 A for phase (three-phase and line-to-line) and ground (line-
to-line-to-ground and line-to-ground) faults respectively. This occurs when the fault is located on 
load L1. It should also be noted that the LOC limit is for an operating voltage of 25 kV.  
6.4.2     Microgrid Protection Settings 
As discussed, the microgrid protection scheme that is deployed in the system under study 
is the same as that indicated in Chapter 5. As indicated in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, buses and 
lines are protected with differential current relays while load taps are protected using adaptive 
overcurrent relays.  The procedure for determining the settings is as outlined in Chapter 5. It 
should be noted that the adaptive overcurrent protection relays were not utilized in the studies of 
this chapter.  
As indicated in Table 6.3, the maximum total load expected to be supplied through a line 
is 3 MVA which gives a current as: 
𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 =
3 × 106
√3 × 13800
= 125.51 𝐴 
This would indicate that a CT ratio of 150:5 would be adequate. Low turns ratio CTs can 
be prone to saturation under high short circuit current conditions [70]. In accordance with IEEE 
standard C37.110, CTs are required to operate accurately up to 20 times their rated current 
during short circuit conditions. The maximum short circuit currents experienced by the relays 
never exceed 2800 A. This would mean that the minimum CT ratio required would be: 
𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
2800
20
= 140 𝐴 
The closest standard CT rating that exceeds the minimum value is 150:5. As such the CT 
ratio selected is 150:5. 
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As indicated in discussions in Section 5.3.3.2, the ratings that can be utilized for the 
differential relays are (note per unit values are on a 5 A base): 
𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐾𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁 = 0.25 𝐴 = 0.05 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑃𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 5 𝐴 = 1 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
𝐾1 = 20% 
𝐾2 = 98% 
6.4.3     Training of the Regression Analysis and Particle Swarm Optimization 
As discussed, in order for the PRA and PSO algorithm to make accurate predictions, a 
series of fault data is required. In order to accumulate the necessary data, multiple case studies 
were conducted for each generation plant.  
6.4.3.1     Photovoltaic Plants Fault Analysis Cases 
In the case of PV based generation plants, the short circuit current of the DG units are 
limited by the inverters used in the modules [78] - [79]. As a consequence the fault level output 
by the PV plants does not exceed a common value for each fault type. As a result, the short 
circuit output of the PV plant was taken as constant when in operation, or taken as zero when not 
in operation. For the PV plants, the following short circuit data was obtained through fault 
analysis simulations and are thus utilized as the fault levels expected from the PV plants: 
Table 6.5: PV generation plant fault current information. 
Plant 
Three-Phase 
fault current (A) 
Line-to-line  
fault current (A) 
Line-to-line-to-
ground fault 
current (A) 
Single line-to-
ground fault 
current (A) 
3 20 23 45 50 
5 83 60 155 165 
It should be noted that the PV plants are at their maximum output when the irradiance is 
1000 W/m2. 
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6.4.3.2     Wind Based Plant Fault Analysis Cases 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Microgrid setup for the maximum short circuit current contribution case for Plant 2. 
As indicated in Table 6.4, there are two wind based generation plants in the system under 
study located at Plant 2 and Plant 4. In order to accumulate the necessary training data, multiple 
sample short circuit case studies were conducted. The first set of studies conducted were when 
all generation plants are disconnected except for Plant 2 or 4 depending on which plant is being 
observed. This is done for all fault types and, as discussed previously, is the maximum short 
circuit case. The microgrid setup for these cases is shown in Figures 6.15 and 6.16. 
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Figure 6.16: Microgrid setup for the maximum short circuit current contribution case for Plant 4. 
The short circuit studies are conducted by applying faults of various types at the load L1 
in Figure 6.10. The outputs of the generation plants were varied by adjusting the wind speed. 
Each plant is made up of two 1.5 MVA DFIG wind turbines connected in parallel with one 
another, as indicated in Figure 6.14, with a rated wind speed of 11.24 meters per second. The 
wind speeds used in the simulation were 11.24, 11, 10, 9 and 8 meters per second, which vary 
rPW as defined in Equation 6.8. From each study the percentage penetration was recorded (100% 
in the maximum penetration case) in conjunction with the short circuit output of the generation 
plants. The results for the training cases are outlined in Appendix E.1 and E.2. 
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The second sample case considered is when all the other generation plants are operating 
at maximum rated output. The only variable that is adjusted is the wind speed. The wind is 
adjusted again for speeds of 11.24, 11, 10, 9 and 8 meters per second. Results for the training 
cases are outlined in Appendix E.1 and E.2. 
The third sample case study involved inactive PV plants (3 and 5) (i.e. the irradiance is 0 
W/m2) and the SM-based plants (Plants 1 and 6) which are operating at 80% of their rated output. 
Results for the training cases are outlined in Appendix E.1 and E.2. 
The final sample case study considered is when the PV plants (3 and 5) are not operating 
(i.e. the irradiance is 0 W/m2) and the SM-based plants (1 and 6) are operating at 60% of their 
rated output. Results for the training cases are outlined in Appendix E.1 and E.2. 
Utilizing the results given in Appendix E.1 and E.2 in conjunction with the procedure 
outlined in Section 6.3.2, the following maximum short circuit prediction equations are obtained: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝑃2 = 0.0128(𝑟𝑃2)
2 − 1.469(𝑟𝑃2) + 318.16 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑃2 = 0.0251(𝑟𝑃2)
2 − 2.243(𝑟𝑃2) + 296.17 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑃2 = 0.0171(𝑟𝑃2)
2 − 3.278(𝑟𝑃2) + 988.50 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑃2 = −0.0011(𝑟𝑃2)
2 + 1.011(𝑟𝑃2) + 973.59 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝑃4 = 0.0130(𝑟𝑃4)
2 − 1.440(𝑟𝑃4) + 318.43 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑃4 = 0.0253(𝑟𝑃4)
2 − 2.244(𝑟𝑃4) + 298.26 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑃4 = 0.0114(𝑟𝑃4)
2 − 2.566(𝑟𝑃4) + 1086.95 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑃4 = −0.0003(𝑟𝑃4)
2 + 0.827(𝑟𝑃4) + 1111.56 
The correction coefficient equations are given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
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𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table 6.6: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for generation plant 2. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 1.5756E-07 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -2.1432E-05 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 6.7719E-04 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -2.9774E-05 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 4.2680E-03 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -1.3867E-01 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 1.4022E-03 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -2.1253E-01 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 8.0967E+00 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
Table 6.7: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for generation plant 4. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 1.0254E-07 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -1.3039E-05 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 4.3112E-04 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -1.7795E-05 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 2.3828E-03 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -7.7390E-02 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 7.5369E-04 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -1.0788E-01 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 4.4271E+00 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.16 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 
 Note that all graphs and derivation of equations is outlined in Appendix E.5 and E.6.  
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6.4.3.3 Biogas Synchronous Machine Based Plant Fault Analysis Cases 
 
Figure 6.17: Microgrid setup for the maximum short circuit current contribution case for Plant 1. 
As indicated in Table 6.4, there are two generation plants in the system under study, 
located at Plant 1 and Plant 6. In order to accumulate the necessary training data, multiple sample 
short circuit case studies were conducted. In the first set of studies conducted, all generation 
plants are disconnected except for Plant 1 or 6, depending on which plant is being observed. This 
is done for all fault types and, as discussed previously, is the maximum short circuit case. The 
microgrid setup for these cases is expressed in Figures 6.17 and 6.18. 
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The short circuit studies are conducted by applying faults of various types at load L1 in 
Figure 6.10. In addition, the output of the generation plants are varied. Each plant is made up of 
five synchronous generators (rated at 0.2 MVA and 0.4 MVA for Plant 1 and 6 respectively) 
connected in parallel with one another as indicated in Figure 6.12. The percentage ratings used 
(rPSM) in simulation are 100%, 90%, 80%, 70% and 60%. From each study the percentage 
penetration was recorded (100% in the maximum penetration case) in conjunction with the short 
circuit output of the generation plants. The results for the training cases are outlined in Appendix 
E.3 and E.4. 
 
Figure 6.18: Microgrid setup for the maximum short circuit current contribution case for Plant 6. 
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The second sample case considered is when all the other generation plants are operating 
at maximum rated output. The only variable that is adjusted is the percentage output. The 
percentage ratings used (rPSM) in simulation are 100%, 90%, 80%, 70% and 60%. Again, results 
for the training cases are outlined in Appendix E.3 and E.4. 
The third sample case study considered is when the PV plants (Plants 3 and 5) are not 
operating (i.e. the irradiance is 0 W/m2) and the wind based plants (Plants 2 and 4) are operating 
at a wind speed of 10 meters per second. Results for the training cases are outlined in Appendix 
E.3 and E.4. 
The final sample case study considered is when the PV plants (Plants 3 and 5) are not 
operating (i.e. the irradiance is 0 W/m2) and the wind based plants (Plants 2 and 4) are operating 
at a wind speed of 10 meters per second, but have one turbine disconnected (i.e. operating at 50% 
capacity of the plant but 100% capacity of a single turbine). Results for the training cases are 
outlined in Appendix E.3 and E.4. 
Utilizing the results given in Appendix E.3 and E.4 in conjunction with the procedure 
outlined in Section 6.3.2, the following maximum short circuit prediction equations are obtained: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝑃1 = −0.00012(𝑟𝑃1)
2 + 0.199(𝑟𝑃1) + 188.29 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑃1 = −0.0006(𝑟𝑃1)
2 + 0.394(𝑟𝑃1) + 178.43 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑃1 = 0.0083(𝑟𝑃1)
2 − 0.874(𝑟𝑃1) + 608.43 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑃1 = 0.0025(𝑟𝑃1)
2 + 0.182(𝑟𝑃1) + 583.29 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝑃6 = 0.0057(𝑟𝑃6)
2 − 0.179(𝑟𝑃6) + 329.50 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑃6 = 0.0077(𝑟𝑃6)
2 − 0.302(𝑟𝑃6) + 309.64 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑃6 = −0.0026(𝑟𝑃6)
2 + 1.017(𝑟𝑃6) + 532.14 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝑃6 = 0.0058(𝑟𝑃6)
2 + 0.001(𝑟𝑃6) + 587.29 
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The correction coefficient equations are given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table 6.8: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for generation plant 1. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a -1.6939E-10 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -7.4012E-07 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 2.0748E-05 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -7.1212E-08 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 1.0996E-04 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -1.6388E-03 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 8.6804E-06 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -3.5758E-03 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 9.5567E-01 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
Table 6.9: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for generation plant 6. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 7.3274E-09 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -8.7461E-07 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 1.9336E-05 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -1.1175E-06 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 1.4564E-04 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -3.0666E-03 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 3.8104E-05 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -5.7563E-03 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 7.3274E-09 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.16 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖          
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This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑖 
 Note that all graphs and derivation of equations is outlined in Appendix E.7 and E.8.  
6.4.4     PSO and Protection Settings 
A critical component within the proposed scheme is the integration of a direction sensing 
unit. The directional components of the relay are discussed in Section 1.2.2. Considering that the 
interconnecting transformer between the microgrid and the utility is a double grounded wye (i.e. 
has a zero sequence source) and is considered to be a main feeder, the directional protection 
settings are selected to be: 
• Relay connection angle: 90 degrees. 
• Relay characteristic angle: 30 degrees. 
The next characteristic setting required is the penalty factor associated with the LOC 
limit within the PSO algorithm. As per discussions in Section 6.3.3, the penalty factor u1 is 1000 
when the corrected LOC limit is exceeded; otherwise it is zero. The corrected LOC limit is 90% 
of the actual LOC limit. Given that the LOC limits determined in Section 6.4.1 are 438 A and 
395 A, the corrected LOC limits are 394 A and 356 A for phase and ground faults respectively. 
As indicated in Figure 6.10, the interconnecting transformer has a voltage of 25 kV on the utility 
side and 13.8 kV on the microgrid side. This means that the LOC limit would be 794 A and 716 
A for the phase and ground faults respectively when referred to the microgrid side. The 
corresponding corrected LOC limits are 714 A and 644 A for phase and ground faults 
respectively. As indicated in Figure 6.11, the interconnecting block is located on the utility side 
of the interconnecting transformer. This means that the corrected LOC limit input into the 
interconnecting block is required to be referred to the utility side of the transformer. As such, the 
following setting for the penalty factor is used: 
• u1 = 1000 when ISCphase ≥ 394 A or ISCground ≥ 356A. 
• u1 = 0 otherwise. 
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For the penalty factor u2, the generation plants are assigned a disconnection value. For 
plants 1, 3, 5 and 6, when a generating unit is disconnected PRPi× NPi increases by one. For 
example for Plant 1 (five units within the plant) when the PSO algorithm requires two units to be 
disconnected, PRP1× NP1 would be equal to two. 
In the case of Plants 2 and 4, there are two large wind turbines that are in service. In order 
to account for the wind farms greater effect, the disconnection value is higher. When one turbine 
is disconnected PRPW× NPW is equal to two (where W in this context represents wind plants 2 or 
4). When two turbines are disconnected PRPW× NPW is equal to minus one (i.e. 5-PRPW×NPW = 6).  
As discussed in Section 1.5, some variables within the PSO algorithm require initial 
settings. In the case of this thesis the PSO algorithm utilizes the following standard settings: 
• c1 = c2 = 2, also c1+c2=4 
• ω0 = 1 
• α = 0.98 
• r1 and r2 are uniformly distributed random numbers in the range from 0 to 1. 
• The function is the same as those specified in Equations 6.22 and 6.23. 
6.4.5     Application of the Proposed Scheme to Mitigate Microgrid Influences on Existing 
Overcurrent Protection 
One full case study is presented in this section to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
proposed scheme for mitigation of microgrid short circuit influences on existing network fuse-
recloser coordination. The full case study includes simulation of multiple fault types, including a 
case where the fault occurs within the microgrid. The case studies showcase the capability of the 
proposed scheme to manage microgrid penetrations beyond the LOC limit of individual feeders. 
The details of the case studies are expressed in Table 6.10. 
It should be noted that the bus voltages within the microgrid are all above 0.95 per unit 
when no generation sources are connected and the load is supplied purely by the utility 
connection. The per unit voltages are given in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.10: Case studies. 
 
Case 
Study-1 
Case  
Study-2 
Case  
Study-3 
Case  
Study-4 
Case 
Study-5 
Fault type 
Three-
phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
Fault location Load L1 
Line 1 in the 
microgrid 
Fault inception 1 second of simulation time 
Fault duration Sustained fault 
microgrid connection 
point 
At distribution bus 2 (DB2) 
SM-based plant 
operating point (% of 
rated) 
100 
Wind speed (m/s) 11.24 
Irradiance (W/m2) 1000 
Table 6.11: Per unit microgrid bus voltages without any generation sources. 
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 Interconnection 
Voltage 
(per unit) 
0.97 0.955 0.95 0.966 0.955 0.95 0.971 
Through use of Equations 6.8 to 6.13, the PRA algorithm programmed into the 
interconnecting block’s CCU can determine the percentage penetrations of each generation plant. 
Through observation of Figure 6.19 the percentage penetrations can be determined as such: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃1 =
42
42+126+8.3
× 100 = 23.82%          
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃2 =
126
42+126+8.3
× 100 = 71.47%     
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𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃3 =
8.3
42+126+8.3
× 100 = 4.71%  
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃4 =
126
126+43+82
× 100 = 50.20%  
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃5 =
43
126+43+82
× 100 = 17.13%  
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑃6 =
82
126+43+82
× 100 = 32.67%  
 
Figure 6.19: Pre-fault plant and microgrid current flows with per unit bus voltages for case 
studies 1 to 5.  
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Furthermore, observation of Figure 6.19 makes it apparent that the bus voltages increased 
when generation sources are integrated into the microgrid. 
Through the utilization of Equations 6.14 to 6.16, it is apparent that the percentage 
ratings of each generation plant for the case studies presented in Table 6.10 are 100%. This 
means that the inputs given to the PSO algorithm are as such: 
Table 6.12: Inputs for the proposed scheme for case studies 1 to 5. 
Generation 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
PENPi (%) 23.82 71.47 4.71 50.20 17.13 32.67 
RPi (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
These initial conditions are input into the PRA and PSO algorithm programmed into the 
interconnecting block’s CCU, resulting in the following predicted short circuit contribution 
generations: 
Table 6.13: Predicted generation plant short circuit contributions for case studies 1 to 5. 
Generation 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Three-phase 
fault current 
(A) 
178 221 20 214 83 344 
Line-to-Line 
fault current 
(A) 
194 276 23 288 60 356 
Line-to-Line-
to-ground 
fault current 
(A) 
195 467 45 538 155 362 
Line-to-
Ground fault 
current (A) 
272 635 50 861 165 318 
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Table 6.14: Predicted overall microgrid short circuit contributions for case studies 1 to 5. 
Fault type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
Fault current (A) 1060 1197 1762 2301 
Utilizing the analysis discussed in this chapter, the PSO algorithm determines the 
generating sources within the plants that are required to trip, such that mitigation of their short 
circuit effects on the utility occur following fault inception. The following results are obtained: 
Table 6.15: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for case studies 1 to 5. 
Generating 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of 
generators to 
trip (phase) 
0 2 0 2 0 0 
Number of 
generators to 
trip (ground) 
2 2 0 2 0 2 
As a result of the DG sources being tripped, as indicated in Table 6.13, the short circuit 
contributions from the microgrid to the main utility are expected to decrease to the levels 
indicated in Table 6.16.  
Table 6.16: Predicted overall microgrid short circuit contributions for case studies 1 to 5 
following source tripping. 
Fault type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
Fault current (A) 669 652 623 638 
It should be noted that the values expressed in Table 6.13 to Table 6.16 are measured on 
the 13.8 kV side of the interconnecting transformer. It should also be noted that the case studies 
presented are not the only results accumulated. Further studies are presented in Appendix F. Note 
that all values are stated in RMS unless otherwise specified. 
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6.4.5.1     Case Study-1 
In Case Study-1, all the generating plants are operating at their maximum condition when 
a three-phase fault is applied to Load L1 within the utility network. As such this is a phase fault 
and as indicated in Table 6.15, two generating units are required to be tripped in plants 2 and 4. 
The short circuit contributions measured for the generating sources during the three-phase fault 
but before source tripping is given in Figure 6.20.  
 
Figure 6.20: Plant and microgrid current flows for Case Study-1 during a three-phase fault 
before source tripping. 
Comparison of short circuit contributions measured in Figure 6.20 with predicted 
contributions in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 result in the following percentage discrepancies between 
predicted and measured values: 
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Table 6.17: Percentage difference between measured and actual fault currents for Case Study-1. 
Generating 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall 
Microgrid 
Percentage 
difference 
(%) 
0.56 2.71 0 0 1.20 0 1.03 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.21: Case Study-1 without the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 
state signals, microgrid grid current and DB2 RMS phase voltage. 
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Figure 6.22: Case Study-1 with the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 state 
signals, microgrid grid current. 
Figure 6.21 presents Case Study-1 for the condition where there is a microgrid connected 
at DB2 without the proposed scheme implemented. The short circuit contribution from the 
microgrid is 1049 A, exceeding the phase LOC limit of 793 A referred to the 13.8 kV side of the 
interconnecting transformer. Consequentially, the utility head end recloser (RE2) operates twice, 
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with the fuse (F1) melting before the second reclose occurs. As such, it is apparent that the 
coordination between RE2 and F1 is lost. Furthermore, it can be seen that the current 
contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1491 Apeak before dissipating to 1144 Apeak after one 
cycle. Figures 6.22 and 6.23 present Case Study-1 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with the proposed scheme implemented. As indicated in Table 6.15, two 
generating units require tripping in plants 1, 2, 4 and 6 in order to restore coordination. 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Case Study-1 with the proposed scheme: interconnecting relay states, DB2 RMS 
phase voltage. 
As can be observed in Figures 6.22 and 6.23, during the steady-state condition the 
microgrid has a net current flow towards the utility grid that is maintained once the fault occurs. 
This means that the proposed scheme is allowed to continue if pickup levels are exceeded. 
Following the inception of a fault, the contribution of current from the microgrid to the utility 
increases until it exceeds the pickup current. At a simulation time of 1.0117 seconds (0.0117 
seconds after fault inception), the proposed scheme notifies generating plants 2 and 4 to 
disconnect two sources each. At this point the microgrid short circuit current reduces to 672 A. 
As per Table 6.16, the PSO algorithm predicted a short circuit current of 669 A to be present 
following source disconnection. This means that the actual short circuit current was only 0.45% 
different than the predicted value, highlighting the efficacy of the prediction algorithm. It can 
also be seen that the current contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1375 Apeak before 
dissipating to 795 Apeak after one cycle when the proposed scheme is implemented. Further 
observation of Figure 6.22 makes it apparent that the system regains coordination between RE2 
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and F1, demonstrating the capacity of the proposed scheme to restore coordination to the system 
without limiting the microgrid penetration. 
6.4.5.2     Case Study-2 
In Case Study-2, all generating plants are operating in their maximum condition when a line-to-
line fault is applied to DB1 within the utility network. This is a phase fault and, as indicated in 
Table 6.15, two generating units are required to be tripped in plants 2 and 4. 
 
Figure 6.24: Plant and microgrid current flows for Case Study-2 during a line-to-line fault 
before source tripping. 
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The short circuit contributions measured for the generating sources during the line-to-line 
fault before source tripping is given in Figure 6.24. Comparison of short circuit contributions 
measured in Figure 6.24 with predicted contributions in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 result in the 
following percentage discrepancies between predicted and measured values: 
Table 6.18: Percentage difference between measured and actual fault currents for Case Study-2. 
Generating 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall 
Microgrid 
Percentage 
difference 
(%) 
0.51 1.81 4.34 0 5.00 0 0.08 
As can be seen in Table 6.18, predicted short circuit levels are accurate when compared 
to actual measured values. Figures 6.25 and 6.26 presents Case Study-2 for the condition where 
there is a microgrid connected at DB2 without the proposed scheme implemented.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Case Study-2 without the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 
state signals. 
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Figure 6.26: Case Study-2 without the proposed scheme: microgrid grid current and DB2 RMS 
phase voltage. 
The short circuit contribution from the microgrid is 1196 A, exceeding the phase LOC 
limit of 793 A referred to the 13.8 kV side of the interconnecting transformer. Consequentially, 
the utility head end recloser (RE2) operates once with the fuse (F1) melting before the second 
trip from the recloser occurs. It is apparent that the coordination between RE2 and F1 is lost. It 
can also be seen that the current contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1945 Apeak before 
dissipating to1842 Apeak after one cycle. 
Figures 6.27 and 6.28 present Case Study-2 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with the proposed scheme implemented. As per Table 6.15, two generating 
units must be tripped in plants 2 and 4 in order to restore coordination between RE2 and F1. 
 
 
Figure 6.27: Case Study-2 with the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current. 
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Figure 6.28: Case Study-2 with the proposed scheme: RE2 and F1 state signals and microgrid 
grid current, interconnecting relay states, DB2 RMS phase voltage. 
As can be observed in Figures 6.27 and 6.28, during the steady-state condition the 
microgrid has a net current flow towards the utility grid that is maintained once the fault occurs. 
The result is that the proposed scheme can continue if pickup levels are exceeded. Following the 
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exceeds the pickup current. At a simulation time of 1.0146 seconds (0.0146 seconds after fault 
inception), the proposed scheme notifies plants 2 and 4 to disconnect two sources each. At this 
point the microgrid short circuit current reduces to 651 A. As per Table 6.16, the PSO algorithm 
predicted a short circuit current of 652 A to be present following source disconnection. This 
means that there was only a 0.15% differential between the actual short circuit current and the 
predicted value, highlighting the efficacy of the prediction algorithm. It can also be seen that the 
current contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1866 Apeak before dissipating to 1055 Apeak after 
one cycle when the proposed scheme is implemented. Further observation of Figures 6.27 and 
6.28 makes it apparent that the system regains coordination between RE2 and F1, demonstrating 
the capacity of the proposed scheme to restore coordination to the system without limiting the 
microgrid penetration. 
6.4.5.3     Case Study-3 
In Case Study-3, all generating plants are operating in their maximum condition when a 
line-to-line-to-ground fault is applied to load L1 within the utility network. This is a ground fault 
and, as indicated in Table 6.15, two generating units are to be tripped in plants 1, 2, 4 and 6. 
The short circuit contributions measured for the generating sources during the double 
line-to-ground fault before source tripping are given in Figure 6.29. Comparison of short circuit 
contributions measured in Figure 6.29 with predicted contributions in Tables 6.13 and 6.14; 
result in the following percentage discrepancies between predicted and measured values: 
Table 6.19: Percentage difference between measured and actual fault currents for Case Study-3. 
Generating 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall 
Microgrid 
Percent 
difference 
(%) 
2.05 1.07 2.22 1.11 3.22 0.82 2.15 
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Figure 6.29: Plant and microgrid current flows for Case Study-3 during a line-to-line-to-ground 
fault before source tripping. 
Figure 6.30 presents Case Study-3 for the condition where there is a microgrid connected 
at DB2 without the proposed scheme implemented. The short circuit contribution from the 
microgrid is 1800 A, exceeding the ground LOC limit of 716 A referred to the 13.8 kV side of 
the interconnecting transformer. Consequentially, it can be seen that the utility head end recloser 
(RE2) operates once with the fuse (F1) melting before the first reclose occurs. It is apparent that 
the coordination between RE2 and F1 is lost. It can also be seen that the current contribution 
from the microgrid peaks at 2545 Apeak before dissipating to 2052 Apeak after one cycle. 
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Figure 6.30: Case Study-3 without the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 
state signals, microgrid grid current and DB2 RMS phase voltage. 
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Figures 6.31 and 6.32 present Case Study-3 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with the proposed scheme implemented. As indicated in Table 6.15, two 
generating units are required to be tripped in plants 1, 2, 4 and 6 in order to restore coordination 
between RE2 and F1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.31: Case Study-3 with the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 state 
signals, microgrid grid current. 
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Figure 6.32: Case Study-3 with the proposed scheme: interconnecting relay states, DB2 RMS 
phase voltage. 
As can be observed in Figures 6.31 and 6.32, during the steady-state condition the 
microgrid has a net current flow towards the utility grid that is maintained once the fault occurs. 
This means that the proposed scheme can continue if pickup levels are exceeded. Following the 
inception of a fault, the contribution of current from the microgrid to the utility increases until it 
exceeds the pickup current. At a simulation time of 1.0094 seconds (0.0094 seconds after fault 
inception), the proposed scheme notifies plants 1, 2, 4 and 6 to disconnect two sources each. At 
this point the microgrid short circuit current reduces to 605 A. As per Table 6.16, the PSO 
algorithm predicted a short circuit current of 623 A following source disconnection. This means 
that the differential between the actual short circuit current and the predicted value was only 
2.89%, highlighting the efficacy of the prediction algorithm. It can also be seen that the current 
contribution from the microgrid peaks at 2100 Apeak before dissipating to 588 Apeak after one 
cycle when the proposed scheme is implemented.  Further observation of Figure 6.31 makes it 
apparent that the system regains coordination between RE2 and F1, demonstrating the capacity 
of the proposed scheme to restore coordination to the system without limiting the microgrid 
penetration. 
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6.4.5.4     Case Study-4 
In Case Study-4, all generating plants are operating in maximum condition when a line-
to-ground fault is applied to load L1 within the utility network. This is a ground fault and, as 
indicated in Table 6.15, two generating units are required to be tripped in plants 1, 2, 4 and 6. 
 
Figure 6.33: Plant and microgrid current flows for Case Study-4 during a single line-to-ground 
fault before source tripping. 
The short circuit contributions measured for the generating sources during the single line-
to-ground fault before source tripping are given in Figure 6.33. Comparison of short circuit 
contributions measured in Figure 6.33 with predicted contributions in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 result 
in the following percentage discrepancies between predicted and measured values: 
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Table 6.20: Percentage difference between measured and actual fault currents for Case Study-4. 
Generating 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall 
Microgrid 
Percentage 
difference 
(%) 
1.47 0.62 4.00 0.92 4.24 2.2 0.91 
As can be seen in Table 6.20, predicted short circuit levels are accurate when compared 
to actual measured values. 
Figures 6.34 and 6.35 presents Case Study-4 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at the DB2 without the proposed scheme implemented.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.34: Case Study-4 without the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 
state signals. 
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Figure 6.35: Case Study-4 without the proposed scheme: microgrid grid current and DB2 RMS 
phase voltage. 
As can be seen, the short circuit contribution from the microgrid is 2280 A, exceeding the 
ground LOC limit of 716 A referred to the 13.8 kV side of the interconnecting transformer. 
Consequentially, it can be seen that the utility head end recloser (RE2) operates twice with the 
fuse (F1) melting before the second reclose occurs. As such, it is apparent that the coordination 
between RE2 and F1 is lost. It can also be seen that the current contribution from the microgrid 
peaks at 2221 Apeak before dissipating to 3200 Apeak after one cycle. 
Figures 6.36 and 6.37 present Case Study-4 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with the proposed scheme implemented. As indicated in Table 6.15, two 
generating units are required to be tripped in plants 1, 2, 4 and 6 in order to restore coordination. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.36: Case Study-4 with the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current. 
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Figure 6.37: Case Study-4 with the proposed scheme: RE2 and F1 state signals and microgrid 
grid current, interconnecting relay states, DB2 RMS phase voltage. 
6.4.5.5     Case Study-5 
In Case Study-5, all generating plants are operating in their maximum condition when a 
line-to-line fault is applied to line L1 within the microgrid. In this case the directional sensing 
unit within the proposed scheme should give a blocking signal to prevent operation, allowing for 
the microgrid internal protection to clear the fault. Case Study-5 can be graphically depicted in 
Figure 6.38. 
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Figure 6.38: Current flows for Case Study-5 during a fault. 
Figures 6.39 and 6.40 present Case Study-5 for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with the proposed scheme implemented.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.39: Case Study-5 with the proposed scheme: L1 differential current, L1 state, DB2 
RMS phase voltage. 
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Figure 6.40: Case Study-5 with the proposed scheme: RE2 current, microgrid grid current, 
interconnecting relay states, line L1 current. 
As can be observed in Figures 6.39 and 6.40, during the steady-state condition the 
microgrid has a net current flow towards the utility grid. When the fault occurs on line L1 within 
the microgrid, the directional element within the proposed scheme senses the current flowing 
from the utility to the microgrid. The proposed scheme is then blocked from operation. As such, 
through observation of Figure 6.39, it can be seen that the line L1 differential current begins to 
rapidly rise following fault inception before peaking at 20 A. The differential relay protecting 
line L1 operates at 1.00535 (0.00535 seconds after the fault occurs) seconds, clearing the fault 
from the microgrid.  This highlights the efficacy of the scheme (particularly the directional 
element) with its compatibility with the microgrid protection scheme given in Chapter 5. 
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6.4.6     Application of the Proposed Scheme in Conjunction with the Reclosing and Fault 
Detection Method 
As indicated in Section 6.4.5, the proposed scheme effectively identifies the generating 
plants that require mitigation with the purpose of preventing loss of distribution network 
protection coordination. The scheme works by tripping relevant generating sources within the 
plant, in order to return the network to pre-fault operation as quickly as possible. The operation 
of the scheme is demonstrated in a case study in Chapters 3 and 4, the same as that expressed in 
Appendix F.2 (grid condition 2); conditions with inputs and outputs of the PRA and PSO scheme 
given in Tables 6.21 to 6.23. Short circuit predictions and measurements are given in Appendix 
F.2. 
Table 6.21: Complete integration study condition details. 
Fault type 
Fault 
location 
Fault 
inception 
time 
Fault 
duration 
microgrid 
connectio
n point 
SM-based 
plants 
operating 
point (% 
of rated) 
Wind 
speed 
(m/s) 
Irradiance 
(W/m2) 
Line-to-
Ground 
Load L1 1 second sustained At DB2 100 0 0 
 
Table 6.22: Inputs for the PRA and PSO scheme for the integration study. 
Generation 
Plant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
PENDGi (%) 100 0 0 0 0 100 
rDGi (%) 100 0 0 0 0 100 
 
Table 6.23: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for the integration study. 
Generating Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 3 0 0 0 0 2 
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As can be seen in Table 6.23, during a ground fault Plants 1 and 6 are required to trip 3 
and 2 units respectively. To allow for fast reclosure of these units (preventing a complete 
shutdown) the reclosing scheme (RD) given in Chapter 3 is integrated in conjunction with the 
fault detection technique given in Chapter 4. Note that RD is integrated into the low voltage side 
of the generating plant transformer indicated in Figure 6.12 with a voltage of 480 V. As per 
Equation 3.2, ground settings for 0.2 MVA and 0.4 MVA SM-based generating sources are: 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑃1 =
0.2 × 106
√3 × 480
× 2 = 481.13 𝐴 
𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑃6 =
0.4 × 106
√3 × 480
× 2 = 962.25 𝐴 
From these equations, ground pickup currents for generating plants 1 and 6 are selected 
to be 481 A and 962 A respectively.  
Utilizing Equation 3.3, ZRE is determined for pre-fault load sharing conditions where the 
generating unit is loaded to 100%, (pre-fault values used in the following equations were 
obtained through simulation.)  The ZRE values for the generating sources in their respective plants 
are: 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃1 =
(
0.46
√3
)2
0.2/3
× 0.91 = 0.97 Ω 
𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃1 = √(
(
0.46
√3
)2
0.2/3
)
2
− (
(
0.46
√3
)2
0.2/3
× 0.91)
2
= 0.44 Ω 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐺6 =
(
0.464
√3
)2
0.4/3
× 0.92 = 0.50 Ω 
𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃6 = √(
(
0.464
√3
)2
0.4/3
)
2
− (
(
0.464
√3
)2
0.4/3
× 0.92)
2
= 0.21 Ω 
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The ROCOC pickup value is selected as 40 A/second. A similar approach is taken with 
the 70% and 60% case. The values for ZRE, with corresponding ranges, can be summarized in 
Table 3.2. The short circuit contributions measured for the generation sources during the single 
line-to-ground fault but before source tripping is given in Figure 6.41.  
 
 
Figure 6.41: Plant and microgrid current flows for the complete integration study during a single 
line-to-ground fault before source tripping. 
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Figure 6.42: Integration study without the proposed scheme: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and 
F1 state signals, microgrid grid current and DB2 RMS phase voltage. 
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Figure 6.43: Integration study with the proposed schemes: RE2 current, F1 current, RE2 and F1 
state signals, microgrid grid current. 
Figure 6.42 presents the integration study without the proposed scheme implemented. As 
demonstrated, the short circuit contribution from the microgrid is 1240 A, exceeding the phase 
LOC limit of 716 A referred to the 13.8 kV side of the interconnecting transformer. 
Consequentially, the utility head end recloser (RE2) operates once, with the fuse (F1) melting 
before the second trip occurs. It is apparent that the coordination between RE2 and F1 is lost. It 
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can also be seen that the current contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1550 Apeak before 
dissipating to 1203 Apeak after one cycle. 
Figures 6.44 and 6.45 present the integration study for the condition where there is a microgrid 
connected at DB2 with all the proposed schemes in Chapters 3 to 6 implemented in the proposed 
scheme. As indicated in Table 6.23, three generating units are required to be tripped in Plant 
1and two in Plant 6 in order to restore coordination between RE2 and F1. 
 
 
Figure 6.44: Integration study with the proposed schemes: interconnecting relay states, DB2 
RMS phase voltage. 
As can be observed in Figures 6.44 and 6.45, during the steady-state condition the 
microgrid has a net current flow from the utility grid in which directional flow from the 
microgrid changes once the fault occurs. This means that the proposed scheme continues to 
operate if pickup levels are exceeded. Following the inception of a fault, the contribution of 
current from the microgrid to the utility increases until it exceeds the pickup current. At a 
simulation time of 1.0122 seconds (0.0122 seconds after fault inception), the proposed scheme 
prompts plants 1 and 6 to disconnect three and two sources respectively, as per the results from 
the PRA and PSO scheme. At this point the microgrid short circuit current reduces to 645 A. As 
per Appendix F.2, the PSO algorithm predicted a short circuit current of 638 A to be present 
following source disconnection. This means that the actual differential between short circuit 
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current and the predicted value was only 1.03%, highlighting the prediction efficacy of the 
algorithm. It can also be seen that the current contribution from the microgrid peaks at 1267 Apeak 
before dissipating to 1023 Apeak after one cycle when the proposed scheme is implemented. 
Further observation of Figure 6.43 makes it apparent that the system regains coordination 
between RE2 and F1, demonstrating the capacity of the proposed scheme to restore coordination 
to the system without limiting the microgrid penetration. 
It should be noted that for the integration study, the communication link from the head 
end recloser in the scheme (demonstrated in Figure 3.5) is substituted with the fault detection 
scheme in Chapter 4, in addition to a signal from the interconnecting relay from the microgrid. 
This means that for RD to trip, the fault detection scheme has to indicate a fault, the microgrid 
interconnecting block has to indicate to the generating source that it is required to trip (through 
the PRA and PSO scheme) and the pickup current is required to be exceeded. Additionally, the 
microgrid protection scheme indicated in Chapter 5 is utilized to protect the internal microgrid. 
Figures 6.45 to 6.47 demonstrate the RD, fault detection and microgrid protection scheme 
working in conjunction with the PRA and PSO scheme. 
 
 
Figure 6.45: Integration study with the proposed schemes: Line L1 differential current, Line L1 
differential trip state. 
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Figure 6.46: Integration study with the proposed schemes for plant 1: Plant current, Plant ΔI, 
Plant fault detection and RD state, Plant frequency, Plant phase voltage. 
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Figure 6.47: Integration study with the proposed schemes for plant 6: Plant current, Plant ΔI, 
Plant fault detection and RD state, Plant frequency, Plant phase voltage. 
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Figure 6.45 presents the time domain simulations for the differential relay protecting line 
L1 within the microgrid during the integration study. The differential current rises marginally 
following fault inception until it peaks at 0.000294 per unit. Consequentially, the differential 
relay protecting line L1 discriminates against the fault experienced on load L1 in the distribution 
network as it falls outside of its protection zone, and thus instructs circuit breakers RBU1 and 
R1BU to remain closed.  
Figure 6.46 presents time domain simulations for Plant 1 for the integration study with 
RD and the fault detection scheme (i.e. RD-mod) which facilitates fast reclosure of the DG 
sources required to trip as per instructions from the PRA and PSO scheme. Following fault 
inception, the plant current begins to ramp up. RD-mod measures the change in the current for 
the time period Δt (0.8333 milliseconds) where it reaches a peak ROCOC (ΔI) of 181 A/second, 
which is greater than the pickup value of 40 A/second. As a result, RD-mod signals the 
occurrence of a fault, which in conjunction with the signal from the microgrid interconnecting 
relay, causes three sources within Plant 1 to switch to a transfer impedance at 1.0122 seconds. 
Following fault clearance, the generating sources successfully reclose into the microgrid at 3.398 
seconds (2.398 seconds after the fault occurs). The overshoot frequency upon reconnection is 
1.00624 per unit (60.37 Hz) before it decays to a nominal level. 
Figure 6.47 presents the time domain simulations for Plant 6 for the integration study 
with RD-mod, which facilitates fast reclosure of the sources required to trip as per instructions 
from the PRA and PSO scheme. Following fault inception, the plant current begins to ramp up. 
RD-mod measures the change in the current of the time period Δt where it reaches a peak 
ROCOC of 194 A/second, which is greater than the pickup value of 40 A/second. As a result, 
RD-mod signals the occurrence of a fault which, in conjunction with the signal from the 
microgrid interconnecting relay, causes two sources within Plant 6 to switch to their transfer 
impedance at 1.0122 seconds. Following fault clearance the sources successfully reclose into the 
microgrid at 3.4158 seconds (2.4158 seconds after the fault occurs). The overshoot frequency 
upon reconnection is 1.001247 per unit (60.07 Hz) before it decays to a nominal level. 
Observation of Figures 6.43 to 6.47 makes it apparent that the integration of RD-mod in 
conjunction with the microgrid protection and PRA with PSO scheme, allows for efficient 
isolation of sources during utility faults to prevent LOC. This is particularly evident in Figure 
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6.43 which demonstrates that F1 melts after two recloses from RE2 during a fault, hence 
coordinating the devices.  In addition, it can be seen that RD-mod aids in disconnecting 
generating sources but also allows for fast reclosure, returning the network to pre-fault operating 
conditions without the need to shut non-faulted components down. 
6.5      Discussions and Comparison with Kalman Filters 
As indicated previously, another method that can be utilized for prediction of short circuit 
contributions is Kalman Filters. Kalman filters work by using a series of measurements to 
produce an estimate on unknown variables. It firstly estimates the state variables in conjunction 
with uncertainties. When a second measurement is observed the estimates are updated using a 
weighted average [73]. In the context of this chapter, the Kalman filter would be unsuitable for 
estimation of short circuit currents mainly due to the nonlinear nature that the fault levels change. 
In cases where the short circuit level changes linearly, a Kalman filter may be used.  
Additionally, Kalman filters create their predictions through an iterative process. This can 
take significant time when generating predictions from large data sets. Considering that PSO is 
also an iterative process, utilization of a Kalman filter for prediction of short circuit currents may 
create significant delays in generating optimized tripping results.  
PRA utilizes data to generate lines of best fit to predict outputs for any given inputs. As 
such it is not generating results through an iterative process. This makes it more suitable for use 
in the application discussed in this chapter as it does not incur additional delays when making 
predictions. Additionally, the PRA can become more accurate when previously unknown data 
points are added to the data set utilized to create the predictive equations.  
6.6      Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a protection scheme through the utilization of polynomial 
regression analysis in conjunction with particle swarm optimization with a directional element to 
prevent excessive short circuit current contribution from microgrids during a grid fault. Results 
presented demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach in mitigating microgrid short circuit 
current influences during utility faults in the context of loss of coordination.  
Case studies conducted demonstrate that the proposed scheme is able to accurately 
predict the expected short circuit contributions from generating plants within a microgrid. This is 
153 
 
achieved through the use of polynomial regression analysis. This PRA consistently predicted 
short circuit values with less than 5 percent error, highlighting the robustness of the prediction 
approach. Results also demonstrate the efficacy of the prediction method for operating 
conditions that are not pre-determined. The PRA is then able to be used within a particle swarm 
optimization algorithm to determine which generating units within a given plant are required to 
be removed from the network during a fault to prevent LOC. In every case, no constraints were 
violated. This scheme removes the need for plant owners within microgrids to install a large 
number of mitigation devices.  
The application of a fault within the microgrid demonstrated the efficacy of the 
directional element within the proposed scheme in the context of discriminating against internal 
microgrid and utility network faults. 
A case study utilizes the concepts discussed in Chapters 3 to 6. During this integration 
study, the PRA and PSO algorithm is established to be effective in determining which generation 
sources are required to trip. RD-mod is then confirmed as being responsible for detecting the 
fault condition and the transfer of the relevant generation sources identified by the PSO 
algorithm to their respective transfer impedances. The outcome is coordination between the head 
end recloser and downstream fuse within the utility network. Following fault clearance, RD-mod 
is established as successful in reclosing the tripped generation sources back into the microgrid, 
allowing for the pre-fault operating conditions to continue. Ultimately, the study demonstrates 
that the microgrid protection scheme successfully discriminates against the utility network fault. 
This demonstrates that the concepts presented in this thesis are compatible. 
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7.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1      Summary 
The main objective of this research is to allow for integration of microgrids and DG units 
into distribution networks, in a manner which minimizes effects on the existing distribution 
network protection infrastructure.  
Results presented in Chapters 3 to 6 make it apparent that intelligent schemes can be 
effectively utilized to prevent degradation of existing distribution network overcurrent protection 
adequacy. It was initially demonstrated that integration of a DG source or microgrid into a 
distribution network produced adverse effects on short circuit current characteristics, yielding 
degradation in existing protection infrastructure adequacy. It was ascertained that the level of 
impact that DG and microgrid sources can have on the network is dependent on source types (i.e. 
SM-based, PV or wind) and rated outputs. When large changes in short circuit currents occur due 
to source penetration, existing protection infrastructure settings may become inadequate, 
requiring changes in settings. In complex systems, changes can be difficult and the effects of 
changes can involve mitigation of sources. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, when a SM-based DG source is integrated into a 
distribution network, the existing fuse-recloser protection coordination can be violated for low 
levels of penetration. Existing methods for mitigation are to limit the penetration level, trip and 
shut down the DG source, or to mitigate the short circuit level output from the DG source. 
Results from Chapter 3 indicate that another possible short circuit current mitigation method is to 
switch the DG source from the network to a transfer impedance. This makes it possible to 
maintain the pre-fault frequency and speed, allowing a fast reconnection time back into the 
network once the fault is cleared. The requirement to limit the penetration level of the DG source 
is removed, and there is no need for significant investment in protection devices capable of 
sustaining long term, high magnitude fault levels. Additionally the scheme is shown to be 
effective when the fault impedance is increased. In Chapter 3, it is also demonstrated that the 
reclosing scheme is effective when compared to an existing potential DG mitigation solution in 
FCLs. 
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Chapter 4 presents a fault detection scheme based on measurements of the rate of change 
of current output by DG sources. This scheme was designed to mimic the possibility of a failure 
within the communication system, a requirement for the reclosing scheme in Chapter 3 to work. 
Results in Chapter 4 make it apparent that there is a significant difference in the ROCOC when 
the changes are attributed to switching transients or load changes as opposed to an actual fault. 
Results demonstrate that by having an understanding of the short circuit behavior of the DG 
sources in addition to their dynamics, it is possible to determine a ROCOC level that faults will 
exceed but other transients will not. This allows for discrimination between transients and short 
circuits, and can be integrated for this purpose into protective devices that rely on alternate 
mechanisms such as communication links. By integrating the ROCOC scheme into the reclosing 
scheme outlined in Chapter 3, the ROCOC scheme was proven to be effective in its purpose, 
successfully substituting the communication link used by the reclosing scheme.  
In Chapter 5, results make it apparent that a significant challenge is the inherent changes 
in short circuit current magnitudes in microgrids when transferring between grid and islanded 
modes of operation. What makes this particularly difficult is that traditional protection 
mechanisms in distribution networks typically rely on unidirectional power flows in conjunction 
with large magnitude short circuit currents. Results obtained and reported in Chapter 5 point to 
differential relays as a feasible solution to clear faults within a microgrid, regardless of short 
circuit current magnitudes. In addition, differential relays have the capacity to discriminate 
between in-zone and out-of-zone faults, using a comparison of current measurements and 
removing the reliance on large magnitude short circuit levels. This removes the tendency towards 
failure when switching between grid and islanded operations. The differential relays can also be 
integrated in parallel with adaptive overcurrent protection that can be set to coordinate with 
existing load point downstream overcurrent protection devices. The outcome is to allow for the 
scheme to be integrated segmentally when constraints such as budgetary considerations are 
present.  
To understand how microgrids can affect utility network overcurrent protection, a 
regression and particle swarm optimization technique is presented in Chapter 6. This PRA and 
PSO scheme is utilized to effectively predict short circuit current contributions from the 
microgrid to the utility network, and indicate which generating units should be subject to 
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mitigation techniques or be disconnected. Equations presented demonstrate that short circuit 
current contributions from generation plants are dependent on factors such as generator type, in 
addition to percentage rated output and percentage penetrations relative to other plants on the 
same feeder. Short circuit current contribution dynamically changes as a factor of these variables.  
Results obtained demonstrate that the PRA and PSO method is able to accurately predict (within 
5% in all cases) the short circuit contributions from the microgrid during the fault, and after 
generating sources are tripped off by the PSO scheme.  
Furthermore, results in Chapter 6 indicate that the integration of the proposed schemes 
presented in Chapters 3 to 6 together make the protection of microgrids and mitigation of their 
potentially undesirable short circuit current contributions plausible. The PRA and PSO algorithm 
is used to indicate which generating sources are required to be mitigated through predictive 
methods. This, in conjunction with the fault detection technique in Chapter 4, can be utilized to 
instruct the reclosing scheme given in Chapter 3 to trip the relevant generation sources from the 
microgrid, thereby preventing excessive short circuit contributions which could potentially result 
in the coordination limit being surpassed. The reclosing scheme is then able to allow for a fast 
reconnection of generating units following fault clearance by the utility network, preventing a 
shutdown of those units and potentially saving the unit owner from undesirable downtime and 
restart costs. In addition, results indicate that the differential protection scheme proposed in 
Chapter 5 can be integrated into the microgrid without interfering with schemes associated with 
interconnecting blocks and generating units. This means that the schemes can be used in parallel 
or integrated into one another, to allow for a complete protection scheme of microgrids that are 
integrated into distribution networks without the need for the utility to redesign existing 
protection infrastructure.  
Economic concerns are key factors affecting the practicality of integrating the proposed 
approaches.  Engineers should consider the comparative cost of adjusting the existing protection 
settings or the cost of purchasing, maintaining, and installing the schemes presented, factoring in 
costs of shut downs and failures. Practical applications are in regions that have an expanding 
population size, and remote settlements requiring network upgrades to meet increases in power 
demand. The proposed techniques offer significant value in the domain of network expansion 
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planning, as they allow for microgrid and DG source penetration into distribution networks 
without significant re-engineering work or limiting capacity. 
7.2      Conclusions 
Studies in this thesis lead to the following conclusions: 
1. DG sources and microgrids have the capacity to adversely affect existing distribution 
network short circuit characteristics based on both size and source type. 
2. Increased short circuit currents associated to integration of DG sources and microgrids 
can yield degradation of existing fuse-recloser coordination thus causing a loss of 
coordination. 
3. Mitigation of DG short circuit contributions is plausible through the use of reclosing 
schemes in conjunction to switching impedances. These switching schemes have the 
capacity to mitigate but also allow for fast reconnection due to the maintenance of pre-
fault speed and frequencies of individual sources thus prevent unnecessary shut downs. 
4. Measurements of the rate of change of current output by DG sources are an effective 
method for discriminating between system transients and faults. These techniques can be 
effectively substituted into schemes (such as the reclosing technique presented) that rely 
on communication links for fault detection thus making them more robust and 
independent.  
5. Microgrid protection is an inherently difficult field due to drastic changes in short circuit 
currents when transitioning between grid and islanded operations. 
6. Hybrid differential and adaptive overcurrent protection is an effective means of 
protecting microgrids as they can contend with the drastic short circuit current changes 
without failure. 
7. Differential and adaptive overcurrent protection do not require to be coordinated with one 
another hence are compatible for parallel use. 
8. Polynomial regression analysis can be an effective method for predicting short circuit 
contributions from microgrids to utility networks regardless of source type and size. The 
efficacy of such methods is dependent on accurate training data. 
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9. Short circuit contributions from generating sources within microgrids to utility networks 
are dependent on the source rating, operating point and associated penetration percentage 
when compared to other sources on the same feeder. 
10. Particle swarm optimization can be utilized in conjunction with polynomial regression to 
determine which units within a generating plant are required to be mitigated such that the 
loss of coordination limit of the utility network is not exceeded. 
11. The use of reclosing schemes, fault detection techniques, hybrid microgrid protection 
schemes and prediction and optimization algorithms is an effective means of allowing 
complete integration of microgrids into utility networks without compromising the 
existing protection infrastructure adequacy.  
12. The proposed schemes presented in this thesis offers significant practical value in the 
domain of network expansion planning and reinforcement options in power distribution 
networks, as well as demonstrating and predicting the effect of generation sources and 
microgrid penetration on existing protection infrastructure in distribution networks.  
This thesis is a stepping-stone in the direction of more research on DG and microgrid 
influence mitigation on existing distribution system short circuit characteristics and fuse-
recloser protection infrastructure.  It is hoped that the research work documented in this thesis 
will provide useful guidance for conducting more studies and analyzing other technical issues 
that might be impacted by DG source and microgrid integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  G. Pepermans, J. Driesen, D. Haeseldonckx, R. Belmans and W. D'Haeseleer, "Distributed 
Generation: Definition, benefits and issues," Energy Policy - Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 
787-798, Apr 2005.  
[2]  N. Rajaei, M. H. Ahmed, M. M. A. Salama and R. K. Varma, "Fault Current Management 
Using Inverter-Based Distributed Generators in Smart Grids," IEEE Transactions on 
Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 2183-2193, September 2014.  
[3]  K. Deng, X. He, D. Bi and C. Feng, "An adaptive protection method for the inverter 
dominated microgrid," in International Conference on Electrical Machines and Systems, 
Beijing, 2014.  
[4]  P. Gupta, R. S. Bhatia and D. K. Jain, "Adaptive protection schemes for the microgrid in a 
smart grid scenario," in Innovative Smart Grid Technologies - Asia, Bangalore, 2013.  
[5]  Oudalov, A. Fidigatti, T. Degner, B. Valov, C. Hardt, J. M. Yarza, R. Li, N. Jenkins, B. 
Awad, F. V. Ovebeeke, N. Hatziargyriou and M. Lorentzou, "Novel protection systems for 
microgrids," 2009. 
[6]  M. R. Islam and H. A. Gabbar, "Study of Micro Grid Safety & Protection Strategies with 
Control System Infrastructures," Smart Grid and Renewable Energy, vol. 3, pp. 1-9, 2012.  
[7]  G. Buigues, A. Dysko, V. Valverde, I. Zamora and E. Fernandez, "Microgrid Protection: 
Technical challenges and existing techniques," in International Conference on Renewable 
Energies and Power Quality, Bilbao, 2013.  
[8]  M. R. Islam and H. A. Gabbar, "Analysis of Microgrid Protection Strategies," in IEEE 
International Conference on Smart Grid Engineering, Oshawa, 2012.  
[9]  C. Yuan, M. A. Haj-Ahmed and M. S. llindala, "An MVDC Microgrid for a Remote Area 
Mine Site: Protection, Operation and Control," in IEEE Industrial Applications Society 
General Meeting, Vancouver, 2014.  
[10]  M. P. Nthontho, S. P. Chowdhury, S. Winberg and S. Chowdhury, "Protection of 
Domestic Solar Photovoltaic Based Microgrid," in 11th International Conference on 
Developments in Power Systems Protection, Birmingham, 2012.  
 
 
160 
 
[11]  G. M. Masters, Renewable and Efficient Electric Power Systems, Hoboken: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2004.  
[12]  "Renewable Energy," United Nations High-Level Group on Sustainable Energy for all, 
2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.se4all.org/our-vision/our-objectives/renewable-
energy/. [Accessed 4 November 2014]. 
[13]  C. J. Mozina, "Impact of Green Power Generation on Distribution Systems in a Smart 
Grid," in Power Systems Conference and Exposition (PSCE), Phoenix, 2011.  
[14]  SaskPower, "Generation interconnection requirements at voltages 34.5 kV and below," 
March 2005. [Online]. Available: 
www.saskpower.com/poweringyourfuture/pdfs/NUG345kV.pdf. [Accessed September 
2015]. 
[15]  D. J. Glover, M. S. Sarma and T. J. Overbye, Power System Analysis and Design, 4th ed., 
Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2008.  
[16]  J. L. Blackburn and T. J. Domin, Protective Relaying: Principles and Applications, 4th ed., 
Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2014.  
[17]  P. M. Anderson, Power System Protection, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 1999.  
[18]  T. Gonen, Electric Power Distribution System Engineering, 2nd ed., Boca Raton: Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2008.  
[19]  B. Ram and D. N. Vishwakarma, Power System Protection and Switchgear, New Delhi: 
Tata McGraw-Hill, 1995.  
[20]  J. J. Justo, F. Mwasilu, J. Lee and J. Jung, "AC-Microgrids versus DC-Microgrids with 
distributed energy resources," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 24, pp. 
387-485, 2013.  
[21]  N. I. Sapankevych and R. Sankar, "Constrained Motion Particle Swarm Optimization and 
Support Vector Regression for Non-linear Time Series Regression and Prediction 
Applications," in IEEE Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, Miami, 2013.  
[22]  J. Kennedy and R. Eberhart, "Particle Swarm Optimization," in IEEE International 
Conference on Neural Networks, Perth, 1995.  
 
 
161 
 
[23]  M. A. Hassan and M. A. Abido, "Optimal Design of Microgrids in Autonomous and Grid-
Connected Modes Using Particle Swarm Optimization," IEEE Transactions on Power 
Electronics, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 755-769, 2011.  
[24]  B. Panigrahi, A. Abraham and S. Das Eds, Computational Intelligence in power 
Engineering, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010.  
[25]  U.S. Department of Energy, "Fault Current Limiters," 6 November 2009. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/hts_fcl_110609.pdf. 
[Accessed 29 May 2014]. 
[26]  M. Elsamahy, S. O. Faried and T. S. Sidhu, "Impact of Superconducting Fault Current 
Limiters on the Coordination Between Generator Distance Phase Backup Protection and 
Generator Capability Curves," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 
1854-1863, July 2011.  
[27]  L. Wang, P. Jiang and D. Wang, "Summary of Superconducting Fault Current Limiter 
Technology," in Frontiers in Computer Education, Berlin, Springer, 2012, pp. 819-825. 
[28]  H. Arai, M. Inaba, T. Ishigohka, H. Tanaka, K. Arai, M. Furuse and M. Umeda, 
"Fundamental Characteristics of Superconducting Fault Current Limiter Using LC 
Resonance Circuit," IEEE Transactions on Applied Superconductivity, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 
642-645, June 2006.  
[29]  S. O. Faried and M. Elsamahy, "Incorporating superconducting fault current limiters in the 
probabilistic evaluation of transient recovery voltage," IET Generation, Transmission & 
Distribution, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 101-107, 2011.  
[30]  T. A. Short, Electric Power Distribution Handbook, Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2004.  
[31]  T. K. Abdel-Galil, A. E. B. Abu-Elanin, E. F. El-Saadany, A. Girgis, A. R. I. Mohamed, 
M. M. A. Salama and H. H. M. Zeineldin, "Protection Coordination Planning with 
Distributed Generation," Qualsys Engco Inc, 2007. 
[32]  S&C Electric Company, "SM Power Fuses," S&C Electric Company, 2018. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.sandc.com/en/products--services/products/sm-power-fuses/. 
[Accessed 15 January 2016]. 
 
 
 
162 
 
[33]  Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), "ABB PCD Control Protection Curves," September 2002. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot235.nsf/veritydisplay/1bc69ae25de85ac585256c44
005e98c4/$file/pcd%20protection%20curves.pdf. [Accessed 15 July 2014]. 
[34]  M. R. Islam and H. M. Gabbar, "Analysis of Microgrid Protection Strategies," in IEEE 
International Conference on Smart Grid Engineering, Oshawa, 2012.  
[35]  EMTP-RV, EMTP Help Center, Montreal: EMTP-RV, 2016.  
[36]  J. M. Gers and E. J. Holmes, Protection of Electricity Distribution Networks, 2nd ed., 
London: The Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2004.  
[37]  H. Joshi, Residential, Commercial and Industrial Electrical Systems, vol. 3, New Delhi: 
Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008.  
[38]  P. Kundur, Power System Stability and Control, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994.  
[39]  H. Dommel, EMTP Theory Book, Microtran Power System Analysis Corporation, 1996.  
[40]  Y. Yu, Electrica Power System Dynamics, New York: Academic Press, 1983.  
[41]  A. D. Hansen, G. Michalke, P. Sorensen, T. Lund and F. Iov, "Co-ordinated Voltage 
Control of DFIG Wind Turbines in Uninterrupted Operation during Grid Faults," Wind 
Energy, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 51-68, 2007.  
[42]  O. Anaya-Lara, N. Jenkins, J. Ekanayake, P. Cartwright and M. Hughes, Wind Energy 
Generation: Modelling and Control, John Wiley & Sons, 2009.  
[43]  J. Morren, S. W. H. de Haan, P. Bauer, J. Pierik and J. Bozelie, "Comparison of Complete 
and Reduced Models of a Wind Turbine with Doubly-fed Induction Generator," in 10th 
European Conference on Power Electronics and Applications, Toulouse, 2003.  
[44]  J. G. Slootweg, H. Polinder and W. L. Kling, "Representing Wind Turbine Electrical 
Generating Systems in Fundamental Frequency Simulations," IEEE Transactions on 
Energy Conversion, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 516-524, 2003.  
[45]  V. K. Sood and P. Bhalla, "EMTP Model of Grid Connected PV System," in International 
Conference on Power Systems Transients, 2013, 2013.  
[46]  "IEEE Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with Electric Power Systems," 
2003. 
163 
 
[47]  K. A. Wheeler, M. Elsamahy and S. O. Faried, "Assessment of Distributed Generation 
Influences on Fuse-Recloser Protection Systems in Radial Distribution Networks," in 
IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition, Dallas, 2016.  
[48]  "Generation interconnection requirements at voltages 34.5 kV and below," SaskPower, 
2005. 
[49]  H. Al-Nasseri, "A new voltage based relay scheme to protect micro-grids dominated by 
embedded generation using solid state converters," in 19th International Conference on 
Electricity Distribution, Vienna, 2007.  
[50]  X. Lou, D. K. Y. Yau, H. H. Nguyen and B. Chen, "Profit-Optimal and Stability-Aware 
Load Curtailment in Smart Grids," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 
1411-1420, 2013.  
[51]  I. Waseem, M. Pipattanasomporn and S. Rahman, "Reliability Benefits of Distributed 
Generation as a Backup Source," in IEEE PES General Meeting, Calgary, 2009.  
[52]  S. Pagadrai, M. Yilmaz and P. Valluri, "Smart-Grid Backbone Network Real-Time Delay 
Reduction via Integer Programming," IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and 
Learning Systems, vol. 27, no. 8, pp. 1787-1792, 2016.  
[53]  J. Prigmore, G. Tcheslavski and C. Bahrim, "An ICGT-based Electronic Circuit Breaker 
Design for a 12.47 kV Distribution System," in IEEE PES General Meeting, Minneapolis, 
2010.  
[54]  "IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and 
Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Buff Book)," IEEE Std. 242-2001. 
[55]  H. Yazdanpanahi, W. Xu and Y. W. Li, "A Novel Fault Current Control Scheme to 
Reduce Synchronous DG's Impact on Protection Coordination," IEEE Transactions on 
Neural Networks, vol. 27, no. 14, pp. 542-551, 2014.  
[56]  A. Cataliotti, V. Cosentino, S. Guaiana, D. Di Cara, N. Panzavecchia and G. Tine, "An 
Interface Protectiono System with Power Line Communication for Distributed Generators 
Remote Control," in IEEE International Workshop on Applied Measurements for Power 
Systems, Aachen, 2014.  
[57]  H. M. Zeineldin, H. H. Sharaf and E. El-Saadany, "Protection Coordination for Microgrids 
with Grid-Connected and Islanded Capabilities using Dual Setting Directional Overcurrent 
Relays," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, p. DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2016.2546961, 2016.  
164 
 
[58]  S. T. Srinivas and H. Swarup, "Optimal relay coordination and communication based 
protection for microgrids," in IEEE Region 10 Symposium, Cochin, 2017.  
[59]  F. Coffele, C. Booth and A. Dysko, "An Adaptive Overcurrent Protection Scheme for 
Distribution Networks," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 561-
568, 2015.  
[60]  Y. Seyedi and H. Karimi, "Coordinated Protection and Control Based on Synchrophasor 
Data Processing in Smart Distribution Networks," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 
p. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2708662, 2017.  
[61]  N. Davydova and G. Hug, "Travelling Wave Based Protection for Medium Voltage Grids 
with Distributed Generation," in IEEE PowerTech Conference, Manchester, 2017.  
[62]  M. Michalic, W. Rebizant, M. Lokuwicz, S. J. Lee and S. H. Kang, "High Impedance Fault 
Detection in Distribution Networks with the use of Wave-let Based Algorithm," IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1793-1802, 2006.  
[63]  Y. S. Ko, T. K. Kang, H. Y. Park, H. Y. Kim and H. S. Nam, "The FRTU-Based Fault-
Zone Isolation Method in the Distribution Systems," IEEE Transactions on Power 
Delivery, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 1001-1009, 2010.  
[64]  X. Jin, R. Gokaraju, R. Wierckx and O. Nayak, "High Speed Digital Distance Relaying 
Scheme using FPGA and IEC 61850," IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, p. DOI: 
10.1109/TSG.2017.2655499, 2017.  
[65]  N. A. Mohamed and M. M. Salama, "A review on the Proposed Solutions to Microgrid 
Protection Problems," in IEEE Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, 
Vancouver, 2016.  
[66]  M. Dewadasa, A. Ghosh and G. Ledwich, "Protection of Microgrids Using Differential 
Relays," in IEEE AUPEC, Brisbane, 2011.  
[67]  S. T. Horowitz and A. G. Phadke, Power System Relaying, 4th ed., Wiley and Sons Ltd., 
2014.  
[68]  General Electric Power Management, T60 Percent Differential Calculations, 2002.  
[69]  L. L. Grigsby, Power System Stability and Control, 2nd ed., CRC Press, 2007.  
[70]  IEEE Guide for the Application of Current Transformers Used for Protective Relaying 
Purposes, 2007.  
165 
 
[71]  Cooper Power Systems, "Kearney Type T TCC," 2013. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cooperindustries.com/content/dam/public/powersystems/resources/library/Kea
rney/K51000AB.pdf. [Accessed January 2017]. 
[72]  D. H. Trinh and H. Chafouk, "Fault Detection and Isolation using Kalman Filter Bank for 
a Wind Turbine Generator," in IEEE Mediterranean Conference on Control and 
Automation, Corfu, 2011.  
[73]  E. Mukherjee, S. Sengupta and S. P. Duttagupta, "A Heuristic Approach of Estimation and 
Prediction of Short-Circuit Current of a Photovoltaic Cell by Kalman Filter," in IEEE 
India Conference, Pune, 2014.  
[74]  M. M. Mansour, S. F. Mekhamer and N. E. El-Kharbawe, "A Modified Particle Swarm 
Optimizer for the Coordination of Directional Overcurrent Relays," IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1400-1410, 2007.  
[75]  M. A. Abido, "Optimal Design of Power-System Stabilizers Using Particle Swarm 
Optimization," IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 406-413, 
2002.  
[76]  N. I. Sapankevych and R. Sankar, "Constrained Motion Particle Swarm Optimization and 
Support Vector Regression for Non-Linear Time Series Regression and Predication 
Applications," in IEEE Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, Miami, 2013.  
[77]  F. van den Bergh and A. P. Engelbrecht, "A New Locally Convergent Particle Swarm 
Optimizer," in IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Tunisia, 
2002.  
[78]  F. Katiraei, J. Holbach and T. Chang, "Investigation of Solar PV Inverters Current 
Contributions during Faults on Distribution and Transmission Systems Interruption 
Capacity," in Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, 2012.  
[79]  D. Turcotte and F. Katiraei, "Fault Contribution of Grid-Connected Inverters," in IEEE 
Electric Power and Energy Conference, Montreal, 2009.  
 
 
 
166 
 
APPENDIX A 
DATA FOR THE MODELS AND SYSTEMS UNDER STUDY 
 
A.1     Synchronous Generators 
Table A.1: Synchronous generator data. 
Armature resistance, ra , p.u. 0.002 
Direct-axis synchronous reactance, xd , p.u. 2.9 
Quadrature-axis synchronous reactance, xq , p.u. 1.4 
Direct-axis transient reactance,  x’d , p.u. 0.254 
Direct-axis subtransient reactance, x”d , p.u. 0.14 
Quadrature-axis subtransient reactance, x”q , p.u. 0.154 
T’d , s 0.09 
T”d , s 0.011 
T’q ,s 0.09 
T”q ,s 0.011 
Moment of inertia 1.4 
 
 
A.2    DFIG Wind Farms 
Table A.2: DFIG wind farm data. 
Generator capacity (MVA) 1.5 
Generator voltage (kV) 0.575 
DC nominal voltage (V) 1150 
Number of poles  6 
Average wind speed (m/s) 11.24 
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A.3    PV Farms 
Table A.3: PV plant data. 
Generator voltage (kV) Rated irradiance (W/m2) 
Temperature reference 
(degrees Celsius) 
0.575 1000 25 
 
A.4    Line and Cable Data 
Table A.4: Line data. 
Conductor Type Raven Pigeon Tulip 
Positive Sequence Resistance (Ω/km) 0.536 0.339 0.173 
Positive Sequence Reactance (Ω/km) 0.342 0.323 0.291 
Positive Sequence Capacitive 
Reactance (µS/km) 
5.102 5.405 5.848 
Zero Sequence Resistance (Ω/km) 1.548 0.979 0.4996 
Zero Sequence Reactance (Ω/km) 0.988 0.933 0.84 
Zero Sequence Capacitive Reactance 
(µS/km) 
1.99 2.109 2.398 
 
A.5    Transformers 
Table A.5: Transformer data. 
 Substation 
Interconnecting 
Transformer 
SM Plants Wind Plants 
Rating, MVA 100 100 5 200 
Rated voltage 138/25 kV 13.8/25 kV 0.48/13.8 kV 34.5/13.8 kV 
Winding X (per 
unit) 
0.001 0.625 0.11 0.011 
Winding 
impedance on 
winding 1 
0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 
Configuration 
Wye-Gnd/ Wye-
Gnd 
Wye-Gnd/ Wye-
Gnd 
Delta/Wye-Gnd Delta/Wye-Gnd 
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A.6    Exciter Data 
Table A.6:  SEXS Exciter and PSS1A Stabilizer data. 
TA = 0 TE = 0 
TB = 0 Emax = 10 
K = 100 Emin = -10 
A1 = 0 A2 = 0 
T1 = 0 T2 = 0.7 
T3 = 0.1 T4 = 0.7 
VSTMAX = 0.15 VSTMIN = -0.15 
T5 = 0.016 T6 = 0 
KS = 5  
 
A.7    Governor Data 
Table A.7:  IEEEG3 Governor data. 
TG = 0.5 TP = 0.04 
TR = 4 Pmax = 1 
SIGMA = 0.05 Pmin = 0.01 
DELTA = 0.3 U0 = 0.25 
UC = -0.1  
 
 
 
169 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
CASE STUDY DATA AND RESULTS FOR THE DG RECLOSING 
SCHEME 
Table B.1: Results for a DG unit at bus 2 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Delta 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4239 4152 4242 4154 4244 4157 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0759 0.0806 0.0757 0.0805 0.0756 0.0802 
DG 
Current (A) 1564 1689 873 933 196 206 
Reconnect time (s) 5.1857 5.3307 3.1520 3.2210 4.8072 2.3152 
Trip Time (s) 0.0112 0.0130 0.0080 0.0101 0.0088 0.0085 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4222 4134 4222 4134 4230 4137 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0991 0.1044 0.0991 0.1014 0.0990 0.1045 
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Table B.2: Results for a DG unit at bus 2 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Wye grounded 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4239 4152 4242 4154 4244 4157 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0759 0.0806 0.0757 0.0800 0.0756 0.0802 
DG 
Current (A) 2760 2918 1848 1893 516 531 
Reconnect time (s) 6.7173 7.9034 4.3300 5.2200 5.8096 7.6100 
Trip Time (s) 0.0060 0.0080 0.0068 0.0072 0.0070 0.0066 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4222 4132 4222 4134 4230 4137 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0991 0.1042 0.0988 0.1040 0.0990 0.1017 
 
Table B.3: Results for a DG unit at bus 5 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Delta 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4236 4139 4240 4141 4244 4160 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0758 0.0806 0.0757 0.0806 0.0756 0.0802 
DG 
Current (A) 1288 1381 742 778 163 168 
Reconnect time (s) 3.9368 4.0135 3.2387 3.3345 2.5126 7.3214 
Trip Time (s) 0.0154 0.0140 0.0152 0.0135 0.0092 0.0085 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4238 4136 4238 4139 4229 4140 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0990 0.0962 0.0990 0.1045 0.0986 0.1039 
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Table B.4: Results for a DG unit at bus 5 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Wye grounded 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4238 4138 4242 4140 4244 4161 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0758 0.0806 0.0757 0.0806 0.0756 0.0803 
DG 
Current (A) 2157 2167 1459 1499 430 430 
Reconnect time (s) 6.3780 6.4368 3.5198 3.6965 1.7769 3.8841 
Trip Time (s) 0.0098 0.0122 0.0081 0.0080 0.0070 0.0066 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4236 4135 4240 4137 4229 4140 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0987 0.1039 0.0965 0.1045 0.0981 0.1045 
 
Table B.5: Results for a DG unit at bus 6 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Delta 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4266 4185 4244 4188 4245 4161 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0754 0.0798 0.0755 0.0797 0.0755 0.0798 
DG 
Current (A) 1009 1022 591 606 140 150 
Reconnect time (s) 1.7481 1.7462 1.9520 2.0145 3.9692 2.7812 
Trip Time (s) 0.0164 0.0165 0.0156 0.0153 0.0150 0.0131 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4251 4165 4228 4168 4230 4140 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0993 0.1017 0.0990 0.1030 0.0992 0.1035 
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Table B.6: Results for a DG unit at bus 6 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded Wye grounded 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 4244 4162 4244 4162 4244 4162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 0.0755 0.0798 
Current (A) with RD 4266 4186 4268 4188 4244 4163 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0754 0.0797 0.0754 0.0797 0.0755 0.0798 
DG 
Current (A) 1491 1428 1063 1025 333 330 
Reconnect time (s) 4.0190 1.3838 3.4707 3.6357 1.6469 5.9997 
Trip Time (s) 0.0168 0.0141 0.0141 0.0128 0.0076 0.0071 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 4229 4141 4229 4141 4229 4141 
Trip Time (s) 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 0.0990 0.1035 
Current (A) with RD 4251 4166 4253 4168 4228 4142 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0997 0.1032 0.0992 0.1030 0.1003 0.1042 
 
Table B.7: Results for a DG unit at bus 3 and a fault at bus 6 for a Wye grounded Delta 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 3090 2953 3090 2953 3090 2953 
Trip Time (s) 0.0750 0.0874 0.0750 0.0874 0.0750 0.0874 
Current (A) with RD 3084 2941 3085 2943 3090 2953 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0754 0.0879 0.0753 0.0879 0.0751 0.0876 
DG 
Current (A) 1138 1183 647 686 153 153 
Reconnect time (s) 5.0480 5.1491 3.1375 3.2168 2.9630 1.7664 
Trip Time (s) 0.0156 0.0146 0.0154 0.0140 0.0110 0.0122 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 3077 2939 3077 2939 3077 2939 
Trip Time (s) 0.0994 0.1093 0.0994 0.1093 0.0994 0.1093 
Current (A) with RD 3084 2941 3086 2943 3077 2938 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0990 0.1098 0.0990 0.1097 0.0992 0.1097 
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Table B.8: Results for a DG unit at bus 3 and a fault at bus 6 for a Wye grounded Wye grounded 
transformer connection. 
 Rating (MVA) 
16 16 8 8 1.6 1.6 
100% 100% 50% 50% 10% 10% 
 Fault Type 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
Three-
Phase 
Double-
Line-to-
Ground 
RE2 
FAST 
Current (A) 3090 2953 3090 2953 3090 2953 
Trip Time (s) 0.0750 0.0874 0.0750 0.0874 0.0750 0.0874 
Current (A) with RD 3084 2941 3085 2943 3090 2953 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0754 0.0879 0.0753 0.0879 0.0751 0.0876 
DG 
Current (A) 1797 1759 1241 1231 374 388 
Reconnect time (s) 5.8148 5.8793 3.3322 3.4640 1.8006 1.6162 
Trip Time (s) 0.0146 0.0129 0.0087 0.0087 0.0072 0.0069 
Fuse 1 
Current (A) 3077 2939 3077 2939 3077 2939 
Trip Time (s) 0.0994 0.1093 0.0994 0.1093 0.0994 0.1093 
Current (A) with RD 3084 2941 3085 2943 3077 2938 
Trip Time (s) with 
RD 
0.0993 0.1095 0.0987 0.1107 0.1010 0.1095 
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Table B.9: Recloser RE2 results for a DG unit at bus 2 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded 
Wye grounded transformer connection with varying fault impedances. 
Fault 
Impedance 
(ohm) 
Fault Type 
Current (A) 
NO DG 
Model (s) 
NO DG 
Current (A) 
WITH DG 
Model (s) 
WITH DG 
0 Three-Phase 4244 0.0755 4239 0.0758 
1 Three-Phase 3748 0.076 3632 0.07695 
6.25 Three-Phase 1890 0.08155 1630 0.0868 
8.125 Three-Phase 1590 0.08395 1320 0.09135 
0 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4162 0.0798 4120 0.0807 
1 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4294 0.0797 4233 0.0805 
6.25 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4086 0.07995 3976 0.08125 
8.125 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4031 0.0802 3916 0.0814 
0 Three-Phase 4244 0.0755 4241 0.0757 
1 Three-Phase 3748 0.076 3686 0.07655 
6.25 Three-Phase 1890 0.08155 1789 0.08295 
8.125 Three-Phase 1590 0.08395 1509 0.08735 
0 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4162 0.0798 4141 0.0806 
1 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4294 0.0797 4262 0.08045 
6.25 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4086 0.07995 4015 0.081 
8.125 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4031 0.0802 3960 0.08115 
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Table B.10: Fuse 1 and DG current results for a DG unit at bus 2 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye 
grounded Wye grounded transformer connection with varying fault impedances. 
Impedance 
(ohm) 
Fault Type 
Current (A) 
NO DG 
Model (s) 
NO DG 
Current (A) 
WITH DG 
Model (s) 
WITH DG 
DG Current 
(A) 
0 
Three-
Phase 
4229 0.1323 6745 0.08675 2543 
1 
Three-
Phase 
3689 0.15635 5474 0.10035 2050 
6.25 
Three-
Phase 
1750 0.5192 2017 0.2448 687 
8.125 
Three-
Phase 
1442 0.74865 1632 0.26625 592 
0 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4141 0.1368 6567 0.08895 2478 
1 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4266 0.13515 6714 0.0871 2511 
6.25 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4030 0.1425 6407 0.09055 2451 
8.125 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
3971 0.14455 6305 0.09075 2466 
0 
Three-
Phase 
4229 0.1323 5800 0.0973 1603 
1 
Three-
Phase 
3689 0.15635 4849 0.1212 1348 
6.25 
Three-
Phase 
1750 0.5192 2017 0.2448 436 
8.125 
Three-
Phase 
1442 0.74865 1553 0.26975 336 
0 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4141 0.1368 5728 0.09625 1617 
1 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4266 0.13515 5828 0.0972 1620 
6.25 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4030 0.1425 5528 0.1008 1600 
8.125 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
3971 0.14455 5518 0.1007 1599 
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Table B.11: Recloser RE2 results for a DG unit at bus 5 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye grounded 
Wye grounded transformer connection with varying fault impedances. 
Fault 
Impedance 
(ohm) 
Fault Type 
Current (A) 
NO DG 
Model (s) 
NO DG 
Current (A) 
WITH DG 
Model (s) 
WITH DG 
0 Three-Phase 4244 0.0755 4104 0.0759 
1 Three-Phase 3748 0.076 3531 0.07725 
6.25 Three-Phase 1890 0.08155 1580 0.08675 
8.125 Three-Phase 1590 0.08395 1286 0.0907 
0 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4162 0.0798 4105 0.0807 
1 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4294 0.0797 3535 0.08235 
6.25 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4086 0.07995 1651 0.09795 
8.125 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4031 0.0802 1378 0.10325 
0 Three-Phase 4244 0.0755 4160 0.0758 
1 Three-Phase 3748 0.076 3650 0.07515 
6.25 Three-Phase 1890 0.08155 1749 0.08435 
8.125 Three-Phase 1590 0.08395 1441 0.0873 
0 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4162 0.0798 4161 0.08045 
1 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4294 0.0797 3662 0.0814 
6.25 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4086 0.07995 1754 0.0944 
8.125 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
4031 0.0802 1478 0.09885 
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Table B.12: Fuse 1 and DG current results for a DG unit at bus 5 and a fault at bus 1 for a Wye 
grounded Wye grounded transformer connection with varying fault impedances. 
Impedance 
(ohm) 
Fault Type 
Current (A) 
NO DG 
Model (s) 
NO DG 
Current (A) 
WITH DG 
Model (s) 
WITH DG 
DG Current 
(A) 
0 
Three-
Phase 
4229 0.1323 6068 0.0939 2021 
1 
Three-
Phase 
3689 0.15635 4786 0.11365 1605 
6.25 
Three-
Phase 
1750 0.5192 1965 0.14535 615 
8.125 
Three-
Phase 
1442 0.74865 1431 0.4914 533 
0 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4141 0.1368 6060 0.0939 2026 
1 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4266 0.13515 4903 0.1135 1596 
6.25 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4030 0.1425 1925 0.1377 626 
8.125 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
3971 0.14455 1570 0.4611 677 
0 
Three-
Phase 
4229 0.1323 5452 0.10285 1354 
1 
Three-
Phase 
3689 0.15635 4542 0.12795 1090 
6.25 
Three-
Phase 
1750 0.5192 1893 0.31515 380 
8.125 
Three-
Phase 
1442 0.74865 1540 0.41325 321 
0 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4141 0.1368 5444 0.1017 1347 
1 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4266 0.13515 4517 0.12665 1066 
6.25 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
4030 0.1425 1888 0.135 384 
8.125 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
3971 0.14455 1534 0.4158 297 
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APPENDIX C 
CASE STUDY DATA AND RESULTS FOR THE DG RECLOSING AND 
FAULT DETECTION SCHEME 
Table C.1: Results for ROCOC for the bolted fault cases. 
 
Fault at DG at Rating (MVA) Fault Type RD Trip Time (s) ΔI (A/s) 
1 2 8 Three-Phase 0.01245 218 
1 2 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.01045 131 
5 2 8 Three-Phase 0.00905 114 
5 2 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.01245 92 
1 5 8 Three-Phase 0.01425 163 
1 5 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.01315 99 
2 5 8 Three-Phase 0.01465 130 
2 5 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.00915 83 
 
Table C.2: Results for ROCOC for faults with a 3 Ω fault impedance. 
 
Fault at DG at Rating (MVA) Fault Type RD Trip Time (s) ΔI (A/s) 
1 2 8 Three-Phase 0.01117 119 
1 2 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.0117 125 
5 2 8 Three-Phase 0.0164 74 
5 2 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.0136 108 
1 5 8 Three-Phase 0.01475 93 
1 5 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.00975 94 
2 5 8 Three-Phase 0.01785 80 
2 5 8 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0.01755 103 
 
Table C.3: Results for ROCOC for a sudden load change. 
 
DG size DG location Fault bus Load Change (MVA) ΔI (A/s) 
8 2 2 10 8.11 
8 2 5 10 7 
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Table C.4: Results for ROCOC for varying DG locations, sizes and fault impedances. 
DG size DG location Fault bus Fault type Fault Impedance (Ω) ΔI (A/s) 
8 2 1 Three-Phase 0 218 
8 2 1 Line-to-Ground 0 90 
8 2 1 Line-to-Ground 10 28 
8 2 1 Line-to-Line 0 210 
8 2 1 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0 131 
8 2 5 Three-Phase 0 114 
8 2 5 Three-Phase 10 38 
8 2 5 Line-to-Ground 0 48 
8 2 5 Line-to-Ground 10 20 
8 2 5 Line-to-Line 0 60 
8 2 5 Line-to-Line-to-Ground 0 92 
4 2 1 Line-to-Ground 0 62 
4 2 1 Line-to-Ground 10 20 
4 2 5 Line-to-Ground 0 33 
4 2 5 Line-to-Ground 10 18 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CASE STUDY DATA FOR THE HYBRID MICROGRID PROTECTION 
SCHEME 
Table D.1: Short circuit data for PV based DG sources with a microgrid in grid connected mode. 
 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Ground Line-to-Line-to-Ground 
Relay Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload 
RUM 1774 20 1774 20 1824 20 1775 20 
RP1 1719 10 1685 10 2124 10 2195 10 
RP4 1719 10 1685 10 2124 10 2195 10 
R1 1640 10 1615 10 2425 10 2691 10 
R2 1566 10 1526 10 2320 10 2502 10 
R3 1510 4.7 1431 4.7 2206 4.7 2423 4.7 
R4 1640 4.7 1615 4.7 2425 4.7 2691 4.7 
R5 1566 10 1526 10 2320 10 2502 10 
R6 1510 4.7 1431 4.7 2206 4.7 2423 4.7 
 
Table D.2: Short circuit data for PV based DG sources with a microgrid in islanded mode. 
 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Ground Line-to-Line-to-Ground 
Relay Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload 
RUM 55 8.59 65 8.59 89.3 8.59 96.1 8.59 
RP1 28 4.3 32 4.3 45 4.3 47 4.3 
RP4 28 4.3 32 4.3 45 4.3 47 4.3 
R1 53.6 9.3 63 9.3 89.15 9.3 94.14 9.3 
R2 53.6 9.3 63 9.3 89.13 9.3 93.98 9.3 
R3 53.5 4.65 60 4.65 89.2 4.65 93.67 4.65 
R4 53.6 9.3 63 9.3 89.15 9.3 94.14 9.3 
R5 53.6 9.3 63 9.3 89.13 9.3 93.98 9.3 
R6 53.5 4.65 60 4.65 89.2 4.65 93.67 4.65 
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Table D.3: Short circuit data for synchronous machine based DG sources with a microgrid in 
grid connected mode. 
 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Ground Line-to-Line-to-Ground 
Relay Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload 
RUM 1729 9.76 1755 9.76 1917 9.76 1864 9.76 
RP1 1845 4.86 1798 4.86 2023 4.86 1954 4.86 
RP4 1845 4.88 1798 4.88 2023 4.88 1954 4.88 
R1 1902 9.3 1844 9.3 2051 9.3 2057 9.3 
R2 1815 9.3 1737 9.3 1884 9.3 1992 9.3 
R3 1733 4.65 1619 4.65 1731 4.65 1886 4.65 
R4 1902 9.3 1844 9.3 2051 9.3 2057 9.3 
R5 1815 9.3 1737 9.3 1884 9.3 1992 9.3 
R6 1733 4.65 1619 4.65 1731 4.65 1886 4.65 
 
Table D.4: Short circuit data for synchronous machine based DG sources with a microgrid in 
islanded mode. 
 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Ground Line-to-Line-to-Ground 
Relay Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload Ifmax Iload 
RUM 293 9.76 302 9.76 345 9.76 302 9.76 
RP1 148 4.86 150 4.86 176 4.86 152 4.86 
RP4 148 4.88 150 4.88 176 4.88 152 4.88 
R1 293 9.3 300 9.3 352 9.3 351 9.3 
R2 293 9.3 300 9.3 352 9.3 351 9.3 
R3 292 4.65 299 4.65 351 4.65 350 4.65 
R4 293 9.3 300 9.3 352 9.3 351 9.3 
R5 293 9.3 300 9.3 352 9.3 351 9.3 
R6 292 4.65 299 4.65 351 4.65 350 4.65 
 
In every case, there were no false tripping instances and the correct protective device 
(differential or adaptive overcurrent relay) operated when faults occurred. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TRAINING AND ANAYLSIS DATA FOR POWER PLANTS USED IN THE 
PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION SCHEME 
 
E.1    Wind Plant 2 Training Data 
Table E.1: Training Data for Generation Plant 2 when no other plants are operating. 
 
 
Wind 
Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 7 6 
 Rating 
(%) 
100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 62.28 53.38 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault 
Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
301 297 287 282 280 278 275 
Line-to-
Line 
325 316 294 277 265 255 247 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
831 832 833 835 843 849 863 
Line-to-
Ground 
1064 1061 1055 1048 1040 1031 1025 
 PEN 
(%) 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Plant 
pre-fault 
current 
(A) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 137 131 108 92 82 78 77 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table E.2: Training Data for Generation Plant 2 when all other plants are operating at full 
capacity. 
 Wind Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 7 6 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 62.28 53.38 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-Phase 223 215 199 192 182 179 176 
Line-to-
Line 
276 271 250 229 210 199 191 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
465 462 456 451 446 441 437 
Line-to-
Ground 
631 629 622 617 608 599 594 
 PEN (%) 71.47 70.64 64.40 56.75 50.83 34.08 31.38 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
2 126 121 91 66 52 26 23 
3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
4 126 121 91 66 52 26 23 
5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
6 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
 
Table E.3: Training Data for Generation Plant 2 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and plants 1 and 
6 are operating at 80% capacity. 
 
Wind 
Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
240 235 224 217 214 
Line-to-
Line 
296 288 264 244 226 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
484 488 485 490 492 
Line-to-
Ground 
659 657 648 641 631 
 PEN (%) 78.26 77.56 72.22 65.35 59.77 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 35 35 35 35 35 
2 126 121 91 66 52 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 126 121 91 66 52 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 55 55 55 55 55 
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Table E.4: Training Data for Generation Plant 2 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and plants 1 and 
6 are operating at 60% capacity. 
 
Wind 
Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
245 241 229 222 219 
Line-to-
Line 
298 289 265 245 226 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
491 489 490 491 492 
Line-to-
Ground 
660 659 650 642 631 
 PEN (%) 82.89 82.31 77.78 71.74 66.67 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 26 26 26 26 26 
2 126 121 91 66 52 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 126 121 91 66 52 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 32 32 32 32 32 
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E.2    Wind Plant 4 Training Data 
Table E.5: Training Data for Generation Plant 4 when no other plants are operating. 
 Wind Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 7 6 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 62.28 53.38 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-Phase 305 302 291 285 283 281 277 
Line-to-
Line 
327 321 297 281 267 257 250 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
942 945 951 956 961 967 985 
Line-to-
Ground 
1191 1189 1182 1176 1169 1161 1155 
 PEN (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 138 132 109 92 83 78 77 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table E.6: Training Data for Generation Plant 4 when all other plants are operating at full 
capacity. 
 Wind Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 7 6 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 62.28 53.38 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-Phase 214 210 195 185 180 171 170 
Line-to-
Line 
288 282 256 239 223 210 198 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
532 530 528 525 523 520 515 
Line-to-
Ground 
856 854 848 845 843 826 820 
 PEN (%) 50.20 48.98 41.86 34.21 28.57 20.38 13.79 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
2 126 120 90 65 50 32 20 
3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
4 126 120 90 65 50 32 20 
5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
6 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
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Table E.7: Training Data for Generation Plant 4 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and plants 1 and 
6 are operating at 80% capacity. 
 Wind Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-Phase 228 226 216 211 209 
Line-to-Line 291 285 264 247 231 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
640 642 645 648 653 
Line-to-
Ground 
902 900 892 886 879 
 PEN (%) 69.61 68.75 62.33 54.55 48.60 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 35 35 35 35 35 
2 126 121 91 66 52 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 126 121 91 66 52 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 55 55 55 55 55 
 
Table E.8: Training Data for Generation Plant 4 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and plants 1 and 
6 are operating at 60% capacity. 
 Wind Speed 
(m/s) 
11.24 11 10 9 8 
 Rating (%) 100.00 97.86 88.97 80.07 71.17 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-Phase 234 233 223 217 216 
Line-to-Line 294 288 267 247 235 
Line-to-Line-
to-Ground 
645 647 650 653 658 
Line-to-
Ground 
904 902 892 890 883 
 PEN (%) 79.75 79.08 73.98 67.35 61.90 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 26 26 26 26 26 
2 126 121 91 66 52 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 126 121 91 66 52 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 32 32 32 32 32 
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E.3    Biogas Plant 1 Training Data 
Table E.9: Training Data for Generation Plant 1 when no other plants are operating. 
 Rating 
(%) 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault 
Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
207 205 204 201 200 198 196 
Line-to-
Line 
212 209 206 203 200 197 193 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
607 594 590 589 588 587 585 
Line-to-
Ground 
629 617 611 610 607 597 594 
 PEN 
(%) 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Plant 
pre-fault 
current 
(A) 
1 42 39 35 31 26 22 17 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table E.10: Training Data for Generation Plant 1 when all other plants are operating at full 
capacity. 
 Rating 
(%) 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault 
Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
177 175 172 169 168 165 162 
Line-to-
Line 
194 187 186 183 180 174 170 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
191 190 188 187 185 184 183 
Line-to-
Ground 
268 268 264 263 263 261 261 
 PEN 
(%) 
23.82 22.50 20.67 18.75 16.22 14.08 10.05 
Plant 
pre-fault 
current 
(A) 
1 42 39 35 31 26 22 15 
2 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
4 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
6 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
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Table E.11: Training Data for Generation Plant 1 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and wind speed 
is 10 m/s. 
 Rating (%) 100 90 80 70 60 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
188 184 180 176 174 
Line-to-
Line 
199 191 189 184 182 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
196 193 191 190 188 
Line-to-
Ground 
272 271 269 268 266 
 PEN (%) 31.58 30.00 27.78 25.41 22.22 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 39 35 31 26 
2 91 91 91 91 91 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 91 91 91 91 91 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 82 82 82 82 82 
 
Table E.12: Training Data for Generation Plant 1 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and wind speed 
is 10 m/s with plants 2 and 4 having one generator disconnected. 
 Rating (%) 100 90 80 70 60 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
201 195 193 185 182 
Line-to-
Line 
204 201 196 189 187 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
205 204 202 201 200 
Line-to-
Ground 
277 276 275 273 272 
 PEN (%) 47.73 45.88 43.21 40.26 36.11 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 39 35 31 26 
2 46 46 46 46 46 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 47 47 47 47 47 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 82 82 82 82 82 
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E.4    Biogas Plant 6 Training Data 
Table E.13: Training Data for Generation Plant 6 when no other plants are operating. 
 Rating 
(%) 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault 
Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
368 361 352 344 340 334 332 
Line-to-
Line 
357 345 335 327 319 314 310 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
607 603 597 591 584 574 570 
Line-to-
Ground 
646 634 625 616 609 601 597 
 PEN (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Plant 
pre-fault 
current 
(A) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 82 69 55 43 32 22 16 
 
Table E.14: Training Data for Generation Plant 6 when all other plants are operating at full 
capacity. 
 Rating 
(%) 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 
Fault 
Current/
Fault 
Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
344 335 327 321 315 311 308 
Line-to-
Line 
356 342 332 321 312 310 302 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
357 343 333 321 316 312 303 
Line-to-
Ground 
311 311 311 308 308 308 308 
 PEN 
(%) 
32.67 28.99 24.55 20.28 15.92 11.52 8.65 
Plant 
pre-fault 
current 
(A) 
1 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
2 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
4 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
6 82 69 55 43 32 22 16 
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Table E.15: Training Data for Generation Plant 6 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and wind speed 
is 10 m/s. 
 Rating (%) 100 90 80 70 60 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
347 339 330 324 318 
Line-to-
Line 
357 344 333 325 319 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
361 345 336 328 318 
Line-to-
Ground 
312 311 311 311 311 
 PEN (%) 47.40 43.13 37.67 32.09 26.02 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 42 42 42 42 
2 91 91 91 91 91 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 91 91 91 91 91 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 82 69 55 43 32 
 
Table E.16: Training Data for Generation Plant 6 when the irradiance is 0 W/m2 and wind speed 
is 10 m/s with plants 2 and 4 having one generator disconnected. 
 Rating (%) 100 90 80 70 60 
Fault 
Current/ 
Fault Type 
(A) 
Three-
Phase 
353 347 339 332 326 
Line-to-
Line 
357 344 334 326 319 
Line-to-
Line-to-
Ground 
366 354 343 333 324 
Line-to-
Ground 
317 318 318 318 317 
 PEN (%) 63.57 59.48 53.92 47.78 40.51 
Plant pre-
fault 
current (A) 
1 42 42 42 42 42 
2 46 46 46 46 46 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 47 47 47 47 47 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
6 82 69 55 43 32 
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E.5    Wind Plant 2 Regression Analysis 
As a result of the data presented in Appendix E.1 the following maximum and minimum 
short circuit current in relation to percentage rating graphs are obtained for each type of fault: 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
    (c)        (d) 
Figure E.1: Plant 2 short circuit current versus percentage rating for maximum and minimum 
cases for a: (a) three- phase fault, (b) line-to-line fault, (c) line-to-line-to-ground 
fault, (d) line-to-ground fault. 
This gives the following maximum predicted short circuit currents: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝐷𝐺2 = 0.0128(𝑟𝐷𝐺2)
2 − 1.469(𝑟𝐷𝐺2) + 318.16 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐺2 = 0.0251(𝑟𝐷𝐺2)
2 − 2.243(𝑟𝐷𝐺2) + 296.17 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺2 = 0.0171(𝑟𝐷𝐺2)
2 − 3.278(𝑟𝐷𝐺2) + 988.50 
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𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺2 = −0.0011(𝑟𝐷𝐺2)
2 + 1.011(𝑟𝐷𝐺2) + 973.59 
 As specified in Section 6.3.2, the fault ratio is required to be plotted against the 
percentage penetration for each percentage rating. This gives the following plots: 
 
  
Figure E.2: Plant 2 three-phase short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.3: Plant 2 line-to-line short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
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Figure E.4: Plant 2 line-to-line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
operating at various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.5: Plant 2 line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
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These are expressed generically in the form given in Equation 6.19: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives the coefficients of Equation 6.19 for each percentage rating and fault type: 
Table E.17: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 2 for a three-phase fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.242E-04 -0.01235 0.99273 
97.86 7.523E-05 -0.00358 0.60486 
88.97 4.936E-06 0.00762 0.18739 
80.07 -1.046E-05 0.00886 0.21754 
71.17 -5.690E-05 0.01551 0.01687 
Table E.18: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 2 for a line-to-line fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 -7.416E-05 0.01784 -0.04348 
97.86 -3.584E-05 0.01081 0.27636 
88.97 -3.331E-06 0.00463 0.56954 
80.07 -1.004E-05 0.00546 0.55356 
71.17 -2.288E-06 0.00443 0.57923 
Table E.19: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 2 for a line-to-line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 6.919E-04 -0.10343 4.42211 
97.86 6.391E-04 -0.09418 4.02529 
88.97 4.012E-04 -0.05344 2.33096 
80.07 2.387E-04 -0.02697 1.30921 
71.17 1.651E-04 -0.01550 0.89823 
Table E.20: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 2 for a line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 6.360E-04 -0.09505 4.14324 
97.86 5.941E-04 -0.08774 3.83198 
88.97 3.983E-04 -0.05413 2.42910 
80.07 2.623E-04 -0.03174 1.55065 
71.17 1.994E-04 -0.02174 1.17942 
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The coefficients are plotted as such: 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.6: Plant 2 coefficients for (a) three-phase and (b) line-to-line faults. 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.7: Plant 2 coefficients for (a) line-to-line-to-ground and (b) line-to-ground faults. 
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This gives the following correction coefficient equations given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖         
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table E.21: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for Plant 2. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 1.5756E-07 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -2.1432E-05 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 6.7719E-04 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -2.9774E-05 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 4.2680E-03 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -1.3867E-01 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 1.4022E-03 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -2.1253E-01 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 8.0967E+00 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
    These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.23 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
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E.6    Wind Plant 4 Regression Analysis 
As a result of the data presented in Appendix E.2 the following maximum and minimum 
short circuit current in relation to percentage rating graphs are obtained for each type of fault: 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
    (c)        (d) 
Figure E.8: Plant 4 short circuit current versus percentage rating for maximum and minimum 
cases for a: (a) three- phase fault, (b) line-to-line fault, (c) line-to-line-to-ground 
fault, (d) line-to-ground fault. 
This gives the following maximum predicted short circuit currents: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝐷𝐺4 = 0.0130(𝑟𝐷𝐺4)
2 − 1.440(𝑟𝐷𝐺4) + 318.43 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐺4 = 0.0253(𝑟𝐷𝐺4)
2 − 2.244(𝑟𝐷𝐺4) + 298.26 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺4 = 0.0114(𝑟𝐷𝐺4)
2 − 2.566(𝑟𝐷𝐺4) + 1086.95 
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𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺4 = −0.0003(𝑟𝐷𝐺4)
2 + 0.827(𝑟𝐷𝐺4) + 1111.56 
 As specified in Section 6.3.2, the fault ratio is required to be plotted against the 
percentage penetration for each percentage rating. This gives the following plots: 
 
  
Figure E.9: Plant 4 three-phase short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.10: Plant 4 line-to-line short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
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Figure E.11: Plant 4 line-to-line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
operating at various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.12: Plant 4 line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating 
at various percentages of rated output.  
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These are expressed generically in the form given in Equation 6.19: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives the following coefficients of Equation 6.19 for each percentage rating and 
fault type: 
Table E.22: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 4 for a three-phase fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.536E-04 -0.01724 1.18381 
97.86 1.359E-04 -0.01441 1.07907 
88.97 8.312E-05 -0.00624 0.79002 
80.07 4.449E-05 -0.00076 0.62863 
71.17 2.250E-05 0.00209 0.56358 
Table E.23: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 4 for a line-to-line fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 7.572E-05 -0.00903 1.14492 
97.86 7.299E-05 -0.00855 1.12355 
88.97 3.880E-05 -0.00318 0.92889 
80.07 3.439E-05 -0.00242 0.89622 
71.17 2.211E-05 -0.00057 0.83489 
Table E.24: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 4 for a line-to-line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.638E-04 -0.01619 0.97290 
97.86 1.514E-04 -0.01426 0.90429 
88.97 9.863E-05 -0.00660 0.66790 
80.07 5.866E-05 -0.00124 0.53320 
71.17 3.597E-05 0.00155 0.48134 
Table E.25: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 4 for a line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.671E-04 -0.01966 1.29000 
97.86 1.584E-04 -0.01828 1.23899 
88.97 1.157E-04 -0.01172 1.01096 
80.07 8.120E-05 -0.00674 0.85933 
71.17 6.593E-05 -0.00467 0.80560 
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The coefficients are plotted as such: 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.13: Plant 4 coefficients for (a) three-phase and (b) line-to-line faults. 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.14: Plant 4 coefficients for (a) line-to-line-to-ground and (b) line-to-ground faults. 
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This gives the following correction coefficient equations given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖         
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table E.26: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for Plant 4. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 1.0254E-07 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -1.3039E-05 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 4.3112E-04 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -1.7795E-05 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 2.3828E-03 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -7.7390E-02 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 7.5369E-04 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -1.0788E-01 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 4.4271E+00 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
   These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.23 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
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E.7    Biogas Plant 1 Regression Analysis 
As a result of the data presented in Appendix E.3 the following maximum and minimum 
short circuit current in relation to percentage rating graphs are obtained for each type of fault: 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
    (c)        (d) 
Figure E.15: Plant 1 short circuit current versus percentage rating for maximum and minimum 
cases for a: (a) three- phase fault, (b) line-to-line fault, (c) line-to-line-to-ground 
fault, (d) line-to-ground fault. 
This gives the following maximum predicted short circuit currents: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝐷𝐺1 = −0.00012(𝑟𝐷𝐺1)
2 + 0.199(𝑟𝐷𝐺1) + 188.29 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐺1 = −0.0006(𝑟𝐷𝐺1)
2 + 0.394(𝑟𝐷𝐺1) + 178.43 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺1 = 0.0083(𝑟𝐷𝐺1)
2 − 0.874(𝑟𝐷𝐺1) + 608.43 
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𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺1 = 0.0025(𝑟𝐷𝐺1)
2 + 0.182(𝑟𝐷𝐺1) + 583.29 
 As specified in Section 6.3.2, the fault ratio is required to be plotted against the 
percentage penetration for each percentage rating. This gives the following plots: 
 
  
Figure E.16: Plant 1 three-phase short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.17: Plant 1 line-to-line short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
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Figure E.18: Plant 1 line-to-line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
operating at various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.19: Plant 1 line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating 
at various percentages of rated output.  
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These are expressed generically in the form given in Equation 6.19: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives the coefficients of Equation 6.19 for each percentage rating and fault type: 
Table E.27: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant1 for a three-phase fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.242E-04 -0.01235 0.99273 
97.86 7.523E-05 -0.00358 0.60486 
88.97 4.936E-06 0.00762 0.18739 
80.07 -1.046E-05 0.00886 0.21754 
71.17 -5.690E-05 0.01551 0.01687 
Table E.28: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 1 for a line-to-line fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 -1.649E-05 0.00312 0.85251 
90.00 -2.786E-05 0.00480 0.79855 
80.00 -1.643E-05 0.00322 0.84235 
70.00 -2.874E-06 0.00158 0.87107 
60.00 -8.939E-06 0.00224 0.86549 
Table E.29: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 1 for a line-to-line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.535E-04 -0.01011 0.47634 
90.00 1.436E-04 -0.00889 0.45301 
80.00 1.329E-04 -0.00752 0.42212 
70.00 1.225E-04 -0.00620 0.39461 
60.00 1.084E-04 -0.00445 0.36091 
Table E.30: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 1 for a line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.325E-04 -0.00897 0.57180 
90.00 1.247E-04 -0.00806 0.55868 
80.00 1.123E-04 -0.00647 0.52376 
70.00 1.049E-04 -0.00553 0.50345 
60.00 9.473E-05 -0.00429 0.48137 
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The coefficients are plotted as such: 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.20: Plant 1 coefficients for (a) three-phase and (b) line-to-line faults. 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.21: Plant 1 coefficients for (a) line-to-line-to-ground and (b) line-to-ground faults. 
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This gives the following correction coefficient equations given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖         
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table E.31: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for Plant 1. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a -1.6939E-10 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -7.4012E-07 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 2.0748E-05 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -7.1212E-08 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 1.0996E-04 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -1.6388E-03 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 8.6804E-06 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -3.5758E-03 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 9.5567E-01 -8.2509E+00 3.8428E-03 1.5421E+01 
          
These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.23 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
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E.8    Biogas Plant 6 Regression Analysis 
As a result of the data presented in Appendix E.4 the following maximum and minimum 
short circuit current in relation to percentage rating graphs are obtained for each type of fault: 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
    (c)        (d) 
Figure E.22: Plant 6 short circuit current versus percentage rating for maximum and minimum 
cases for a: (a) three- phase fault, (b) line-to-line fault, (c) line-to-line-to-ground 
fault, (d) line-to-ground fault. 
This gives the following maximum predicted short circuit currents: 
𝐼𝑓𝑟3𝑃𝐷𝐺6 = 0.0057(𝑟𝐷𝐺6)
2 − 0.179(𝑟𝐷𝐺6) + 329.50 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐺6 = 0.0077(𝑟𝐷𝐺6)
2 − 0.302(𝑟𝐷𝐺6) + 309.64 
𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺6 = −0.0026(𝑟𝐷𝐺6)
2 + 1.017(𝑟𝐷𝐺6) + 532.14 
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𝐼𝑓𝑟𝐿𝐺𝐷𝐺6 = 0.0058(𝑟𝐷𝐺6)
2 + 0.001(𝑟𝐷𝐺6) + 587.29 
 As specified in Section 6.3.2, the fault ratio is required to be plotted against the 
percentage penetration for each percentage rating. This gives the following plots: 
 
  
Figure E.23: Plant 6 three-phase short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.24: Plant 6 line-to-line short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating at 
various percentages of rated output.  
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Figure E.25: Plant 6 line-to-line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration 
operating at various percentages of rated output.  
 
 
Figure E.26: Plant 6 line-to-ground short circuit ratios versus percentage penetration operating 
at various percentages of rated output.  
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These are expressed generically in the form given in Equation 6.19: 
𝑅𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives the following coefficients of Equation 6.19 for each percentage rating and 
fault type: 
Table E.32: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 6 for a three-phase fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 5.507E-06 0.00025 0.92020 
90.00 -8.233E-07 0.00114 0.89430 
80.00 -3.501E-06 0.00141 0.89420 
70.00 -5.503E-06 0.00153 0.90250 
60.00 -7.042E-06 0.00171 0.89908 
Table E.33: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 6 for a line-to-line fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 -1.662E-06 0.00026 0.99086 
90.00 -6.574E-07 0.00016 0.99051 
80.00 -2.537E-07 0.00012 0.99089 
70.00 -4.960E-07 0.00014 0.99075 
60.00 0.000E+00 0.00000 1.00000 
Table E.34: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 6 for a line-to-line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.447E-04 -0.01325 0.87546 
90.00 1.293E-04 -0.01073 0.77808 
80.00 1.112E-04 -0.00809 0.69571 
70.00 9.321E-05 -0.00557 0.62431 
60.00 8.171E-05 -0.00406 0.58829 
Table E.35: Ratio scaling coefficients for Plant 6 for a line-to-ground fault. 
Percentage Rating (r) τ γ ε 
100.00 1.906E-04 -0.01779 0.87056 
90.00 1.607E-04 -0.01370 0.76175 
80.00 1.323E-04 -0.00993 0.66850 
70.00 1.067E-04 -0.00664 0.59649 
60.00 8.790E-05 -0.00436 0.55691 
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The coefficients are plotted as such: 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.27: Plant 6 coefficients for (a) three-phase and (b) line-to-line faults. 
 
 
  
   (a)         (b) 
Figure E.28: Plant 6 coefficients for (a) line-to-line-to-ground and (b) line-to-ground faults. 
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This gives the following correction coefficient equations given in the form: 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝛾𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑓
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑔𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝑘𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝑚𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖         
The corresponding coefficients for the correction coefficient equations are: 
Table E.36: Coefficients for correction coefficient equations for Plant 6. 
Fault Type Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
a 7.3274E-09 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
b -8.7461E-07 2.3834E-05 -6.3758E-05 -5.0521E-05 
c 1.9336E-05 -9.4261E-04 2.2646E-03 1.8419E-03 
d -1.1175E-06 2.9067E-05 -8.6526E-05 -6.8977E-05 
f 1.4564E-04 -4.6184E-03 1.1717E-02 9.2214E-03 
g -3.0666E-03 1.8673E-01 -4.1090E-01 -3.2841E-01 
h 3.8104E-05 -1.4051E-03 3.8428E-03 3.0451E-03 
k -5.7563E-03 2.2358E-01 3.8428E-03 -4.1691E-01 
m 7.3274E-09 -1.5021E-07 4.8098E-07 3.8523E-07 
     
These corrected coefficient equations are utilized in Equation 6.23 which is expressed as: 
𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖)
2 + 𝛾
𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖
(𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑟𝐷𝐺𝑖) + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
This gives a predicted short circuit current equation in the form: 
𝐼𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 = 𝐼𝑓𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖 × 𝑅𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑡𝐷𝐺𝑖          
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APPENDIX F 
 
RESULTS FOR USE OF THE PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION 
SCHEME WITH VARYING MICROGRID CONDITIONS 
F.1    Grid Condition 1 Results 
Table F.1: PSO inputs for grid condition 1. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PEN (%) 23.82 71.47 4.71 50.20 17.13 32.67 
Rating (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Irradiance (W/m2) 1000 
Wind speed (m/s) 11.24 
 
Table F.2: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 1. 
    Fault currents (A) 
Generation 
Plant 
  Three-Phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
1 
Predicted 178 194 195 272 
Actual 177 195 191 268 
2 
Predicted 221 276 467 635 
Actual 215 271 462 631 
3 
Predicted 20 23 45 50 
Actual 20 24 46 48 
4 
Predicted 214 288 538 861 
Actual 214 288 532 853 
5 
Predicted 83 60 155 165 
Actual 82 63 160 158 
6 
Predicted 344 356 362 318 
Actual 344 356 359 311 
Overall 
Predicted 1060 1197 1762 2301 
Actual 1049 1196 1800 2280 
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Table F.3: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 1 percentage differences. 
  Percentage difference (%) 
Generation Plant Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
1 0.56 0.51 2.05 1.47 
2 2.71 1.81 1.07 0.62 
3 0.00 4.34 2.22 4.00 
4 0.00 0.00 1.11 0.92 
5 1.20 5.00 3.22 4.24 
6 0.00 0.00 0.82 2.20 
Overall 1.03 0.08 2.15 0.91 
 
Table F.4: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for grid condition 1. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (phase) 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 2 2 0 2 0 2 
 
Table F.5: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 1 after tripping. 
  Fault current (A)     
Fault type Predicted Actual 
Percentage difference 
(%) 
Coordination 
restored? 
Three-Phase 669 672 0.45 Yes 
Line-to-Line 652 651 0.15 Yes 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
623 605 2.89 Yes 
Line-to-Ground 638 645 1.10 Yes 
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F.2    Grid Condition 2 Results 
Table F.6: PSO inputs for grid condition 2. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PEN (%) 100 0 0 0 0 100 
Rating (%) 100 0 0 0 0 100 
Irradiance (W/m2) 0 
Wind speed (m/s) 0 
Table F.7: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 2. 
  
Fault currents (A) 
Generation 
Plant 
 
Three-
Phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
1  Predicted 207 212 604 627 
Actual 200 204 582 599 
2  Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
3  Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
4  Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
5  Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
6  Predicted 368 357 608 646 
Actual 362 362 595 615 
Overall  Predicted 575 569 1212 1273 
Actual 559 564 1160 1240 
Table F.8: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 2 percentage differences. 
 
Percentage difference (%) 
Generation Plant Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
1 3.38 3.77 3.64 4.46 
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.63 1.40 2.13 4.79 
Overall 2.78 0.87 4.29 2.59 
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Table F.9: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for grid condition 2. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (phase) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 3 0 0 0 0 2 
 
Table F.10: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 2 after tripping. 
  Fault current (A)     
Fault type Predicted Actual 
Percentage difference 
(%) 
Coordination 
restored? 
Three-Phase 575 559 2.78 - 
Line-to-Line 569 564 0.88 - 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
606.4 620 2.24 Yes 
Line-to-Ground 638.4 645 1.03 Yes 
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F.3    Grid Condition 3 Results 
Table F.11: PSO inputs for grid condition 3. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PEN (%) 36.14 56.80 7.06 34.21 22.63 43.16 
Rating (%) 100 80.07 100 80.07 100 100 
Irradiance (W/m2) 1000 
Wind speed (m/s) 9 
Table F.12: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 3. 
    Fault currents (A) 
Generation 
Plant 
  
Three-
Phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
1 
Predicted 192 200 189 264 
Actual 185 206 196 268 
2 
Predicted 189 233 450 616 
Actual 196 240 463 614 
3 
Predicted 20 23 45 50 
Actual 19 23 44 51 
4 
Predicted 186 238 530 849 
Actual 190 245 529 840 
5 
Predicted 83 60 155 165 
Actual 81 59 153 160 
6 
Predicted 347 357 348 295 
Actual 349 368 357 282 
Overall 
Predicted 1017 1111 1717 2239 
Actual 1010 1116 1780 2190 
Table F.13: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 3 percentage differences. 
  Percentage difference (%) 
Generation Plant Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
1 3.64 3.00 3.70 1.51 
2 3.70 3.00 2.88 0.32 
3 5.00 0.00 2.22 2.00 
4 2.15 2.94 0.18 1.06 
5 2.40 1.66 1.29 3.03 
6 0.57 3.08 2.58 4.40 
Overall 0.68 0.45 3.66 2.18 
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Table F.14: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for grid condition 3. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (phase) 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 2 2 0 2 0 2 
 
Table F.15: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 3 after tripping. 
  Fault current (A)     
Fault type Predicted Actual 
Percentage difference 
(%) 
Coordination 
restored? 
Three-Phase 669 658 1.64 Yes 
Line-to-Line 652 651 0.15 Yes 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
623 610 2.09 Yes 
Line-to-Ground 638 630 1.25 Yes 
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F.4    Grid Condition 4 Results 
Table F.16: PSO inputs for grid condition 4. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PEN (%) 44.68 55.32 0.00 37.88 0.00 62.12 
Rating (%) 100 71.17 0.00 71.17 0.00 100 
Irradiance (W/m2) 0 
Wind speed (m/s) 8 
Table F.17: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 4. 
    Fault currents (A) 
Generation 
Plant 
  
Three-
Phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
1 
Predicted 199 204 200 273 
Actual 194 205 199 275 
2 
Predicted 198 215 462 612 
Actual 207 218 467 614 
3 
Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
4 
Predicted 192 226 571 846 
Actual 201 232 595 883 
5 
Predicted 0 0 0 0 
Actual 0 0 0 0 
6 
Predicted 353 357 371 323 
Actual 348 346 368 315 
Overall 
Predicted 942 1002 1604 2054 
Actual 944 1002 1655 2120 
Table F.18: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 4 percentage differences. 
  Percentage difference (%) 
Generation Plant Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
1 2.51 0.49 0.50 0.73 
2 4.54 1.39 1.08 0.32 
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 4.68 2.65 4.20 4.37 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.41 3.08 0.80 2.47 
Overall 0.21 0.00 3.17 3.21 
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Table F.19: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for grid condition 4. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (phase) 0 1 0 2 0 0 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 2 2 0 2 0 3 
 
Table F.20: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 4 after tripping. 
  Fault current (A)     
Fault type Predicted Actual 
Percentage difference 
(%) 
Coordination 
restored? 
Three-Phase 654 649 0.76 Yes 
Line-to-Line 663 670 2.00 Yes 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
605 614 1.49 Yes 
Line-to-Ground 633 626 1.11 Yes 
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F.5    Grid Condition 5 Results 
Table F.21: PSO inputs for grid condition 5. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PEN (%) 22.00 71.48 6.52 55.21 26.38 18.40 
Rating (%) 80 88.97 100 88.97 100 60 
Irradiance (W/m2) 1000 
Wind speed (m/s) 10 
Table F.22: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 5. 
    Fault currents (A) 
Generation 
Plant 
  
Three-
Phase 
Line-to-
Line 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
Line-to-
Ground 
1 
Predicted 174 185 191 268 
Actual 174 188 190 256 
2 
Predicted 220 262 473 633 
Actual 210 252 488 626 
3 
Predicted 20 23 45 50 
Actual 19 23 47 48 
4 
Predicted 206 260 576 851 
Actual 209 250 568 852 
5 
Predicted 83 60 155 165 
Actual 80 62 160 158 
6 
Predicted 316 320 316 308 
Actual 311 324 318 311 
Overall 
Predicted 1019 1110 1756 2275 
Actual 993 1060 1802 2198 
Table F.23: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 5 percentage differences. 
  Percentage difference (%) 
Generation Plant Three-Phase Line-to-Line Line-to-Line-to-Ground Line-to-Ground 
1 0.00 1.62 0.52 4.47 
2 4.54 3.81 3.17 1.10 
3 5.00 0.00 4.44 4.00 
4 1.45 3.84 1.38 0.11 
5 3.61 3.33 3.22 4.24 
6 1.58 1.25 0.63 0.97 
Overall 2.55 4.50 2.61 3.38 
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Table F.24: Outputs from the proposed scheme’s PSO for grid condition 5. 
Generation Plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of generators to trip (phase) 1 1 0 2 0 0 
Number of generators to trip (ground) 2 2 0 2 0 2 
 
Table F.25: Predicted and actual fault currents for grid condition 5 after tripping. 
  Fault current (A)     
Fault type Predicted Actual 
Percentage difference 
(%) 
Coordination 
restored? 
Three-Phase 670 664 0.90 Yes 
Line-to-Line 677 662 2.22 Yes 
Line-to-Line-to-
Ground 
572 570 0.35 Yes 
Line-to-Ground 617 625 1.30 Yes 
 
